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Campaign-finance reform is currently stalled. A series of recent Supreme
Court decisions culminating in Citizens United v. FEC, which rejected limits
on corporate and union spending on electioneering communications,1
undermined the bipartisan campaign-finance-reform legislation that the Court
largely approved less than a decade ago in McConnell v. FCC.2 Both public3
and scholarly4 reaction to Citizens United has been sharply negative, with
critics viewing the decision as an invitation to electoral domination by
corporate money and special interests.5 For many, Citizens United has become
a worrisome symbol of the Court’s overall turn toward deregulation of
campaign finance.6 Although the 2010 midterm elections—the most expensive

1. See 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010).
2. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–456 (2006)); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224
(2003) (upholding most of the 2002 BCRA’s provisions, including the “electioneering
communication” provisions and the “soft money” ban), overruled in part by Citizens United, 130
S. Ct. at 913.
3. See, e.g., PUB. CITIZEN, 12 MONTHS AFTER: THE EFFECTS OF CITIZENS UNITED ON
ELECTIONS AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 17–22 (2011), available
at http://www.citizen.org/documents/citizens-united-20110113.pdf; Dan Eggen, Corporate
Sponsorship Is a Campaign Issue on Which Both Parties Can Agree, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2010,
at A15; Barry Friedman & Dahlia Lithwick, Speeding Locomotive: Did the Roberts Court
Misjudge the Public Mood on Campaign Finance Reform?, SLATE (Jan. 25, 2010, 2:09 PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2242557.
4. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Decision that Threatens Democracy, 57 N.Y. REV.
BOOKS 63, 63 (2010).
5. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, No Middle Ground? Reflections on the Citizens United
Decision, 96 IOWA L. REV. 649, 650 (2011); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE
L.J. 978, 1025 (2011); Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign
Finance After Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643, 660–61 (2011); Richard L.
Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 582–83 (2011);
Deborah Hellman, Money Talks but It Isn’t Speech, 95 MINN. L. REV. 953, 954–55 (2011);
Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1829474; Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143, 176 (2010); Justin J. Wert, Ronald
Keith Gaddie & Charles S. Bullock, III, Of Benedick and Beatrice: Citizens United and the Reign
of the Laggard Court, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 719, 719–20 (2011); Molly J. Walker
Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign Speech After Citizens United, 31 CARDOZO. L.
REV. 2365, 2368–69 (2010). But see Joel M. Gora, The First Amendment . . . United, 27 GA. ST.
U. L. REV. 935, 935 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court properly protected citizens’ civil
liberties in Citizens United).
6. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 5, at 643–44 (stating the decision “crystallized for many
people the concern that corporate money dominates American politics”).
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in recent history7—do not appear to have confirmed critics’ most hyperbolic
predictions about corporate domination of political advertising,8 the data do
suggest a striking post-Citizens United political picture.9 Many of the
independent political ads that aired after Citizens United did not include any
meaningful donor identification, and there is little reason to believe this will
change.10 Simply put, the 2012 presidential election season will likely feature
extensive and largely negative “independent” advertising, sponsored by
shadowy third-party organizations sporting identity-concealing names and
funded by undisclosed partisan donors.11
This is the feared “Citizens United effect”: Non-candidate groups, carefully
structured to take advantage of the limits to election-law disclosure
requirements, spending potentially unlimited funds to air veiled partisan
political ads without accountability to voters.12
This environment of disguised advertising is at odds with Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s political vision in Citizens United itself—a vision of balance, in
which the accountability promoted by effective public disclosure would
neutralize the potential electoral harms of unlimited corporate expenditures.13
However, according to election-law authority Professor Richard Hasen,
“Justice Kennedy’s utopian information-flowing vision of the U.S.
campaign-finance system is now no more than a dream.”14
7. See Paul Blumenthal, The Citizens United Effect: 40 Percent of Outside Money Made
Possible by Supreme Court Ruling, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Nov. 4, 2010, 1:43 PM), http://sunlight
foundation.com/blog/2010/11/04/the-citizens-united-effect-40-percent-of-outside-money-madepossible-by-supreme-court-ruling/; Kathleen Ronayne, OpenSecrets.org Unveils 2010 ‘Big
Picture’ Analysis, OPENSECRETS.ORG (July 26, 2011, 7:20 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org
/news/2011/07/2010-election-big-picture.html.
8. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 5, at 643–44 (noting the satirical aftereffect of
corporations running in a congressional election); Walker Wilson, supra note 5, at 2366–67 &
nn.8, 12 (identifying the critical prediction that Citizens United will lead to foreign entities
bankrolling elections and will have a destructive effect on the system).
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See infra notes 107–22 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part I.C; see also Kim Barker & Marian Wang, Super PACs and Dark
Money: ProPublica’s Guide to the New World of Campaign Finance, PROPUBLICA (July 11,
2011, 1:38 PM), http://www.propublica.org/blog/item/super PACs-propublicas-guide-to-the-newworld-of-campaign-finance (predicting that the 2012 election season will set a new record for
election spending due to a wide array of organizations capable of hiding funding sources).
12. See, e.g., BILL DE BLASIO, THE PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK,
CITIZENS UNITED AND THE 2010 MIDTERM ELECTIONS 26 (2010), available at http://advocate
.nyc.gov/files/12-06-10CitizensUnitedReport.pdf; see also CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUSTICE, TRANSPARENT ELECTIONS AFTER CITIZENS UNITED 3 (2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1776482 (discussing corporations’ and unions’ ability to be involved in
elections by spending through intermediaries, which does not require disclosure following
Citizens United).
13. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010).
14. Richard L. Hasen, Justice Kennedy’s Mistaken Citizens United Vision and the Lurch
Toward Campaign Finance Deregulation, ACSBLOG (Jan. 21, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acs
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The fear of a political landscape distorted by massive amounts of veiled
advertising has led opponents of Citizens United to seek help from Congress,
the states, the Federal Election Commission (FEC), the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), the courts, and the White House.15 Abandoning efforts to
achieve wide-ranging reform of the electoral system, many campaign
reformers have shifted their focus to the mitigating effects of mandated
disclosure requirements.16 The remainder has turned its attention away from
traditional campaign-finance regulation to alternative reformist strategies, such
as lobbying regulation.17
Yet, the efforts of post-Citizens United reformers, which thus far have been
directed toward influencing a predictable group of decision makers,18 have
either failed or are still pending, subject to delay.19 In the meantime, the 2012
presidential election season is already in full swing.20 American politics has
switched to an electoral mode of “permanent campaign,”21 and money is
Therefore,
already flowing into third-party political advertisements.22
policymakers should aggressively explore alternative avenues to mitigate the
negative consequences of Citizens United.
Because expenditures for political advertising are still principally focused on
television and cable,23 Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulation
could help realize the speech-and-disclosure-based vision of electoral
democracy in Citizens United.24 Indeed, having recognized this possibility, the

blog/justice-kennedy’s-mistaken-citizens-united-vision-and-the-lurch-toward-campaign-financedere.
15. See infra Part I.C.
16. See infra Part I.C. Congress considered legislation that required increased donor
disclosure, and state legislators passed similar statutes. See infra notes 181–89.
17. See Heather Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, 27 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1155, 1155, 1159, 1161–65 (2011); Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 4, 43–45);
see also Michael S. Kang, The Campaign Finance Debated After Citizens United, 27 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 1142, 1153 (2011) (“Citizens United . . . leaves no promising avenue to reform for those
concerned about the influence of money in politics.”).
18. See infra Part I.C.
19. Gerken, supra note 17, at 1155 (“Citizens United . . . cut off most of the traditional
pathways for campaign finance reform.”); see infra notes 190–97 and accompanying text.
20. See Matea Gold & Melanie Mason, Independent Groups Getting a Head Start on 2012
Campaign, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/17/nation/la-naoutside-spending-20110717.
21. See Jeanne Cummings, Don’t Adjust Your Set: Now Campaign Ads Never End,
POLITICO (Mar. 18, 2011, 4:38 AM), www.politico.com/news/stories/0311/51535.html (internal
quotation marks omitted). For arguments that a clear distinction between governance and
campaigning no longer exists, see generally THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN AND ITS FUTURE
(Norman J. Ornstein & Thomas E. Mann eds., 2000).
22. See Gold & Mason, supra note 20 (noting the early start of independent-group political
ads for the 2012 presidential election).
23. See, e.g., id.
24. See infra Parts II–III.
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advocacy group Media Access Project (MAP) recently filed a petition with the
FCC requesting that the agency expand its current sponsorship disclosure rules
for political ads to include the disclosure of funding sources for independent
electoral advertisements.25
This Article argues that the FCC can use communications law to regulate
electoral advertising by independent advocacy groups. First, the FCC has the
statutory authority to require third-party purchasers of airtime for political and
advocacy advertising to disclose their major direct and indirect funding sources
Extra-governmental
and principal directors, officers, or operators.26
approaches can also be developed to promote voluntary adoption of disclosure
rules by electronic media.27
Second, the FCC can adopt a rule grounded on a dormant FCC
doctrine—colloquially known as the “Zapple doctrine” or the “quasi-public
opportunities rule”28—to constrain broadcaster partisanship in airtime sales to
third-party advocacy groups.29 Thus, the FCC can deploy regulatory precedent
to mandate overall broadcaster evenhandedness in airing non-candidate
political advertising.30 Moreover, if the FCC reaffirms its prior view that
broadcasters airing political advertisements by supporters or opponents of
candidates are not immune from liability for defamation, as they would be with
respect to ads by candidates themselves, broadcasters might voluntarily engage
in more searching review of non-candidate political ads.
Although the Zapple doctrine has been associated with the now-defunct
fairness doctrine,31 the legitimacy of such a quasi-equal opportunities
regulation does not depend on the fairness doctrine.32 Nor must the equal
opportunities provision under section 315 of the Communications Act of
25. Petition for Rulemaking at 1, Amendment of 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (Fed. Commc’ns
Comm’n filed Mar. 12, 2011), available at http://ecfsdocs.fcc.gov/filings/2011/03/22/
6016374308.html (hereinafter MAP Petition); see also Paul Blumenthal, Super PACs and Secret
Money: The Unregulated Shadow Campaign, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 27, 2011, 1:49 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/26.
/super PACs-secret-money-campaign-finance_n_977699.html; John Yoo & David W. Marston,
Overruling Citizens United with Chicago-Style Politics: Federal Contract Bidders Must Disclose
Political Giving, LEGAL OUTLOOK (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Pol’y Res., Wash., D.C.), July
2011, at 1, 4, available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/LO-2011-07-No-2-g.pdf (noting the
significance of the proposed rule change and positing that its implementation would unduly
expand current FEC disclosure requirements, chill political speech, and provide a powerful new
tool for the FCC).
26. See infra Part II.A.1.
27. See infra Part II.B.4.
28. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
29. See infra Part II.B.2.
30. See infra Part II.B.
31. LaVonda N. Reed-Huff, Political Advertisements in the Era of Fleeting Indecent Images
and Utterances, 84 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 199, 212 (2010) (noting the survival of the Zapple
doctrine).
32. See infra Part II.
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193433 be read to incorporate ads by independent third-party groups. Rather,
the FCC can adapt Zapple to the modern electoral picture under its ancillary
Particularly when exercise of ancillary authority would
authority.34
specifically promote the congressional values behind the political-advertising
provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, an FCC revival and adaptation
of the Zapple principle would avoid the critiques of ancillary authority that the
agency has encountered in the past.
This is not to say, as some skeptics of disclosure might contend, that the
FCC should affirmatively require broadcasters and perhaps even cable
companies to air a rich array of political programming choices to mitigate the
purported ill effects of manipulative advocacy advertising. It would be both
unwise and constitutionally questionable for the FCC to adopt affirmative
programming obligations to induce enhanced commitments to political
programming by broadcasters and cable operators, regardless of the repeated
trope of television as a “vast wasteland.”35
Part I.A provides an overview of Citizens United and its legal context. Part
I.B discusses attempts to cabin campaign reform after Citizens United. Part I.C
describes the “Citizens United effect” in election contests, summarizing current
empirical findings about the 2010 elections and describing several harms
(other than electoral outcomes) that can be attributed to the Court’s
campaign-finance deregulation, and addressing the 2012 presidential contest.
Part I.D reviews the various approaches proposed by campaign-finance-reform
advocates in response to the Citizens United line of campaign-finance cases.
Part II describes the statutes and FCC regulations applicable to political
advertising, addressing both legislative history and the policy question raised
by further involving the FCC in campaign-finance matters. Part II.A describes
the FCC’s political advertising rules.
Part II.B focuses on the
sponsorship-identification requirement of 47 U.S.C. § 317. It addresses what
an FCC-based disclosure regime might look like, tackles the desirability of an
FCC-based donor-disclosure regime from constitutional and policy
standpoints, and discusses the arguments to induce broadcasters’ voluntary
adoption of donor disclosure rules. Part II.C looks at the possible revival of an
antidiscrimination rule like the FCC’s Zapple doctrine as a way of ensuring
roughly equal airtime opportunities to supporters and opponents of candidates.
It also explores whether FCC action should be grounded in § 315 itself or
under the FCC’s ancillary authority.
Part III.A raises the question of institutional choice, concluding that the
Commission is an appropriate participant in the attempt to improve campaigns.
33. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 315, 48 Stat. 1064, 1089 (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2006)).
34. See infra Part II.
35. See James Warren, Never Mind the ‘Vast Wasteland.’ Minow Has More to Say, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 2011, www.nytimes.com/2011/05/08/us/08cncwarren.html (referring to former
FCC Chairman Newton Minow’s now-iconic description of television).
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Finally, Part III.B discusses the limits of FCC intervention, concluding that it
would be unwise for the agency to impose an affirmative politicalprogramming obligation on broadcasters or cable operators to mitigate the
potential skewing effects of Citizens United and the judicial rejection of
campaign-finance reform.
I. CITIZENS UNITED AND ITS AFTERMATH
Citizens United unleashed a passionate debate and apocalyptic predictions
about the future of American politics and democracy.36 In response to the
decision, critics predicted the expenditure of vast sums of corporate money that
would dominate political debate and steamroll electoral outcomes.37 Many
scholars worried that Citizens United and other developments in election law
would result in various democratic harms arising from the hidden uses of
Although some
concentrated wealth for partisan political purposes.38
commentators see Citizens United as simply an incremental element in the
Court’s dismantling of campaign-finance reform,39 most recognize that “[e]ven
if Citizens United’s incremental impact is mild, it nevertheless has the feel of a
final straw.”40 As summarized by election-law expert Professor Michael Kang,
“Citizens United marks the end of campaign-finance law as we knew it.”41

36. See, e.g., Donna F. Edwards, A Call to Bold Action, BOS. REV., Sept./Oct. 2010, at
23–24 (“The Citizens United ruling will go down in history as one of the Supreme Court’s worst
decisions—the Dred Scott of our time.”); see also Briffault, supra note 5, at 643 (characterizing
most of the popular and academic commentary on Citizens United as “critical”).
37. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Analysis: A New
Law to Offset Citizens United?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 21, 2010, 4:00 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/analysis-a-new-law-to-offset-citizens-united/ (quoting President Barak
Obama’s assertion that Citizens United “has given a green light to a new stampede of special
interest money in our politics”); see also Michael Malone, Report: O & Os Big Beneficiaries
&
CABLE
(Jan.
26,
2010),
of
‘10
Political
Cash,
BROADCASTING
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/445944-Report_O_Os_Big_Beneficiaries_of_10_Political_Cash.php (quoting the comment that “[a]fter Citizens United, [2010] will be a highlycaffeinated political season” that is expected to generate as much as $3 billion in political
spending).
38. See supra notes 3, 5 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 5, at 644 (“[T]he impact of Citizens United may
ultimately have less to do with corporate spending and more with the changes the decision could
lead to in other areas of campaign finance . . . .”).
40. See Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
217, 217 (2010); cf. Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 14) (observing that the consequences of
the decision reach beyond the protection of corporate speech and have resulted in a new
campaign-finance landscape).
41. Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 14).
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A. Citizens United in Its Legal Context
Federal law has regulated campaign finance in American elections since the
early twentieth century.42 Since the 1970s, campaign finance has received
particularly intense congressional attention,43 which resulted in two major
statutes: the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)44 and the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), which significantly
amended the FECA.45 The BCRA, principally designed to close perceived
gaps in the FECA,46 banned soft money fund-raising by national parties,
federal candidates, and officeholders in federal elections, and also restricted
issue advocacy before elections.47 A sharply divided Supreme Court upheld
most of the BCRA’s provisions against a facial constitutional challenge in its
2003 McConnell v. FEC decision.48
Soon after, in a series of decisions preceding Citizens United, the Supreme
Court began striking down various aspects of the BCRA as applied.49 In 2006,
the Court struck down the expenditure and contribution limits in Vermont’s
campaign-finance system in Randall v. Sorrell.50 One year later, in FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), the Court reviewed an as-applied
challenge to the BCRA’s electioneering-communication ban and issued a
plurality opinion, which held that corporations could spend money to air
pre-election advertisements if the ads could be interpreted as something other
than “express advocacy” to vote for or against candidates.51 WRTL
“effectively eviscerated McConnell” and subverted the BCRA’s ban on
electioneering communications.52 In the 2008 decision in Davis v. FEC, the
42. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 41542, THE STATE OF CAMPAIGN
FINANCE POLICY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1 & n.1 (2011)
(describing the 1907 Tillman Act, which Congress enacted to prohibit federally created campaign
contributions from banks and corporations).
43. Id. at 3 (“[A]pproximately 900 campaign finance measures have been introduced since
the 93[rd] Congress . . . .”).
44. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–435 (2006)).
45. BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§§ 431–456 (2006)); GARRETT, supra note 42, at 3.
46. S. REP. NO. 105–167, at 4468 (1998) (“[S]oft money spending by political party
committees eviscerates the ability of the FECA to limit the funds contributed by individuals,
corporations, or unions for the defect or benefit of specific candidates.”).
47. BCRA, sec. 101, § 323, 116 Stat. at 82–84; id. § 201, 116 Stat. at 88–90.
48. 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003) (“In the main we uphold BCRA’s two principal,
complementary features: the control of soft money and the regulation of electioneering
communications.”), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
49. See Levitt, supra note 40, at 219–20 (discussing cases leading up to Citizens United).
50. 548 U.S. 230, 262 (2006).
51. 551 U.S. 449, 456, 476 (2007).
52. Briffault, supra note 5, at 649–50 (“So long as they paid a little attention to the wording
of their messages, corporations and unions were once again free to spend as much as they wanted
on broadcast ads intended to help or harm candidates in the pre-election period.”).

2011]

Plan B for Campaign Finance Reform

105

Court rejected the BCRA’s “Millionaire’s Amendment,” which had permitted
additional fundraising for congressional candidates competing against selffinanced opponents to help level the financial playing field.53
Citizens United, the fourth case in this series,54 concerned section 203 of the
BCRA, which prohibited corporations and unions from making independent
expenditures of general treasury funds for broadcast, cable, and satellite
“electioneering communications”55 that explicitly mentioned candidates for
federal office and aired within thirty days of a primary election or caucus or
within sixty days of a general election or caucus.56 In an opinion filled with
sweeping constitutional pronouncements,57 Justice Kennedy, speaking for the
eight-person majority, found that the BCRA’s restrictions on such independent

53. 554 U.S. 724, 729, 744–49 (2008).
54. For the fifth decision in this series, see Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (striking down the matching-funds provision in Arizona’s
Citizens Clean Elections Act on First Amendment grounds).
55. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)).
The BCRA defines an “independent expenditure” as an expenditure “expressly advocating the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate . . . that is not made in concert or cooperation
with or at the request or suggestion of such candidates, the candidate’s authorized political
committee, as their agents, or a political party committee or its agents.” BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107155, sec. 211, § 301(17), 116 Stat. 81, 92–93 (2002) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431
(2006)).
The facts of Citizens United are as follows. Citizens United, an ideological nonprofit group,
produced a feature-length film called Hillary: The Movie criticizing Hillary Clinton, which the
group sought to show in theaters during the 2008 primaries and on cable, specifically video-ondemand. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886–87. Although the movie did not explicitly advocate
voting against Senator Clinton, it contained many negative statements, which the FEC considered,
and the Court later held, to be the functional equivalent of express advocacy. Id. at 890. In
Citizens United’s ensuing suit against the FEC, the district court sided with the FEC and held that
the statements triggered the BCRA electioneering-communication limits on express advocacy.
Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 275, 279–80 (D.D.C. 2008) (per curiam), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). The Supreme Court dismissed Citizens United’s appeal
of the district court’s denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction. Citizens United v. FEC,
552 U.S. 1278, 1278 (2008). Thereafter, the district court granted summary judgment for the
FEC based on the same reasoning used to denying the preliminary injunction. Citizens United v.
FEC, No. 07-2240, 2008 WL 2788753, at *1 (D.D.C. July 18, 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). The case returned to the Supreme Court in 2008. Citizens United v. FEC,
555 U.S. 1028, 1028 (2008). In 2009, the Court requested supplemental briefing on whether the
disposition of the case would require overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,
which held that Michigan could ban the use of corporate funds for independent political
expenditures, or McConnell to the extent that it upheld the facial validity of BCRA’s section 203.
Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 2893, 2893 (2009); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652, 654, 660 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876. The Court issued
its final decision on the issue in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
56. BCRA, sec. 201, § 304(f)(3)(A), 116 Stat. at 88–89 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 434 (2006)).
57. See Bezanson, supra note 5, at 649–51 (arguing that Justice Kennedy’s sweeping
pronouncements about the First Amendment were unnecessary to the result).
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expenditures violated corporations’ First Amendment rights.58 Nevertheless,
the Court concluded, using “exacting” scrutiny, that the BCRA’s disclaimer
and disclosure provisions passed constitutional muster as applied because
“disclosure is a less restrictive alternative to more comprehensive regulations
of speech.”59 Justice Kennedy’s opinion envisioned a marketplace of political
information in which anyone—corporation or individual—might speak, and
everyone listening would have efficient access to sufficient information to
weigh the credibility of what was said.60
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its view, previously articulated in the iconic
Buckley v. Valeo, that “disclosure could be justified based on a governmental
interest in ‘provid[ing] the electorate with information’ about the sources of
election-related spending.”61 Such information “would help citizens ‘make

58. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 917. The majority declared that, “[w]e return to the
principle . . . that the Government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s
corporate identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the political speech of
nonprofit or for-profit corporations.” Id. at 913. In reaching its conclusion, the majority
overruled Austin and partially overruled McConnell, which had permitted limits on corporate
independent expenditures. Id.
59. Id. at 915. Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia
Sotomayor concurred with the majority in sustaining the disclosure provisions. Id. at 931
(Stevens, J., concurring). Although “[d]isclaimer and disclosure requirements may burden the
ability to speak, . . . they ‘impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities,’ or ‘prevent anyone
from speaking.’” Id. at 914 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
BCRA section 311 requires televised electioneering communications that are not funded by
candidates to include a disclaimer identifying the person or entity “responsible for the content of
this advertising.” BCRA, sec. 311, § 318(d)(2), 116 Stat. at 106 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 411d (2006)). The required disclaimer must be made “in a clearly spoken manner,” displayed
in a “clearly readable manner” for at least four seconds, and state that a candidate or a candidate’s
committee has not authorized the ad. Id. Such disclaimers must be made by any person spending
more than $10,000 on electioneering communications within a calendar year, and they must
identify the person making the expenditure, the expenditure amount, the election in question, and
the names of certain contributors. BCRA, sec. 207, § 304(f), 116 Stat. at 88 (codified as amended
at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)). The Court rejected Citizens United’s claim that the disclosure requirements
“must be confined to speech that is the functional equivalent of express advocacy,” thereby
seeking to exclude issue ads, which do not necessarily advocate for a candidate, from the
requirements. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915.
60. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (“The First Amendment protects political speech; and
disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper
way. This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight
to different speakers and messages.”). Shortly after Citizens United, the Court reaffirmed its
endorsement of disclosure in Doe v. Reed, in which it upheld a state law allowing public
disclosure of the names of those who signed a petition in favor of Proposition 8, a referendum
concerning gay marriage. 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2821 (2010). The Court reiterated the importance of
the state’s interest in “‘protect[ing] the integrity and reliability of the initiative process . . . .’” Id.
at 2819 (quoting Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Fund, Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 191 (1999)).
61. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (alteration in original) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 66 (1976) (per curiam)). In Buckley, the Supreme Court upheld the Federal Election
Campaign Act’s disclosure rules regarding express advocacy on the grounds that disclosure deters
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informed choices in the political marketplace.’”62 The Court concluded that
disclosure would be particularly effective at informing the electorate today
because modern technology increases the speed and accessibility of
disclosure.63
B. Post-Citizens United: Attempts to Cabin Campaign Reform
Lower court decisions after Citizens United continued the trend toward
cabining campaign-finance reform,64 and later developments cast doubt on the
viability of Justice Kennedy’s political vision “of a free exchange of ideas in a
democratic marketplace, coupled with complete and instantaneous disclosure
of campaign contributions and expenditures over the Internet.”65
On the state front, opponents of campaign-finance reform began to target
and challenge state disclosure laws.66 On the administrative front, the FEC
corruption, provides information to voters, and aids in the enforcement of other campaign-finance
laws. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 18–76.
62. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (citations omitted) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540
U.S. 93, 197 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913). This informational
interest permits disclosure requirements even if the advertisement merely contains a request to
perform a commercial transaction because “the public has an interest in knowing who is speaking
about a candidate shortly before an election.” Id. at 915.
63. For the Court’s discussion of the role of modern technology, see id. at 916 (“With the
advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure . . . can provide . . . the information needed to hold
corporations and elected officials accountable . . . . Shareholders can determine whether their
corporation’s political speech advances the corporation’s interest in making profits, and citizens
can see whether elected officials are ‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests.” (quoting
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 259)).
64. See, e.g., SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that
contributions to PACs that themselves only make independent expenditures to advocate or oppose
the election of federal candidates cannot be limited on an anti-corruption rationale because
Citizens United established that “independent expenditures do not corrupt or give the appearance
of corruption as a matter of law,” to entities that only engage in independent expenditures). The
contributions permitted under SpeechNow “will greatly expand the resources available to [such
political committees] and is likely to result in an increased role for them in elections.” Briffault,
supra note 5, at 660–61. Notably, however, the D.C. Circuit rejected SpeechNow’s challenge to
the reporting requirements at issue. SpeechNow.org, 599 F.3d at 697. The FEC codified
SpeechNow.org by sanctioning the super PAC, which can raise funds without constraint from
contribution limits because it is an independent-expenditure entity. See Kang, supra note 5
(manuscript at 24) (citing FEC Advisory Opinion No. 2010-09 (July 22, 2010)).
More recently, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, upon a motion for
reconsideration of its previous ruling dismissing a charge for violating the ban on direct
contributions of corporate money to candidates, relied on Citizens United to find the ban
unconstitutional as applied under the facts. United States v. Danielczyk, No. 1:11cr85(JCC),
2011 WL 2268063, at *2–6 (E.D. Va. June 7, 2011) (extending the Citizens United’s
holding—that independent expenditures do not corrupt—to direct contributions to candidates).
65. Hasen, supra note 14.
66. See PR Watcher, Center for Media and Democracy Submits Amicus Brief Defending
Campaign Disclosure Rules, PRWATCH (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.prwatch.org/news/2011/03
/10325/center-media-and-democracy-submits-amicus-brief-defending-campaign-disclosure-rul
(noting a Koch-funded group’s challenge, brought in the Wisconsin Supreme Court, to new
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deadlocked along partisan lines in response to an attempt by the three
The
Democratic commissioners to adopt stricter disclosure rules.67
agency—once criticized as “the most dysfunctional and inoperative agency in
Washington”68—even interpreted existing disclosure rules narrowly.69
As for outside groups, loopholes and limitations in existing election
disclosure rules enabled strategic institutional arrangements resulting in a
patchwork of political groups that were able to campaign and advertise with
“dark money.”70
disclosure rules Wisconsin passed in the wake of Citizens United); Washington Post: Citizens
United Decision Reverberates in Courts Across Country, DEMOCRACY 21 (May 22, 2011),
http://www.democracy21.org/index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC=%7BAC81D4FF-0476-4E28-B9B17619D271A334%7D&DE=%7BCEAE65A4-BE66-40C3-A92F-CD54BAA4F7D6%7D
(reporting that James Bopp, the legal architect of the Citizens United challenge, and his
colleagues are litigating between twenty-five and thirty cases across the country, including
challenges to state disclosure rules); see also David D. Kirkpatrick, A Quest to End Spending
Rules for Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2010, at A11 (noting Bopp’s explicit
acknowledgement of his goal to dismantle disclosure rules). But see Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Has
the Tide Turned in Favor of Disclosure? Revealing Money in Politics After Citizens United and
Doe v. Reed, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1057, 1084 (2011) (“Overwhelmingly, lower courts are
upholding state disclosure laws [so long as] the laws capture more than tiny spenders
and . . . parties can assert an as-applied harassment exception to otherwise applauded disclosure
laws.” (footnote omitted)); Adam Liptak, A Blockbuster Case Yields an Unexpected Result, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/us/disclosure-may-be-real-legacy-ofcitizens-united-case.html (noting that lower courts “embraced the ruling” in Citizens United and
relied on it when rebutting attacks against disclosure laws).
67. David G. Savage & Kim Geiger, Secret Campaign Ad Financing in Offing as FEC Is
Deadlocked, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/28/nation/la-naelection-commission-deadlock-20110228; Richard L. Hasen, The FEC Is As Good As Dead,
SLATE (Jan. 25, 2011, 10:13 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence
/2011/01/the_fec_is_as_good_as_dead.html.
68. Savage & Geiger, supra note 67 (quoting Fred Wertheimer, who was involved in the
creation of the FEC); see also Hasen, supra note 67 (referring to the FEC “as good as dead” in
light of the deadlock, which is “business as usual” for the agency).
69. See Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 24–25 & n.128); see also TAYLOR LINCOLN &
CRAIG HOLMAN, PUB. CITIZEN, FADING DISCLOSURE: INCREASING NUMBER OF
ELECTIONEERING GROUPS KEEP DONORS’ IDENTITIES SECRET 4–5 (2010), available at
http://www.citizen.org/
documents/Disclosure-report-final.pdf (discussing the FEC’s disclosure exceptions, including the
agency’s interpretation of its rules to require disclosure only if donors earmarked their money for
specific electioneering communications at the time of contribution). Recently, the FEC
unanimously approved federal-candidate and officeholder solicitations for independent,
expenditure-only Political Action Committees (PACs). See Lisa Rosenberg, Semi-Soft Money
Prevails at the FEC, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (June 30, 2011, 2:55 PM), http://sunlight
foundation.com/blog/2011/06/30/semi-soft-money-prevails-at-the-fec/ (“[C]andidates and elected
officials may only ask for contributions of $5,000 or less from individuals, but the Super PACs
are free to take unlimited contributions from individuals, corporations and labor unions.”).
70. See, e.g., Andy Kroll, Unmasking Dark Money Is Good for Democracy—and for the
Bottom Line, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 7, 2011, 9:35 AM), http://motherjones.com/mojo/2011/09/
citizens-united-dark-money-corporations-disclosure (defining “dark money” as money from
anonymous fundraisers). For a description of “campaign finance disclosure in a nutshell,” see
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C. The Citizens United Effect(s)
Although the Citizens United decision is important standing alone, the case
also served as a catalyst for increased public attention to the broader issue of
campaign-finance deregulation and corporate campaign involvement.71
Professor Richard Hasen pointed to several of its troublesome factors in
summing up the current landscape of campaign-finance reform: “Citizens
United has not only unleashed new money into the election process; actions by
lower courts and the FEC, combined with an inadequate disclosure regime,
have led to a system of largely undisclosed corporate, union, and individual
campaign contributions flooding into elections.”72

TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 12, at 4–5 (describing some of the confusion about loopholes in
campaign-finance disclosure).
Existing campaign-finance disclosure rules are limited in both comprehensiveness and
effectiveness. Even entities clearly subject to reporting and disclosure requirements need not
provide timely information; often, they do not provide details of last-minute pre-election spending
until thirty days post-election. GARRETT, supra note 42, at 18. FEC analysis often causes
significant subsequent delays to public disclosure, meaning that sometimes “final” data are not
publicly available for some time after elections. Id. Moreover, because there are exemptions to
electronic filing requirements, the public does not have convenient digital access to the full scope
of historically filed information. Id.
There are also loopholes in the FECA disclosure requirements that enable groups to be
exempt. See Barker & Wang, supra note 11 (describing the categories of groups to which the
disclosure requirements do not apply). Some organizations registered under § 501(c)(4) through
(6) of the Internal Revenue Code are not subject to campaign-finance disclosure requirements, so
long as their primary purpose is not politics. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 501(c) (2006). However, this
limitation does not prohibit all political activities. Despite the primary-purpose limit, for
example, the IRS has permitted 501(c)(4) social-service organizations to make political
expenditures. See Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 24–25) (citing Donald B. Tobin, Political
Advocacy and Taxable Entities: Are They the Next “Loophole?”, 6 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV.
41 (2007)). Similarly, trade associations registered under § 501(c)(6), such as the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce, are not prohibited from political activities, and such trade associations have spent
significant amounts of money on issue advertising during political campaigns. See infra notes
157–58 and accompanying text.
71. See Briffault, supra note 5, at 643, 650 (noting that although “WRTL did much of the
real work of legally enabling corporate electioneering,” “Citizens United has gotten the public’s
attention as the decision that opened up federal and many state elections to corporate ads
concerning candidates”); Marian Wang, As Political Groups Push Envelope, FEC Gridlock Gives
‘De Facto Green Light,’ PROPUBLICA (Nov. 7, 2011, 12:16 PM), http://www.propublica.org
/article/as-political-donors-push-envelope-fec-gridlock-gives-de-facto-green-light/single
(discussing the polarization between Republican and Democratic groups).
72. See Hasen, supra note 14; see also, supra note 5 (manuscript at 25) (“[P]ost-Citizens
United, these outside groups that engage in forthright and extensive campaigning, in the form of
independent expenditures, operate entirely outside campaign finance regulation as it had existed
for more than thirty years since Buckley.”); Richard L. Hasen, After the Other Shoe Drops, AM.
INT. (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1141 (discussing
three post-Citizens United rulings that “have contributed to the precipitous decline in our
campaign finance laws”).
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In his first State of the Union address, President Obama spoke for many
when he criticized the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision and predicted
a tsunami of electioneering expenditures by corporate and special interests:
With all due deference to separation of powers, last week, the
Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I believe will open the
floodgates for special interests—including foreign corporations—to
spend without limit in our elections. . . . I don’t think American
elections should be bankrolled by America’s most powerful interests,
or worse, by foreign entities. . . . They should be decided by the
American people. And I’d urge Democrats and Republicans to pass
a bill that helps to correct some of these problems.73
Academics, too, expressed concern that Citizens United would not only lead
to corporate dominance of political discourse,74 but also to an increase in quid
pro quo corruption.75 These arguments all raise the empirical question of what
effect Citizens United has had and will continue to have on elections.76
1. Data Regarding, and Notable Aspects of, the 2010 Elections
Any attempt to describe the Citizens United effect empirically is limited by
the scarcity of data.77 Because only one election cycle has passed since
Citizens United, and a non-presidential contest at that, empirical predictions
are risky. Nevertheless, at least five aspects of the 2010 elections are notable.
First, each 2010 election study shows that campaign advertising as a whole
significantly increased, making 2010 a “record-breaking” year.78 Roughly
73. Barack Obama, President of the United States, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27,
2010), available at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-state-union-address.
74. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 5, at 596; Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 11) (explaining
corporate support for restrictions on corporate electioneering as resulting from a concern about “a
form of extortion against deep-pocket corporations by . . . legislators”); Timothy Werner, The
Sound, the Fury, and the Nonevent: Business Power and Market Reactions to the Citizens United
Decision, 39 AM. POL. RES. 118, 124–25 (2011).
76. This Part focuses only on the question of Citizens United’s effect on elections. It does
not situate the decision in the jurisprudence of the First Amendment.
Although
campaign-finance-reform proponents concluded that Citizens United tilts the balance between
free expression and electoral integrity too far in the direction of the former, free speech and media
interests celebrated the Court’s strong affirmation of a libertarian interpretation of the First
Amendment. See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 143–45 (explaining that the Citizens United opinions
reflected a division in the Court between those who view the First Amendment as primarily
endorsing speech as liberty and those who see it as primarily promoting speech as equality).
77. GARRETT, supra note 42, at 17–18 (discussing current availability of campaign-funding
data).
78. See Erika Franklin Fowler & Travis N. Ridout, Advertising Trends in 2010, 8 FORUM,
2010, at 2. According to Professors Erika Franklin Fowler and Travis Ridout, congressional
battles led to a more than thirty-percent increase in television ad airings at an estimated cost of
$735 million, which constitutes a sixty-one-percent increase over 2008 spending. Id.
Gubernatorial advertising was also “intense”; in thirty-seven gubernatorial races, 1.3 million ads
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$4 billion was spent on federal races in 2010, which amounts to almost twice
the cost of the 2006 midterm elections.79 Local television in 2010, a midterm
election, garnered between $2 billion and $3 billion from political advertisers,
approaching twice the amount spent on adds during 2008, a presidential
election year.80 Political advertising “is soaring and is expected to grow in the
future.”81 In fact, political advertising may be one of the few remaining
sources that still generate significant profits for local broadcasters.82
Following Citizens United, an estimated $400 million in additional political
advertising was generated in 2010.83 This is not, of course, proof that Citizens
United caused the increased spending;84 rather, it is important as a measure of
the size of the problem to be addressed.
Second, the evidence indicates that the number of new advocacy groups,
such as super political action committees (super PACs), has mushroomed since
2010.85 Although nominally independent from candidates, many of these
aired at an estimated cost of $697 million. Id. The total volume and cost of advertising for House
and Senate races each increased by about fifty percent. Id. at 3; Election Stats: 2010,
OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/elec_stats.php?cycle=2010 (last visited
Oct. 5, 2011).
79. Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 26–27).
80. STEVEN WALDMAN, WORKING GRP. ON INFO. NEEDS OF CMTYS., THE INFORMATION
NEEDS OF COMMUNITIES: THE CHANGING MEDIA LANDSCAPE IN A BROADBAND
AGE 75–76 (2011), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/osp/inc-report/The_Information_
Needs_of_Communities.pdf; see also Joel Connelly, Karl Rove, Koch Brothers—on Your TV, in
Your Mailbox, SEATTLEPI (Mar. 6, 2011), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/connelly/article/KarlRove-Koch-Brothers-on-your-TV-in-your-1045421.php (reporting that “$47 million worth of TV
spots aired on local TV stations in the 2010 ‘off-year’ election”).
81. WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 75.
82. See Michael Malone, PEJ Study: 2010 Was a Good Year for Stations, Grim Trends
and
All,
BROADCASTING
&
CABLE
(Mar.
14,
2011,
10:31
AM),
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/465205-PEJ_Study_2010_Was_a_Good_Year_For_
Stations_Grim_Trends_and_All.php (noting that the increase in total revenue for stations in 2010
was driven by “around $2.2 billion in political [with] 73% of the political spend [going to] TV
stations”).
83. WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 75 (citing a Borrell Associates estimate).
84. The literature does not appear to contain a careful statistical analysis of the many
variables that would have to be addressed to make a persuasive causation claim. Because the data
discussed represent all broadcast advertising during the election, including ads aired during
periods outside the BCRA regulatory framework, determining causation would require, at a
minimum, disaggregating and refining the data for comparative purposes. Moreover, important
developments other than Citizens United occurred around the 2010 elections. A study of the
increased spending would have to address whether some of the hike was driven by the Tea Party,
which became a new and vocal electoral participant during this period. The spending increase
could also have been due to the breakdown in disclosure requirements rather than the Citizens
United decision. I am very grateful to Professor Robinson for these points.
85. See Dan Eggen, New Breed of ‘Super PACs,’ Other Independent Groups Could Define
2012 Campaign, WASH. POST, July 4, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/new-breedof-super-pacs-other-independent-groups-could-define-2012-ampaign/2011/06/29/gHQAo47FyH
_story.html (“Dozens of super PACs and nonprofit groups have sprung up over the past
year . . . .”); Dave Levinthal, 2011 Sees Super PAC Explosion, POLITICO (Oct. 6, 2011, 11:26
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groups are able to coordinate informally and signal their campaign strategies.86
They are also becoming more professional than ever before.87 Not to be
outdone by influential Republican advocacy groups like American Crossroads
and Crossroads GPS, both associated with Karl Rove, Democrats also began
generating entities to support Democratic candidates.88 Reportedly, although
Democrats had widely criticized Citizens United when the decision was issued,
Democratic activists now agree that Democratic advocacy groups must be
more involved in the 2012 elections.89 Despite President Obama’s criticism of

AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/65310.html (noting that super PACs have been
“forming at a rate of about one per day”); see also Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 27) (“The
biggest change in campaign finance in 2010 was the involvement of outside groups.”); Barker &
Wang, supra note 11 (discussing the various types of groups, such as 501(c)(4) tax-exempt
organizations, 527 groups, and super PACs).
86. See Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 25–26) (questioning the independence of such
groups); Blumenthal, supra note 25 (noting that super PACs backing specific candidates are
“routinely run by former staffers or close associates of the candidates,” and that although they are
“technically not allowed to coordinate with campaigns or parties, . . . candidates can get involved
in the fundraising”); Dan Froomkin, Candidate-Specific Super PACs Offer End Run For MaxedOut Donors: Study, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 4, 2011, 11:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2011/10/04/candidate-specific-super-pacs-donors_n_994260.html (noting that “candidatespecific super PACs are being used to end-run traditional campaign contribution limits” and
quoting the view of the president of Democracy 21 that “[t]he presidential candidate super PAC
exists for one reason: to serve as an arm of the presidential campaign for big-money donors to
launder unlimited contributions”).
87. Reid Wilson, Outside Groups Deflate Obama’s Bully Pulpit, ATLANTIC, July 7, 2011,
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/07/outside-groups-deflate-obamas-bullypulpit/
241569/#.
88. See Barker & Wang, supra note 11; see also Jack Gillum, Democratic Group Founded
by Former Obama Aides Raises $5 Million to Counter GOP-Leaning Ads, STAR TRIB., July 31,
2011, http://www.startribune.com/politics/national/126485298.html (discussing the creation of a
Democratic outside group to parry Republican groups); Eduardo Porter, Editorial, How the Big
Money Finds a Way In, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
09/18/opinion/sunday/how-the-big-money-finds-a-way-in.html (discussing Democrats’ donations
to an independent group called Priorities USA Action).
89. Michael Luo, Effort to Set Up Liberal Counterweight to G.O.P. Groups Begins, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 23, 2010, at A18–19 (describing “prominent Democratic political operative” David
Brock’s attempts to “raise money for Democratic-oriented media efforts” through a new
organization, American Bridge, as well as Media Matters Action Network, Brock’s other
nonprofit organization, “which tracks conservative politicians and advocacy organizations”); see
also Gerken, supra note 17, at 1157 (“[T]he parties will find a way to even things out. I would be
stunned if the Democrats don’t catch up substantially on this front [corporate independent
spending] next year.”); Jim Rutenberg, New Liberals Offer Donors a Cash Cloak, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 2011, at A3 (discussing the importance of liberal groups’ involvement in coordinating an
attack against conservative groups); Julian Brookes, Why the 2012 Election Will Be the Most
Expensive Ever, ROLLING STONE (June 7, 2011, 6:05 AM), http://www.rollingstone.com
/politics/blogs/national-affairs/why-the-2012-election-will-be-the-most-expensive-ever-20110607
(identifying new Democratic political groups and discussing outside groups’ potential impact on
the high anticipated expenses of the 2012 election); Steven Greenhouse, A Campaign Finance
Ruling Turned to Labor’s Advantage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com
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Citizens United and outside support groups in the 2008 election campaign,
even the White House has signaled a change in the administration’s position,90
and conservative groups have attacked this “about-face.”91
Third, although some researchers suggest that the overall increase in 2010
campaign expenditures may be the most significant result of Citizens United,92
other observers have concluded baldly that “Citizens United led to even greater
spending by corporate-funded outside groups than political observers
expected.”93 A Congressional Research Service report suggests that “new
donors and groups with access to previously restricted funds may be a potent
force in future campaigns.”94 Although overall independent-group advertising
in the 2010 elections might not have been unprecedented in the history of
television politics, it was certainly extensive, with one source asserting that
outside groups spent almost $300 million.95 Empirical studies from the
independent Wesleyan Media Project reveal significant increases in
interest-group advertising, particularly in House races.96 Moreover, the most
expensive and most competitive races experienced extensive increases in

/2011/09/26/us/politics/a-campaign-finance-ruling-turned-to-laborsadvantage.html?ref=campaign
finance (describing labor unions’ response to Citizens United).
90. Luo, supra note 89, at A19 (“White House officials have signaled in recent weeks that
the Obama administration would not object to Democratic-leaning outside groups getting
involved in the 2012 elections. . . . But they have also indicated that they would prefer that the
names of donors be disclosed.”).
91. Paul Blumenthal, Citizens United Knocks Obama for Campaign Finance Hypocrisy,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 30, 2010, 9:06 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/30/
citizens-united-knocks-obama-campaign-finance_n_887557.html?new=screen.html.
92. Raymond J. La Raja, Will Citizens United v. FEC Give More Political Power to
Corporations? 3 (Sept. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1642175 (concluding that although Citizens United will likely
increase business-group independent spending, particularly on behalf of Republican candidates, it
will also create a spending “arms race” and increase election-related spending by all groups).
93. PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 1; see also Steven L. Winter, Citizens Disunited, 27 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1133, 1134 (2011) (asserting that money spent by Republican outside groups
“yielded” success). But see Gerken, supra note 17, at 1157 (“[W]e don’t really know whether
Citizens United has opened the corporate floodgates.”).
94. GARRETT, supra note 42, at 15.
95. See Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 27) (citing Congressional Campaigns: Half of
Outside Spending in Campaigns Came from Groups Not Revealing Donors, BNA MONEY & POL.
REP., Nov. 12, 2010); see also Press Release, Campaign Fin. Inst., Non-Party Spending Doubled
in 2010 But Did Not Dictate the Results (Nov. 5, 2010) [hereinafter CFI Press Release], available
at http://www.cfinst.org/Press/PReleases/10-11-05/Non-Party_Spending_Doubled_But_Did_Not
_Dictate_Results.aspx (discussing the increase in independent expenditures).
96. Fowler & Ridout, supra note 78, at 2–3 (“Independent groups saw the biggest jump in
both the volume of ads paid for and the estimated cost of such advertising . . . increas[ing] their
share of total advertising in House races from around 5 percent in 2008 to over 13 percent in
2010, while the share of ads sponsored by candidates declined by almost 7 percentage points.”).
Although the “jump [was] not as dramatic” for Senate as for House races, both the volume and
cost of independent-sponsored ads noticeably increased. Id. at 3.
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independent-ad spending.97 The extent of independent spending varied
depending on the race; however, it exceeded twenty-three percent in several
media markets, and in at least one instance in a gubernatorial fight, interest
groups sponsored more ads than either of the candidates.98 Additionally,
outside interest groups’ participation was largely concentrated, according to
some.99 Public Citizen pointed out that only ten groups were responsible for
more than forty-seven percent of the outside money spent on advertising in
2010.100 Despite all the data on increased independent spending, determining
the effect of third-party group advertising on electoral results in the 2010
elections has been difficult.101
Fourth, Wesleyan Media Project researchers found a shift in the character of
independent political ads. Notably, overall political advertising in the 2010
midterm elections was generally much more negative in tone than in the recent
past, and independent ads were extensively negative.102 This stands in marked
contrast to the history of independent ads in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
“when about three quarters of ads from interest groups were positive.”103 In
sum, negativity has been on the rise this decade, and the evidence points
toward an electoral environment dominated by interest groups with negative
messages in the future.104
97. Id. at 7 (noting that ads from independent groups accounted for over twenty percent of
the ads in the post-September 1st period in the four most expensive House races and ranged
greatly—from three to forty percent—in the most expensive Senate races).
98. Id. In Wisconsin, interest groups accounted for forty-three percent of ads, which is
more than either candidate for governor. Id. at 8; see also Michael M. Franz, Erika Franklin
Fowler & Travis N. Ridout, Citizens United and Campaign Advertising in 2010, at 6 (2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
99. See PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 9–10.
100. Id. (cataloguing, in order of decreasing expenditures, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
American Crossroads, American Action Network, Inc., Crossroads Grassroots Policy Strategies,
American Future Fund, Americans for Job Security (AJS), SEIU COPE, American Federation of
State County and Municipal Employees AFL-CIO, 60 Plus Association, and the National Rifle
Association of America Political Victory Fund).
101. See Michael Luo & Griff Palmer, Outside Groups on the Right Flexed Muscles in House
Races, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, at P6; see also Michael M. Franz, The Citizens United
Election? Or Same As It Ever Was?, 8 FORUM, 2010, at 1, 16; La Raja, supra note 92, at 23–25.
102. Fowler & Ridout, supra note 78, at 10–11. In 2010, 53.5% of ads aired after August
were “purely” negative, with another 20.5% consisting of “contrast ads” comparing the
opponents, and only 26% being “purely positive.” Id. at 10. In addition, there was “a dramatic
difference in ad tone depending on sponsor.” Id. at 11 (finding party-sponsored ads to be the
most negative (at ninety-six percent) and independent-group ads to be eighty-seven percent “pure
attack ads”).
103. Id.
104. Id.; Nicholas Confessore, Without ‘Super PAC’ Numbers, Campaign Filings Present an
Incomplete Picture, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/us/politics
/campaign-finance-filings-present-an-incomplete-picture.html (discussing strategic uses of super
PACs that support individual candidates to run negative ads while the candidates themselves
focus on positive messages).
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Fifth, these empirical findings, although significant in themselves, are even
more consequential given the rampant non-disclosure of donors by
independent outside groups. Some groups structured under the Internal
Revenue Code can participate in politics so long as such participation is not
their primary purpose, but are not required to reveal their donors.105 According
to one source, groups that do not disclose their contributors spent an estimated
$138 million of the $300 million total spent in 2010.106 The Center for
Responsive Politics reports that over forty-five percent of outside spending, not
including party committee spending, did not disclose donors.107 Of the top ten
outside spending groups identified by Public Citizen, seven, which accounted
for almost seventy-four percent of the total expenditures, did not disclose their
donors.108 With respect to PACs, which are formally required to disclose their
donors, some fail to comply, presumably because they are confident that the
FEC’s enforcement efforts will be inefficient, ineffective, and ultimately just a
cost of doing business.109 Furthermore, even with groups that do comply,
disclosures generally are not publicly available without some significant time
lags.110 The usefulness of these disclosures, even if timely, is undermined
when the donors are structured as nonprofit organizations exempt from
disclosure, such as 501(c)(4)s, which leads to the mere illusion of disclosure
and informational dead ends.111 Presumably, numerous practical reasons exist
for electioneering groups not to disclose their donors, including privacy and
the desire to keep their political commitments secret.112 In addition, however,
concealed donations allow groups to “make corporate-funded effort appear to
be grassroots.”113

105. See Barker & Wang, supra note 11 (describing and highlighting certain 501(c)
organizations as “[t]he invisibles,” such as Americans for Prosperity, a supporter of the Tea Party
whose cofounder is one of the billionaire Koch brothers, who are “credited with pioneering some
of the bolder new campaign fundraising tactics”).
106. See Kang, supra note 5 (manuscript at 27); see also PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 9
(claiming that over forty percent of the money spent by outside groups came from ten entities).
107. See Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outside
spending/index.php?cycle=2010&view=A&chart=N (last visited Aug. 24, 2011).
108. PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 10.
109. See Barker & Wang, supra note 11 (describing fines paid by 527 groups (PACs) for
sham issue ads after the 2004 election); cf. Michael Luo & Stephanie Strom, Donor Names
Remain Secret as Rules Shift, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2010, at A1, A19 (describing FEC’s and
IRS’s lack of enforcement).
110. See Barker & Wang, supra note 11 (“[B]ecause of time lags in reporting, months can go
by before the identities of million-dollar donors are revealed; some weren’t disclosed until after
the 2010 midterm elections.”).
111. Id.
112. Id. (describing why groups prefer to donate anonymously—sometimes to “shield
corporations from blowback when supporting controversial causes”).
113. Id.; see also Confessore, supra note 104 (explaining that because most super PACs will
be required to disclose their contribution and expenditure reports for the first time only on
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Notably, undisclosed donor spending by outside groups greatly increased in
the 2010 elections, with one study showing that the percentage of such
spending rose from one percent to forty-seven percent since the 2006 midterm
elections.114 Nearly all groups making electioneering communications in the
2004 and 2006 elections disclosed the identities of their donors.115 By
contrast, the percentage of groups disclosing their electioneering
communications dropped to 49.3% in the 2008 election cycle and 31.8% in the
2010 cycle, as of September 2nd.116 Groups that failed to disclose any donor
information in the 2010 election cycle collectively spent roughly double the
grand total spent by outside groups in the 2006 cycle.117 The apparent trend
shows increases both in spending and non-disclosure.
Tracking down outside groups’ donor lists becomes difficult if they do not
disclose the information adequately.118 Although “enterprising journalists”
have “tried to fulfill the role of following the money when possible,”119 their
efforts to unearth information have been unable to substitute reliably for
information fully disclosed by the groups themselves.120

January 31, 2012, a complete picture of the spending on the presidential race will not be available
until after the election).
114. Spencer MacColl, Citizens United Decision Profoundly Affects Political Landscape,
OPENSECRETS.ORG (May 5, 2011, 11:16 AM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/05/citizens
-united-decision-profoundly-affects-political-landscape.html (reporting on a Center for
Responsive Politics study).
115. LINCOLN & HOLMAN, supra note 69, at 1.
116. Id. Although groups making independent expenditures made more disclosures in 2010,
the percentage was still much lower compared to past elections. TAYLOR LINCOLN, PUB. CITIZEN,
DISCLOSURE ECLIPSE: NEARLY HALF OF OUTSIDE GROUPS KEPT DONORS SECRET IN 2010; TOP
10 GROUPS REVEALED SOURCES OF ONLY ONE IN FOUR DOLLARS SPENT 4 (2010), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Eclipsed-Disclosure11182010.pdf; see also PUB. CITIZEN,
supra note 3, at 10–11 (noting the significant decrease in disclosure by groups making
electioneering communications in 2008 after the decision in WRTL).
117. LINCOLN, supra note 116, at 3.
118. Hasen, supra note 14 (highlighting one investigator’s experience looking into an outside
group’s donors, which led him to “P.O. boxes and unanswered emails”); see also Barker & Wang,
supra note 11 (discussing the practice of hiding true donors by funneling contributions to super
PACS through 501(c)(4)s, which are not required to disclose their donors).
119. Hasen, supra note 14; see also Mike McIntyre, The Secret Sponsors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
2, 2010, at 1, 6 (describing a reporter’s attempt to track down the members of the “Coalition to
Protect Seniors”); Liz Cox Barrett, NYT Noses Around, Still Knows Nothing, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.cjr.org/campaign_desk/nyt_noses_around_
still_knows_n.php.
120. See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 119, at 1, 6 (“At any rate, it is clearly going to take a lot
more [for journalists] to see through an organization that is about as transparent as a dirty
diaper.”).
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2. Drawing Conclusions About the Citizens United Effect on the 2010
Elections
The data from the 2010 election cycle raise questions as to the effect of
Citizens United on electoral results and expenditure patterns. The first
question is whether the expenditure patterns post-Citizens United had direct
effects on electoral outcomes. Some observers concluded that outside groups’
spending had a significant impact on election results.121 However, others have
found to the contrary.122 Because the current political science literature fails to
provide definitive answers, determining the influence of interest-group ads on
voters choice is very tricky.123 One political scientist concluded that
“[e]mpirical evidence of any systematic impact of corporate campaign
spending on electoral outcomes is weak or mixed at best.”124 Yet others in the
field observed a shift “toward the position that there are moderate campaign
effects on voter knowledge, preference, and even behavior.”125
A Wesleyan Media Project study shows that Republicans in the 2010
midterm elections “outperformed most of the election forecasting models built
on factors external to campaigns.”126 Political scientists attempting to isolate
121. See, e.g., PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 12 (basing this conclusion on the fact that, in
sixty of the seventy-five congressional contests involving a change in partisan power, outside
group spending favored the victor, and in the six such Senate races, supporters of the victors
outspent the loser by an average of $2.7 million).
122. See, e.g., CFI Press Release, supra note 95 (examining House and Senate races before
concluding that “non-party spending doubled in 2010 but did not dictate the results”).
123. See Jeremy N. Sheff, The Myth of the Level Playing Field: Knowledge, Affect, and
Repetition in Public Debate, 75 MO. L. REV. 143, 154–55 (2010) (noting the dearth of
understanding about the relationships among campaign financing, campaign activities, and
political outcomes in the legal literature).
124. Susan Clark Muntean, Corporate Independent Spending in the Post-BCRA to PreCitizens United Era, 13 BUS. & POL., no. 1, 2010 at 1. The complexity of connection between
campaign contributions and political influence does not preclude the possibility that political
advertising messages have at least some influence on voter decisions. See Sheff, supra note 123,
at 154–54 (discussing the potential effect of political advertising).
125. Sheff, supra note 123, at 152 (footnote omitted). Professor Jeremy Sheff recounts that
Campaign messages do appear to increase voter information, particularly among voters
with the least background political knowledge—the “civic slackers” benefit most in
informational terms. Campaign ads also appear to affect voter attitudes toward
candidates. In particular, political advertising appears to have the ability to implant
emotional or affective attitudes toward its sponsors and subjects, though the positive or
negative tenor of the ads can determine the polarity of these attitudes. Significantly,
repeated exposure to a candidate’s campaign advertisements appears to moderately but
consistently strengthen positive attitudes toward the candidate, though the tone of the
advertisement may influence its effects. . . . [I]t is far less clear whether or how these
effects
translate
into
different
voting
behaviors
or
political
outcomes. . . .[Nevertheless,] empirical research . . . is moving . . . toward a more
rigorous demonstration of aggregate spending effects. However, it should be noted that
the size of these effects, while statistically significant, is relatively small . . . .
Id. at 152–55 (footnotes omitted).
126. Fowler & Ridout, supra note 78, at 1.
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the effect of independent-group ad spending in 2010 suggest “the potential for
interest group advertising to have been decisive in several races across the
country, shifting the balance from one in which viewers saw more
pro-Democratic ads on their television screens to one in which viewers saw
more pro-Republican ads aired.”127
It might be concluded, from the overall data, that the Citizens United effect,
although measurable, was not of overwhelming significance. However, that
view would not adequately account for the broader consequences of
independent-expenditure deregulation.
Although disagreement exists
concerning the effect of the decision on electoral outcomes, Citizens United
“has profoundly affected the nation’s political landscape.”128
With regard to the overall increase in campaign ad spending, for example,
there is a question whether such spending by third-party groups led to
message-repetition effects on voters’ political views.129 In light of 2010’s rise
in political advertising, it is likely that “many voters, whether they liked it or
not, were undoubtedly exposed to more campaign information than in previous
election cycles.”130 Although some political scientists draw the conclusion that
such voters were “more likely to make informed choices at the ballot box,”131
others emphasize the degree to which the great majority of voters rely on
heuristic cues to prompt their votes rather than absorbing and analyzing
substantive issue information.132 Repetition enhances voter responses to
heuristic cues, which permits groups with the ability to repeat campaign
messages to influence elections regardless of the truthfulness of their
messages.133 Failure to disclose ad sponsorships and sponsor groups’
ideological affiliations may further exacerbate the cognitive problem for
voters.134 Furthermore, because repetition of messages apparently leads people
127. Franz, Fowler & Ridout, supra note 98, at 8.
128. MacColl, supra note 114.
129. See Sheff, supra note 123, at 160–61.
130. Fowler & Ridout, supra note 78, at 14.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Sheff, supra note 123, at 158–60; Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral
Decision Theory and Implications for the Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 679, 687–91 (2010) (using behavioral science to address the impact of
campaign messages on voters); see also Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy:
Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV.
1141, 1157–58 (2003) (explaining that voters use interest-group endorsements as heuristic cues in
issue elections).
133. Sheff, supra note 123, at 160–63 (explaining that repetition of campaign messages has
been found to increase the susceptibility of uninformed voters to believing false information, a
phenomenon experimental psychologists have found to be an “illusory truth effect,” where
repetition of a proposition strengthens the impression that it is true and widely believed to be true,
regardless of its actual truth).
134. See Kang, supra note 132, at 1158–59 (describing the impact of difficulties voters
encounter when trying to discern the political affiliations of interest groups with purposefully
obscure names); see also PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 9 (contending that almost eighty percent
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to believe in the credibility of their source, voters may be more likely to
attribute veiled ads to credible sources if the ads are repeated.135 Therefore,
voters might assume the credibility of the nominal sponsor and all of its ads,
and have no reason to assess the credibility of the ad’s true sponsor.136 This
misdirected assumption of credibility can have significant consequences in
today’s recommendation-based Facebook culture, in which a single voter’s
views can be greatly amplified by repetition across many affinity networks.
By allowing corporations to advocate expressly for or against particular
candidates, rather than masking such advocacy in issue-oriented language,
Citizens United may have enhanced the effectiveness of political messages by
making them easier to decode.137 Although one could argue that voters are
able to discern which candidates are being implicitly recommended even in
“sham” issue ads—those communications purporting merely to ask voters to
contact a candidate about an issue138—the voting cue is nevertheless easier to
pick up when it is explicit.139
As demonstrated in the midterm elections, interest groups were able to get
involved early and “shape the playing field.”140 Whatever the reality, the
of the outside-group spending in the 2010 elections “was spent by groups that accepted
contributions larger than $5000 . . . or that did not reveal any information about the sources of
their money”).
135. Sheff, supra note 123, at 161–62; see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The
Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 831–32 (describing the
“availability heuristic,” which “means that individuals are likely to believe something if it is
repeated often enough”).
136. See Lidsky, supra note 135, at 828–33 (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing
the findings of cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, which explain that people make
decisions with bounded rationality and rely on heuristics or “mental shortcuts”); Sheff, supra note
123, at 161–162; cf. Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 983, 997–98 (2005) (“[M]essages derive their persuasive powers not only from
their content and the quality of their supporting argumentation. . . . Individuals process persuasive
messages by taking into account a variety of factors, including source, message, recipient, and
context. The degree to which a message, or the beliefs or attitudes expressed therein, finds
acceptance will vary significantly depending on who delivers the message, who receives it, and
the context in which the communication occurs.” (footnotes omitted)).
137. Marisa Guthrie, Campaign Finance Ruling Could Spell Political-Ad Windfall,
BROADCASTING & CABLE (Jan. 22, 2010, 8:58 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/4
45390-Campaign_Finance_Ruling_Could_Spell_Political_Ad_Windfall.php?rssid=20069.
138. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Hiding Behind the Tax Code, The Dark Election of 2010 and
Why Tax-Exempt Entities Should Be Subject to Robust Federal Campaign Disclosure Laws, 16
CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y 59, 66 (2011) (distinguishing “sham issue ads (ads that avoid[] the[] magic
words [of vote for or against], but were nonetheless intended to influence the election) from
genuine issue ads (ads that express no opinion on a public issue)” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
139. See Franz, Fowler & Ridout, supra note 98, at 8; see also Walker Wilson, supra note
132, at 689 (describing how many voters tend to rely on scant information and cursory analysis of
that information).
140. Luo & Palmer, supra note 101, at P6 (quoting a strategist for a Republican-oriented
group); see also PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 2 (“[W]inning candidates were helped more (or
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publicity given Citizens United may have led to a public perception that
“interest group ads were a decisive factor in the overall outcome.”141
Researchers with the Wesleyan Media Project conclude, very preliminarily and
with methodological caveats, that “interest group advertising may be
influential both by influencing the overall outcome but also in shaping
perceptions of the race.”142 Perhaps the most telling evidence of the Citizens
United effect is that some Republicans ironically agreed with reformist critics
that the ability to raise unlimited contributions, coupled with early
involvement, proved to be quite influential.143 The influence on people’s
perceptions is significant not only for its possible effects on voters’ future
electoral decisions, but because it is likely to increase the power of interest
groups and lobbyists in Congress.144
The inflated spending for negative ads by outside groups in 2010 may have
yet another effect.145 Research shows that attack ads generate voter
disaffection, even as they provide policy information.146 Negativity of political
ads is apparently likely to increase cynicism, especially among the non-aligned
voters whom both sides aim to persuade.147

harmed less) by outside spending than their opponents in 80 percent of the congressional races in
which power changed hands from Democratic to Republican control or vice versa.”).
141. Franz, Fowler & Ridout, supra note 98, at 8.
142. Id. at 17.
143. See, e.g., Luo & Palmer, supra note 101, at P6 (quoting advocate groups).
144. See PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 12–16; see also Ronald Dworkin, The “Devastating”
Decision, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 25, 2010, at 39 (“The Court has given lobbyists . . . a nuclear
weapon.”); David D. Kirkpatrick, Lobbyists Get Potent Weapon in Campaign Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/22donate.html (“A
lobbyist can now tell any elected official: if you vote wrong, my company, labor union or interest
group will spend unlimited sums explicitly advertising against your re-election. . . . The decision
seeks to let voters choose for themselves among a multitude of voices and ideas when they go to
the polls, but it will also increase the power of organized interest groups at the expense of
candidates and political parties.”); cf. PUB. CITIZEN, CAUSE FOR CONCERN: MORE THAN 40% OF
HILL STAFFERS RESPONDING TO PUBLIC CITIZEN SURVEY SAY LOBBYISTS WIELD MORE POWER
BECAUSE OF CITIZENS UNITED 3 (2011), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Causefor-Concern.pdf (discussing congressional staffers’ fear of retaliation against politicians who
displease lobbyists); Gerken, supra note 17, at 1165–68 (suggesting that the next front for
campaign-finance reform focus on lobbying).
145. Fowler & Ridout, supra note 78, at 14.
146. Id.
147. Id. Admittedly, there is disagreement in the empirical literature regarding the precise
effects of negative advertising. See Luciana Carraro & Luigi Castelli, The Implicit and Explicit
Effects of Negative Political Campaigns: Is the Source Really Blamed?, 31 POL. PSYCHOL. 617,
618–19 (2010) (discussing some of the different views).
If the 2010 election cycle simply had reflected an increase in the number of negative ads in the
wake of Citizens United, without material change in the ratio of positive to negative ads, then the
increased negativity could have been attributed to increased spending for ads overall, rather than
any additional Citizens United effect. Cf. Fowler & Ridout, supra note 78, at 10 (observing that
claims of increased negativity follow every election). Notably, however, the Wesleyan Media
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3. Corporate Interest (or Disinterest) in Excessive Political Spending
Supporters of Citizens United and campaign-finance deregulation in general
use the 2010 election data to argue that corporate money did not “flood” the
election and that the hysterical predictions of corporate electoral speech
Analysts have explained that
causing harm were proven wrong.148
corporations lack incentives to engage in large-scale, one-sided political
advertising as a result of Citizens United because such efforts would risk
alienating their customers and other constituencies.149 Instead, these analysts
expect corporations to follow “prudentially pusillanimous policies,”150 thereby
shying away from political statements through hefty contributions.151 The
additional fear of sparking a “spending arms race,” in which competing
Project’s empirical evidence suggests that increased spending resulted in an increase in the
relative percentage of negative to positive ads after Citizens United. Id.
148. See, e.g., Fowler & Ridout, supra note 78, at 5.
149. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC: The Constitutional Right that Big
Corporations Should Have But Do Not Want, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 655–59 (2011);
see also Kang, supra note 5 (noting that “corporate money, as far as we can tell, accounted for
only a small percentage of federal campaign spending in 2010”); Kirkpatrick, supra note 144 (“In
practice, major publicly held corporations like Microsoft or General Electric are unlikely to spend
large sums of money on campaign commercials, for fear of alienating investors, customers and
other public officials.”). But see Daniel Winik, Note, Citizens Informed: Broader Disclosure and
Disclaimer for Corporate Electoral Advocacy in the Wake of Citizens United, 120 YALE L.J. 622,
633–34 (2010) (noting uncertainty in whether corporations will use their rights under Citizens
United to “flood the airwaves,” but commenting that the prospect is troubling).
During the 2010 election season, New York City’s public advocate reportedly elicited
promises from a significant number of major corporations that they would publicly pledge
“campaign-finance austerity” and not ramp up their political spending. Suzy Khimm, Bill de
Blasio: Citizens United Avenger, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 22, 2010, 3:00 AM PDT),
http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/09/bill-de-blasio-citizens-united-avenger.
150. Epstein, supra note 149, at 653; Wert, Gaddie & Bullock, supra note 5, at 726–27
(noting the risks involved in undertaking political action); Guthrie, supra note 137 (quoting a
media analyst questioning whether “you’re going to see big corporations plunking down a bunch
of money for political advertising”).
Target, for example, contributed to an independent group that aired ads in support of an
anti-gay gubernatorial candidate, inciting a call to boycott its stores and precipitating a public
apology by the firm’s CEO. Epstein, supra note 149, at 657–68. Many point to Target’s story as
evidence that a corporation’s potentially controversial political spending could be inhibited even
in the post-Citizens United environment. Id. Indeed, at least one source suggests that Target did
not immediately recover from the political-donation scandal. Suzy Khimm, Is Target Still Paying
the Price for Citizens United?, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 7, 2010, 7:56 AM PDT),
http://motherjones.com/mojo/2010/09/target-paying-price-citizens-united.
To the extent that corporations’ likely approaches to ad expenditures can be predicted from
their political-contribution histories, it is notable that for-profit corporations typically contribute
to both Democrats and Republicans. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance
Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 324 (describing the corporate “hedging” strategy of
contributing money to both sides).
151. Epstein, supra note 149, at 657 (“[C]orporations want to spend their money where it
matters to them: on particular legislation where they hope to gain influence while flying below
the radar.”).
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advocacy groups would arguably lobby corporations for funding, might also
discourage corporations from ramping up their political spending.152 Indeed,
according to some public-choice theorists, corporations might prefer
campaign-finance regulation to a deregulated environment, in which legislators
might extort their financial participation.153
Although these generalizations are plausible, in reality, corporations have
long spent money on political races, and increases in corporate political
expenditures are expected in the post-Citizens United era.154 Moreover, the
spending behavior of family-owned or founder-led private companies may
differ from the expected behavior of widely held public firms.155 Even if
152. See Khimm, supra note 150. But see MONICA YOUN, AM. CONST. SOC’Y L. & POL’Y,
CITIZENS UNITED: THE AFTERMATH 3–7 (2010), available at http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default
/files/ACS_Issue_Brief_Youn_Citizens_United.pdf (arguing that Citizens United encourages
corporations to engage in a corporate influence-bidding arms race, in which reluctant corporations
involve themselves in electoral politics “to maintain access to and avoid retribution from elected
officials” by contributing more than competing corporations).
153. Cf. FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION,
AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 46–59 (1997) (discussing the potential for political extortion of
corporations).
154. See Briffault, supra note 5, at 647–50 (noting the ways in which corporations
“deploy[ed] considerable amounts of money in elections” even before Citizens United). For
example, although many political contests involve large amounts of money, there are many
congressional races that are neither highly publicized nor heavily funded. See Congressional
Elections, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/races/index.php (last visited Oct. 20,
2011). There are also local and state elections, in which corporations with particular legislative
agendas could expect their expenditures to have more effect than on the national stage.
Additionally, although corporations may be more likely to spend their money lobbying for or
against legislation of particular relevance to their corporate interests, rather than spending
significant capital on elections concerned with issues in which they do not have a “distinctive
position,” Epstein, supra note 149, at 657, those two categories are not always distinct. In
addition, a recent application of game theory to corporate political expenditures supports the
intuitive sense that corporations will spend more money on independent expenditures postCitizens United. See Anne Tucker, Rational Coercion: Citizens United and a Modern Day
Prisoner’s Dilemma, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1105, 1127–32 (2011) (concluding, based on an
application of the classic game-theory prisoner’s dilemma scenario, that “Citizens United has
established an environment that exacerbates the pressure on corporations to participate politically
through independent expenditures” by effectively coercing rational corporations into making
political expenditures so that they maintain a comparative advantage in political influence over
other corporations). This conclusion, of course, is predicated on a number of assumptions,
including the premise that corporations all compete, and do not collude, for political influence.
155. See Luo & Strom, supra note 109, at A19 (noting that in contrast to “the big name
companies remaining” on the sidelines, small- to medium-size, privately held companies “are
jumping in,” albeit mostly through 501(c) organizations). Scholarship concerning corporate
political donations has largely focused on publicly held companies, thereby neglecting some of
the largest political contributors. Muntean, supra note 124, at 2. A recent study of pre-Citizens
United corporate contributions to political organizations, not limited to publicly held firms, found
a “robust relationship between principal-owner presence and political activity,” suggesting that
family or founder-controlled firms are more likely to make political contributions. Id. at 5.
Professor Susan Muntean identifies multiple private entities making political contributions, such
as Koch Industries, Marmon Group, United Dairy Farmers, A.G. Spanos, Avalon Capital Group,
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corporations ultimately decline to air political ads, the mere ability to do so is
undoubtedly a powerful weapon, the use of which would be virtually
impossible to discover.156
Most importantly, corporations are likely to contribute money indirectly for
political advertising through trade associations, such as the Chamber of
Commerce, so long as their contributions are not publicly disclosed.157 This
anonymity helps to neutralize corporate concerns about alienating not only
their customers, but also shareholders who might object to the contributions.158
Thus, data suggesting that corporations reported only a relatively small amount
of independent expenditures in 2010 federal races do not disprove the
significant effect of Citizens United and campaign-finance deregulation.159
4. Spending Predictions for the 2012 Presidential Election Cycle
The 2012 presidential contest will be an important testing ground for the
changes in campaign-finance regulation captured by the metaphoric Citizens
Amway, and various hedge funds. Id. at 2. She speculates that such entities are more politically
active because they “are pursuing a longer term and more proactive relational strategy with the
political parties, while independently managed firms and their executives pursue a reactionary,
post hoc or transactional CPA [corporate political action] strategy.” Id. at 5. Such a strategy can
also explain indirect contributions to independent political groups; Muntean argues that “the
strategy of making independent expenditures to influence public opinion suggests that
principal-owners are selecting a constituency-building strategy and an entrepreneurial approach to
political action. Id. at 9.
156. See YOUN, supra note 152, at 7.
157. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick, supra note 144 (“[W]ealthy individuals and companies might
contribute to trade associations, groups like the Chamber of Commerce or the National Rifle
Associations, or other third parties that could run commercials.”); see also TORRES-SPELLISCY,
supra note 12, at 3 (noting that corporations avoid direct political spending by contributing to
intermediaries, such as 501(c) organizations); Briffault, supra note 5, at 645 (discussing the need
for obtaining records of not only the “spender of record,” but also the entities contributing to the
organizations in order to have effective disclosure); Ron A. Schotland, The Post-Citizens United
Fantasy-Land, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 753, 753 (2011) (“Corporate actors have
traditionally used trade associations and charitable associations as vehicles to shape political
debate and engage in advocacy.”); Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 138, at 89–91.
158. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. Information from companies that disclose
their political spending is suggestive of the possibilities. The Los Angeles Times reports that
PACs operated by Prudential Financial, for example, gave only $218,230 to candidates and other
committees in 2010, but contributed more than $2.2 million for lobbying and other political
purposes to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other trade groups. Noam N. Levey & Kim
Geiger, Much Corporate Political Spending Stays Hidden, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/23/nation/la-na-money-politics-survey-20110424 (noting that
a “[c]ompany giving to trade associations for political campaigns can dwarf direct donations to
candidates”).
159. See supra notes 154–58 and accompanying text; see also Dan Eggen, Surge in PACs at
the Last, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2010, at A4 (reporting on the increase in the registering of PACs
in the days leading up to the election, “dumping tens of millions of dollars into House and Senate
races, and in many cases, avoiding the need to tell voters who is funding their activities”). These
last-minute activities make it exceedingly difficult for candidates to respond effectively before
election day. Id.
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United effect.160 Given that political-ad spending is typically higher in
presidential election cycles than in midterm elections, groups are likely to
engage in “blockbuster” spending in 2012.161 For example, Crossroads GPS
and American Crossroads apparently plan to raise $120 million in support of
the Republican party.162 Over one hundred super PACs are registered to
date,163 and they are poised to spend millions more than the $80 million spent
by super PACs in the 2010 contests.164 In fact, outside groups began running
ads for the 2012 cycle in December 2010, just weeks after the midterm
elections.165 Many of the new super PACs are candidate-specific entities.166
Furthermore, such blockbuster spending is likely to include many campaign
messages funded by organizations that are not required to disclose their
donors.167 In June 2011, the Center for Responsive Politics identified five
super PACs that disclosed that all, or a vast majority, of their funding came
160. See, e.g., Brookes, supra note 89 (discussing the amount of money likely to be spent for
the 2012 election in light of Citizens United’s effects); Gold & Mason, supra note 20 (detailing
the increased fundraising and spending by independent groups in anticipation of the 2012
election).
161. PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 9; Porter, supra note 88; see also Marian Wang, FEC
Data Show Big Jump in Spending by Super PACs and Outside Groups, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 9,
2011), http://www.propublica.org/article/fec-data-show-rise-of-super-pacs-and-outside-spending.
The Center for Responsive Politics has tracked close to $6 million in spending by outside groups
already for the 2012 cycle. 2012 Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets
.org/outsidespending/summ.php?disp=O.
162. See Blumenthal, supra note 25. Another source previously reported that the super PACs
planned to raise half—$120 million—of the currently circulating planned figure. Connelly, supra
note 80 (“If the Rove group reaches its target . . . the Crossroads committees will be the biggest
financial players in 2012 outside presidential candidates themselves.”).
163. Spencer MacColl, Super PAC Registrations Accelerate, Favor Conservatives,
OPENSECRETS.ORG (June 17, 2011, 3:06 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/06/superpac-registrations-accelerate.html.
164. Barker & Wang, supra note 11; see also Nicholas Confessore, Super PAC Plans Major
Primary Campaign for Perry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/07/us
/politics/07donate.html?ref=campaignfinance (noting that a new super PAC called “Make Us
Great Again” plans to spend up to $55 million to help Rick Perry win the Republican presidential
nomination).
165. See, e.g., Wilson supra note 87 (noting that Crossroads ran its first 2012 advertisement,
supporting the extension of Bush tax cuts, in December 2010 and that it had run three rounds of
advertising by the second week of February 2011). Crossroads GPS spent $700,000 in Florida on
an anti-Obama ad this summer and planned on spending $20 million in July and August. Alex
Leary, In 2012 Elections, Expect More Attack Ads with the Rise of Super PACs, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, July 24, 2011, http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/national/article1181968.ece.
166. See Confessore, supra note 164; Confessore, supra note 104 (noting that almost all of
the 2012 presidential candidates are supported by super PACs); Elite Donors Do Double Duty:
Presidential Super PACs Attract Wealthy Donors Who Have Maxed Out to Candidates,
OPENSECRETS.ORG (Oct. 4, 2011, 12:15 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/10/elitedonors-do-double-duty-for-super-pacs.html.
167. See LINCOLN & HOLMAN, supra note 69, at 1 (noting that the percentage of groups
reporting the donors who funded their electronic communications has greatly decreased over the
past decade, dropping from 97.9% in 2004 to 31.8% in 2010); Blumenthal, supra note 25.
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from non-profit organizations themselves not subject to disclosure
requirements.168 Further obscuring the source of funding, many super PACs
operate under unassuming names such as “Concerned Taxpayers of America,”
“Citizens for a Working America,” and “We Love USA,” which do not reveal
their actual political commitments.169 If the trends of non-disclosure and
negativity continue, the 2012 presidential election season may feature more
money, more competitive and negative speech, more opportunities for
corporations to contribute silently to intermediary groups, and more
anodyne-sounding organizations with undisclosed affiliations.170
D. Attempts to Mitigate the “Citizens United Effect”
In response to Citizens United, proponents of campaign reform turned to
legislation both at the federal and state level, complaints to the IRS,
administrative and judicial challenges against the FEC, White House
involvement, and grassroots public advocacy. Some organizations and
legislators even proposed a constitutional amendment limiting the free-speech
protection of for-profit corporations.171 Conversely, campaign-finance-reform
opponents sought to challenge disclosure legislation judicially and politically,
and resisted administrative attempts to circumvent the effects of the Citizens
United decision.172

168. Barker & Wang, supra note 11.
169. Id.; see also YOUN, supra note 152, at 15 (describing misleading names); Michael
Beckel, Would a PAC By Any Other Name Sound As Sweet?, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Sept. 29, 2011,
4:25 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/09/a-pac-by-any-other-name.html (noting that
“names touting America and Americans are among the most common, as well as the words
‘citizens,’ ‘action,’ and ‘freedom’”).
170. See supra Part I.C–E.
171. For example, the advocacy organization Public Citizen submitted testimony suggesting
a constitutional amendment to a congressional committee hearing on campaign-finance reform
after Citizens United. Letter from Robert Weissman, President, Pub. Citizen, to Robert Brady,
Chairman, Comm. on House Admin., U.S. House of Representatives 4 (Feb. 3, 2010), available
at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Final%20testimony%20on%20CU.pdf; see also PUB.
CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 2–3 (noting that Public Citizen collected roughly 750,006 signatures in
support of a constitutional amendment). Representatives Donna Edwards and John Conyers, Jr.
introduced a similar constitutional amendment resolution in the House of Representatives. H.R.J.
Res. 74, 111th Cong. § 1 (2010). Similarly, Senators Christopher Dodd and Tom Udall proposed
a constitutional amendment in response to Citizens United. S.J. Res. 29, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010);
see also R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41054, CAMPAIGN FINANCE POLICY
AFTER CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR
CONGRESS 3 (2010) (noting other proposals for constitutional amendments). See generally
Senator Tom Udall, Amend the Constitution to Restore Public Trust in the Political System: A
Practitioner’s Perspective on Campaign Finance Reform, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 235 (2010).
172. Yoo & Marston, supra note 25, at 4–5 (noting the opposition to the failed DISCLOSE
Act and to any executive order mandating disclosure, and characterizing disclosure proposals as
“[o]verruling Citizens United with Chicago-[s]tyle [p]olitics”).
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The principal pro-reform tactic post-Citizens United centers on donor
disclosure.173 Professor Hasen was not alone when he warned that the need for
an adequate disclosure policy is “urgent” in light of recent post-Citizens United
developments.174 Responding to the lack of transparency in many of the 2010
third-party advocacy ads,175 the public called for stricter laws requiring
disclosure of the names of those funding independent advocacy groups.176
Accordingly, legislatures, at both the federal and the state levels, attempted
to avert the predicted Citizens United effect by passing legislation requiring
increased transparency in third-party ad funding.177 Justice Kennedy’s rousing
encomium to disclosure quieted concerns about the susceptibility of disclosure
173. See infra notes 174–76; see also Elizabeth Garrett, Voting With Cues, 37 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1011, 1011 (2003) (“[T]he campaign finance reform eliciting nearly uniform support has
been disclosure of the source and amount of campaign contributions and expenditures.”).
Another reform proposal made after Citizens United required shareholder approval of corporate
political spending. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech:
Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 85 (2010) (citing Shareholder Protection Act of 2010,
H.R. 4790, 111th Cong. § 4(a)). Reformers have also discussed eliminating contribution limits
under FECA. See Sullivan, supra note 5, at 167–80. Additionally, Representative Thomas
Perriello proposed legislation prohibiting independent expenditures by foreign corporations. See
Save Our Democracy from Foreign Influence Act of 2010, H.R. 4523, 111th Cong.
174. Rick Hasen, President’s Statement on Passage of DISCLOSE Act in House Committee,
ELECTION L. BLOG (May 20, 2010, 3:50 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=14873; see also
Schotland, supra note 157, at 755–56 (discussing the need to update federal and state disclosure
requirements); Sullivan, supra note 5, at 172–74; Francis Bingham, Note, Show Me the Money:
Public Access and Accountability After Citizens United, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1027, 1056 (2011)
(advocating state and federal increases in disclosure requirements); Winik, supra note 149, at 651
(proposing more disclosure requirements).
175. Peter Overby, Who Writes the Check? Group Wants Voters to Know, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/22/134746513/who-writes-the-check-groupwants-voters-to-know (reporting that Media Access Project, a public advocacy organization,
requested stricter disclosure rules from the FCC after many independent groups in the 2010
elections hid their donors behind vague entity names). One commonly cited example is the entity
called the “Concerned Taxpayers of America,” whose name suggests a large group, but whose
$450,000 of television ads in two congressional races was secretly bankrolled by only two
contributors whose identities were not publicly disclosed. Id.; Dan Eggen, Concerned Taxpayers
Group Is Powered by Only Two Donors, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2010, at A6. Similarly, a single
donor contributed $1 million for campaign advertising under the name “Ending Spending Fund.”
Dan Eggen, supra note 159, at A4. This phenomenon was not exclusive to Republican
supporters; the advertisements purchased by “Iowans for Responsible Government” attacking
Republican Terry Branstad was, in fact, funded by a $370,000 contribution from the Democratic
Governors Association. MAP Petition, supra note 25, at 2. One of the major sponsors of
political-committee advertising in 2010 was Crossroads GPS, but nowhere in its advertisements
did the entity disclose that it was cofounded by Karl Rove. See Connelly, supra note 80.
Crossroads GPS and American Crossroads apparently plan to raise $120 million to defeat
President Obama and capture the Senate for Republicans. Id. (“If the Rove Group reaches its
target . . . the Crossroads committees will be the biggest financial players in 2012 outside
presidential candidates themselves.”).
176. See PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 17–19 (examining public-opinion polls, which show
overwhelming support for stricter disclosure rules).
177. Id. at 24–26, 29–31.
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rules to constitutional attack and opened the door for such legislation.178 In
2010, Congress considered nine bills in response to Citizens United.179
However, such legislation ultimately failed to reduce the decision’s impacts.
For example, the House narrowly passed the DISCLOSE Act,180 which would
have increased disclosure,181 but it was filibustered in the Senate.182 This
history suggests that congressional action is therefore unlikely in 2011.183
Moreover, at the state level, an early 2011 report by the National Conference
of State Legislatures noted that eleven states amended their election laws to
enhance disclosure in reaction to Citizens United.184 Advocacy groups are
litigating dozens of lawsuits challenging such statutes, which will lead, at a
minimum, to controversy, delay, and uncertainty.185 Advocacy groups also
made claims that some third-party organizations that produced election-related
advertising violated IRS rules,186 but the IRS rejected the opportunity to
178. See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 66, at 1079–82.
179. Note, Restoring Electoral Equilibrium in the Wake of Constitutionalized Campaign
Finance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1545 (2011).
180. DISCLOSE Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010); GARRETT, supra note 42, at 7 (“[T]he
House of Representatives passed H.R. 5175, with amendments on June 24, 2010 by a 219-206
vote.”). “DISCLOSE” is an acronym for “Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on
Spending in Elections.” H.R. 5175, § 1(a).
181. H.R. 5175, §§ 201–203, 211–215, 221, 231, 301; see also R. SAM GARRETT, L. PAIGE
WHITAKER & ERIKA K. LUNDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41264, THE DISCLOSE ACT (H.R.
5175): OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1–22 (2010) (providing an overview of the proposed
DISCLOSE Act).
182. See GARRETT, supra note 42, at 7. The Senate denied cloture on S. 3628, the
companion bill to H.R. 5175, by a 57-41 vote on July 27, 2010, and by a 59-39 vote on
September 23, 2010. Id. The 111th Congress recessed without any further action on the
DISCLOSE Act. Id.; see Deborah G. Johnson, Priscilla M. Regan & Kent Wayland, Campaign
Disclosure, Privacy, and Transparency, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 959, 968 (2011);
Schotland, supra note 157, at 758–60 & n.32 (providing a critique of the DISCLOSE Act).
183. See GARRETT, supra note 42, at 7; see also Hasen, supra note 14 (concluding that there
is “virtually no chance that the current Congress will pass a viable disclosure bill absent some
new scandal”). Although the DISCLOSE Act contained controversial provisions in addition to
donor disclosure requirements, so that a pared-down version of the legislation, requiring only
donor disclosure, might fare better, there has been a breakdown in the prior bipartisan support for
campaign disclosure. See GARRETT, WHITAKER & LUNDER, supra note 181, at 10–12.
184. Life After Citizens United, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan 4, 2011),
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19607; see also PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 29
(stating that at least sixteen states have passed legislation in to the wake of Citizens United);
TORRES-SPELLISCY, supra note 12, at 5–7 (indicating that seventeen states adopted statutes
regulating electioneering communications since 2002, and calling on states to improve their
disclosure laws).
185. See GARRETT, supra note 42, at 7.
186. Press Release, Campaign Legal Ctr., IRS Urged to Review Crossroads GPS Tax Status:
501(c)(4) Status Questioned for Anonymously Funded Attack Ad Vehicle (Oct. 5,
2010), available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/index.php?option=com_content&
view=article&id=1119:10-5-2010-irs-urged-to-review-crossroads-gps-tax-status-501c4-statusquestioned-for-anonymously-funded-attack-ad-vehicle-&catid=63&Itemid=61 (reporting their
claim that Crossroads GPS operated in violation of 501(c)(4)). In addition, legal academics
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investigate the claim that Crossroads GPS violated the requirements for its
tax-exempt status.187
In addition to legislative disclosure initiatives, critics of Citizens United
focused their attention on administrative and executive-branch responses. For
example, Congressman Chris Van Hollen filed both a federal action against the
FEC to challenge the agency’s implementation of statutory disclosure rules,
and an FEC petition to commence a new disclosure rulemaking.188 However,
Republican FEC Commissioners “are still blocking efforts to ensure effective
disclosure,”189 thereby deadlocking the FEC politically.190 Pending lawsuits
against the FEC also will take time and likely will only enhance preexisting
election-law requirements.
The White House has also been involved in seeking mitigation. In April
2010, a draft White House Executive Order circulated in the press, which, if
signed, would require companies applying for government contracts to disclose
donations to advocacy groups involved in election activities.191 The order has

petitioned the SEC to adopt disclosure rules for political expenditures, with newspaper editorial
support. See, e.g., Editorial, Serving Shareholders and Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/10/opinion/serving-shareholders-and-democracy.html?ref=
campaignfinance.
187. See IRS Calls Off Gift Tax Investigation of Donors to Karl Rove’s Crossroads GPS,
TAXPROF BLOG (July 7, 2011), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2011/07/irs-calls-.html
(announcing that the IRS will not continue its investigation into the applicability of the gift tax to
contributions to 501(c)(4) organizations, apparently due to Republican lawmaker pressure); Sean
Parnell, IRS Won’t Tax Donations to 501(c)(4) Groups, CTR. COMPETITIVE POL. (July 7, 2011,
4:23 PM), http://www.campaignfreedom.org/blog/detail/irs-wont-tax-donations-to-501c4-groups
(deciding that prior donations to 501(c)(4) organizations are not subject to IRS gift taxes);
Stephanie Strom, I.R.S. Drops Audits of Political Donors, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011, at B1 (noting
that the IRS has ceased to pursue gift taxes stemming from contributions to 501(c)(4) groups); see
also Democracy 21 and Campaign Legal Center Challenge Legality of IRS Regulations as
Failing to Properly Limit Campaign Activity by 501(c)(4) Organizations, DEMOCRACY 21 (July
27, 2011), http://www.democracy21.org/index.asp?Type=B_PR&SEC=%7B91FCB139-CC824DDD-AE4E-3A81E6427C7F%7D&DE=%7BD68E818D-632A-4F25-B4E3-979BD1139FA4%
7D (asserting that the IRS regulates all groups qualifying for tax-exempt status under § 401(c)(4)
to “make far more campaign expenditures than is allowed by law”); supra notes 71, 105
(clarifying that 501(c)(4)s are not subject to disclosure requirements).
188. See Alex Knott, Van Hollen Sues FEC for More Disclosure, ROLL CALL (Apr. 21, 2011,
2:24 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/van_hollen_sues_fec_for_more_disclosure-2050821.html; Kenneth P. Vogel, Federal Election Commission Sued to Disclose Anonymous Donors,
POLITICO (Apr. 21, 2011, 11:17 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0411/53534.html.
189. Hasen, supra note 14.
190. See GARRETT, supra note 42, at 7.
191. Paul Blumenthal, Draft Executive Order on Outside Spending Disclosure Would Have
Sweeping Reach, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Apr. 22, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://sunlightfoundation.com
/blog/2011/04/22/draft-executive-order-on-outside-spending-disclosure-would-have-sweepingreach/. But see Yoo & Marston, supra note 25, at 1–10 (critiquing the executive order).
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proven very controversial,192 and it may ultimately be seen as too politically
costly.193
Thus far, these multi-pronged efforts to mitigate Citizens United have had
limited success. Given the impending 2012 presidential election, a more
expansive examination of alternative avenues for reform would be prudent.
II. THE FCC ALTERNATIVE
Communications law and FCC rules could produce a more fruitful response
to the Citizens United effect,194 both because other efforts have faltered, and
principally because television is still the medium of communication for
political advertising today.195 In June 2011, FCC Commissioner Michael
Copps stated:
I continue to believe that the sooner we can ensure fuller disclosure
of political advertising sponsorship, the better off our democracy will
be. Voters have a right to know who is really behind all those glossy
and sometimes wildly misleading ads we see on TV. Concealing
from voters that an ad brought to us by “Citizens for a More
Beautiful America” is really sponsored by a cabal of chemical
companies polluting the water we drink is not just non-disclosure—it
is deception aimed at buying elections. We need to fix this—and the
FCC has an active role to play. I suggest the Commission tee up an
item in the next two months that moves us toward meaningful
disclosure of political advertising.196

192. See GARRETT, supra note 42, at 10–11 (describing the controversy and noting that the
House passed two otherwise-unrelated House bills to prevent executive agencies from
conditioning government-contract grants on required political-spending disclosure).
193. Sam Stein, Obama Administration Drafts Executive Order on Contractor Donation
Transparency, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 19, 2011, 5:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/20
11/04/19/obama-administration-drafts-order_n_851228.html.
194. For a discussion of Citizens United’s potential impact on FCC regulations (rather than
the use of FCC rules to promote the underlying vision of Citizens United), see generally Elizabeth
Elices, Citizens United and the Future of FCC Content Regulation, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 51 (2010). See also Wang, supra note 71 (discussing the partisan deadlock in the FEC and its
failure to regulate super PACs).
195. See, e.g., WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 13–14 (discussing the role of broadcast and
cable television in political advertising); see also Kevin Downey, In Political Spending, All
Markets Not Equal, TVNEWSCHECK (Mar. 2, 2010, 8:41 AM), http://www.tvnewscheck.com/arti
cle/2010/03/03/40321/in-political-spending-all-markets-not-equal (estimating that television
political-advertising expenditures would exceed $2.7 billion in 2010).
196. Press Release, Michael J. Copps, Comm’r, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Statement of
Michael J. Copps on Release of FCC Staff Report “The Technology and Information Needs of
Communities” (June 9, 2011), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases
/Daily_Business/2011/db0609/DOC-307421A1.pdf.
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In addition to the FCC’s sponsorship-disclosure rules, communications
regulation contains an antidiscrimination rule and limits on broadcaster
immunity for the content of political ads.197
A. The Regulation of Political Speech on Radio, Broadcast Television, and
Cable
The regulation of political speech on radio and television has three
components of relevance to this inquiry: the sponsorship-identification
requirement, the equal opportunities rule, and the reasonable-access
provision.198
1. Sponsorship Identification
Since Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927, broadcasters have been
subject to sponsorship-identification requirements. 199 Section 317 of the
Communications Act of 1934, the current legislation governing such
requirements, requires that:
[a]ll matter broadcast by any radio station for which service, money,
or any other valuable consideration is directly or indirectly paid, or
promised to or charged or accepted by, the station so broadcasting,
from any person, shall, at the time the same is so broadcast, be
announced as paid for or furnished, as the case may be, by such
person.200
All sponsored programming on television and radio is subject to this
requirement.201 The FCC applied similar rules to cable operator-originated
197. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006).
198. WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 25, 296.
199. Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 19, 44 Stat. 1162, 1170. The Radio Act
required stations to “afford equal opportunities” to candidates for public office and required
broadcast disclosure of sponsors. Radio Act §§ 18–19. The rationale behind the sponsorship
provision, as described by Representative Emanuel Celler of New York, was to prohibit radio
stations from disguising advertisements as program content. Richard Kielbowicz & Linda
Lawson, Unmasking Hidden Commercials in Broadcasting: Origins of the Sponsorship
Identification Regulations, 1927–1963, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 329, 334 (2004) (“[Rep. Emanuel
Celler] unsuccessfully pressed for an amendment that would require stations to label such
broadcast content as ‘advertising,’ not simply as ‘paid for’ or ‘furnished by’ an interested party.”
(citing 67 CONG. REC. 2309 (1926)).
200. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 317, 48 Stat. 1064, 1089 (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2006)). Section 508 makes nondisclosure of sponsorship by
broadcast employees, program suppliers, and sponsors a crime. Communications Act
Amendments, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-752, sec. 8(b), § 508, 74 Stat. 889, 896 (codified as amended
at 47 U.S.C. § 508 (2006)); see Ellen Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85
TEX. L. REV. 83, 96 (2006).
201. See Communications Act of 1934 §§ 2–3 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 152(a),
153) (2006)). Although few changes have been made to the statutory requirement since the
1940s, the “payola” scandals in the 1950s led to an uptick in broadcaster obligations to disclose
sponsored programming. See Goodman, supra note 200, at 99. Recently, the issue of
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programming in 1969.202
The FCC adopted regulations to implement section 317.203 The regulations
require not only that sponsorship be revealed, but that broadcasters
fully and fairly disclose[] the true identity of the person or persons,
or corporation, committee, association or other unincorporated
group, or other entity by whom or on whose behalf such payment is
made or promised, or from whom or on whose behalf such services
or other valuable consideration is received . . . .204
Additionally, section 73.1212(b) of the agency’s regulations requires
broadcast licensees to “exercise reasonable diligence to obtain . . . information
to enable such licensee to make the announcement required by this section.”205
With respect to political commercials, the regulations require on-air
sponsorship identification, as well as identification of the sponsoring entity’s
top leadership in the broadcast station’s publicly available file.206
2. Equal Opportunities
Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 provides that if a
broadcaster permits a legally qualified political candidate to “use” its station, it
must provide equal opportunities to that candidate’s opponents.207 Although
the statute does not define the term “use,” the agency has interpreted the word
to include “any presentation or appearance that features a candidate’s voice or
image.”208 This equal opportunities provision is commonly referred to as the
“equal time” rule. 209

sponsorship identification has been addressed in the context of embedded advertising. Id. at 89–
90; see WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 280.
202. 47 C.F.R. § 76.1615 (2009); WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 296.
203. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (2010) (tracking the language of section 317(a)(1) of the
Communications Act of 1934 very closely).
204. Id. § 73.1212(e).
205. Id. § 73.1212(b).
206. Id. § 73.1212(e).
207. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006) (“If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally
qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal
opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station.”
(emphasis added)).
208. Colin Vandell, Note, Words Signifying Nothing? The Evolution of § 315(a) in an Age of
Deregulation and Its Effect on Television News Coverage of Presidential Elections, 27 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 443, 447 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting DON R. PEMBER,
MASS MEDIA LAW 603 (McGraw-Hill 1999)).
209. See id. at 444. There are constraints on the equal opportunities provision, however. It is
state law, not FCC rules, that is used to determine whether a candidate is legally qualified. 47
C.F.R. § 73.1940(a)(2). Moreover, even if a broadcaster has equal-time obligations in a particular
political race, it is not required to provide exactly the same amount or class of time as was given
the original use; it is enough that the original user’s opponents are provided “equal opportunities.”
See infra notes 218–19.
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The provision originated in Congress in the 1920s as its members expressed
concern over the amount of electoral influence potentially wielded by radio
stations and networks.210 The fear that radio stations would “charge one man
an exorbitant price [or arbitrarily exclude him] and permit another man to
broadcast free or at a nominal price” led Congress to include section 18—the
predecessor of section 315(a)—in the Radio Act of 1927.211 Historically,
Congress was concerned with neutralizing the “kind of political advantage a
discriminatory network can confer.”212
Section 315 only applies to the political candidate’s use of broadcast stations
and does not discuss advertising in support of a candidate by independent
entities.213 In 1970, the FCC addressed this statutory gap by adopting what
came to be called the “Zapple doctrine,” or the “quasi-equal opportunities
rule.”214 In response to a request for an interpretive ruling by Nicholas Zapple,
Communications Counsel to the Senate Committee on Commerce, regarding
“the applicability of the fairness doctrine to situations where supporters of a
political candidate purchase broadcast time,” the FCC opined that the fairness
doctrine would be “plainly applicable” to circumstances in which a candidate’s
supporters purchase airtime.215 According to the FCC, a station selling airtime
to a candidate’s spokesperson or supporter to discuss campaign issues could
not reasonably refuse to sell similar airtime to the spokesperson in support of
another candidate absent unusual circumstances, because allowing a candidate
to air his or her position on a given issue is tantamount to broadcasting one
side, and therefore, the opposing candidates are “the logical spokesmen for
presenting contrasting views.”216 However, the Zapple doctrine did not require
the opponent’s supporters to be provided with free airtime to respond to the
original advertising—a reasonable opportunity to purchase equal time was
adequate.217 The FCC reiterated its support for the general principle that a
broadcaster’s inability to find paid sponsorship of the opposing view should
not defeat the public’s right to know; however, the agency determined that this

210. See Vandell, supra note 208, at 446 (citing 67 CONG. REC. 5483 (1926)).
211. Id.
212. TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 23–24
(2010).
213. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006).
214. Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707 (1970) (discussing whether broadcast stations had
obligations to provide equal opportunities for political messages by candidate supporters and
opponents, as well as candidates themselves); see Ann Kramer Ricchiuto, The End for Equal
Time?: Revealing the Statutory Myth of Fair Election Coverage, 38 IND. L. REV. 267, 281 n.95
(2005).
215. Nicholas Zapple, Comm’ns Counsel, Comm. on Commerce, 23 F.C.C. 2d 707, 707
(1970).
216. Id. at 708.
217. Id.
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general principle “should not have applicability in the direct political arena.”218
The FCC simply held that the station would be obligated to permit the
purchase of equal opportunities.219
Section 315, as currently codified, has exceptions as well.220 As a result of
congressional amendment in 1959, § 315 states:
Appearances by a legally qualified candidate on any—(1) bona fide
newscast, (2) bona fide news interview, (3) bona fide news
documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is incidental to the
presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news
documentary), or (4) on the spot coverage of bona fide news events
(including but not limited to political conventions and activities
incidental thereto), shall not be deemed to be use of a broadcasting
station . . . .221
218. Id. The agency reasoned that
[w]hen spokesmen or supporters of candidates A half purchased time, it is our view that
it would be inappropriate to require licensees to in effect subsidize the campaign of an
opposing candidate by providing candidate B’s spokesmen or supporters with free time
(e.g., the chairman of the national committee of a major party purchases time to urge
the election of his candidate, and his counterpart then requests free time for program on
behalf of his candidate). Any such requirement would be an unwarranted and
inappropriate intrusion of the fairness doctrine into the area of political campaign
financing. To implement this view, we would carve out the same area as in the case of
our personal attack rules, i.e., there would be no obligation to provide free time to
authorized spokesmen of or those associated with legally qualified candidate B in a
situation such as your point where candidate A, his authorized spokesmen or those
associated with him, have purchased time.
Id.; see also Cullman Broad. Co., 40 F.C.C. 576, 577 (1963).
219. Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C. 2d at 707.
220. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 88-274, sec. 1, § 315(c), 73 Stat. 557, 557 (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(1)–(4) (2006)).
221. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a). Section 315(b), as currently codified, also constrains what charges
broadcast stations can impose on political advertising. Id. § 315(b). During the forty-five days
before a primary and sixty days before a general election, broadcast stations must offer political
candidates airtime at the station’s lowest unit rate. Id. The statute does not define “lowest unit
rate.” See id. § 315(c). Although the FCC’s enforcement of § 315(b) has been sporadic, the
agency has accused stations of manipulating ad-sale practices to avoid bona fide compliance with
the lowest-unit-rate requirement. Seth Grossman, Note, Creating Competitive and Informative
Campaigns: A Comprehensive Approach to “Free Air Time” for Political Candidates, 22 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 351, 355–57, 377 (2004).
In addition to the equal opportunities rule, the Communications Act of 1934 gives candidates
for federal office a limited right of access to the air. See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7). Section 312(a)(7)
authorizes the FCC to revoke the license of any broadcaster who willfully or repeatedly fails to
offer a federal candidate the reasonable opportunity to purchase reasonable amounts of airtime for
political advertising. Id. Section 312(a)(7) specifically states that the FCC may revoke any
station license for “for willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit
purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station . . . by a legally
qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy.” Id. Although the FCC
has declined to provide formal guidelines defining this provision, it is clear that broadcasters are
required to engage in bona fide individualized negotiations with the candidates over airtime
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Communications law does not explicitly address the question of whether the
Communications Act provisions and FCC rules may serve to limit the
threatening effects posed by independent-group political advertising permitted
by the Citizens United series of decisions. This Article contends that: 1) the
FCC has the authority to read § 317 as requiring disclosure of major funders of
independent groups airing political advertising, and 2) the FCC should not
hesitate to apply a quasi-equal opportunities rule akin to the Zapple doctrine.
Although the issue is not free from doubt, there is no clear prohibition to the
analysis suggested in this Article.
B. Disclosure Obligations Under § 317
The potential for misleading voters is a major concern associated with postCitizens United independent-group advertising.222 For example, if voters
believe that a neutral, expert group made statements in a given advertisement,
they are likely to find that advertisement more credible than a message created
by a clearly identified special-interest group. Because of this concern,
observers have called for disclosure as an antidote to troublesome advocacy
advertising by unaccountable speakers.223 Without adequate disclosure, voters
requests. Stations cannot impose blanket prohibitions on selling time to federal candidates in any
day-part, or category of programming, or for any length of time. Codification of Commission’s
Political Programming Policies, 7 FCC Rcd. 678, 681 (1991). The requirement to negotiate
applies even with when federal candidates request to purchase airtime in lengths typically not
sold by the station.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the federal-candidate reasonable-access
provision under the First Amendment in CBS, Inc. v. FCC. 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (“Section
312(a)(7) represents an effort by Congress to assure that an important resource—the airwaves—
will be used in the public interest. We hold that the statutory right of access, as defined by the
Commission and applied in these cases, properly balances the First Amendment rights of federal
candidates, the public, and broadcasters.”). Although the Court affirmed broadcaster editorial
discretion in that case and accepted the possibility that a realistic prospect of program disruption
could properly lead to rejection of a candidate’s request, the actual practice affirmed by the Court
on the facts suggests that federal-candidate requests for airtime should virtually always be
accommodated under § 312(a)(7).
222. See, e.g., PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 10.
223. See, e.g., Denniston, supra note 37 (“One approach would be to increase the
transparency of ‘special interest’ spending by more rigorous disclosure legislation, in hopes of
exposing more vividly who is in fact benefiting and, perhaps, by embarrassing the
beneficiaries.”). The Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo listed the three rationales for campaign
disclosure requirements:
First, disclosure provides the electorate with information as to where political
campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate in order to aid the
voters in evaluating those who seek federal office . . . .
Second, disclosure requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of
corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of
publicity . . . .
Third, and not least significant, recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure
requirements are an essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations
of the contribution limitations described above.
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are being “deprive[d] . . . of important cues they need to make informed
decisions of how to vote.”224 Additionally, inadequate disclosure “also creates
the conditions for actual corruption of elected officials.”225 Given that Citizens
United set the new baseline for corporate funding of election speech,
disclosure becomes more important than ever.226
This analysis poses the question: could § 317’s sponsorship-identification
provisions reasonably be read to require major funders of groups airing
political advocacy ads to be identified? MAP’s petition, which was submitted
to the FCC on March 22, 2011, asked the agency to revise its sponsorship rules
to require such disclosure explicitly.227 The group observed that a large
increase in express and issue-advocacy spending followed Citizens United
because “[e]xisting campaign-finance and IRS regulations allow organizations
which are often hollow shells for one or a few organizations or individuals to
purchase commercials without identifying the source of their funding.”228
According to the group, this practice is contrary to current FCC sponsorshipidentification rules interpreting § 317, which nominally require disclosure of
the sponsor’s “true identify.”229
Therefore, the group argues that because “the statutory objective of
informing the electorate about who is the “true” sponsor of political messages
is not being met,” the FCC should revise its political sponsorship-identification
regulations.230
1. The History and Scope of § 317
Postal regulations mark the genesis of broadcasting sponsorship disclosure
rules. In 1912, Congress enacted the Newspaper Publicity Act, a law requiring
newspaper and magazine publishers receiving second-class mail privileges to
identify paid advertisements231 and to publish the names of the publishers’
424 U.S. 1, 66–68 (1976) (per curiam) (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Recent Case, Constitutional Law—First Amendment—Ninth Circuit Holds Montana Election
Contribution Disclosure Requirements Unconstitutional as Applied to De Minimis
Contributions—Canyon Ferry Road Baptist Church of East Helena, Inc. v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d
1021 (9th Cir. 2009), 123 HARV. L. REV. 1043, 1046 (2010) (applying the three rationales in the
ballot-related context).
224. Hasen, supra note 14.
225. Id.
226. See Edward Wyatt, The Caucus, A Plea for More Disclosure on Political Ads, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2011, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/a-plea-for-moredisclosure-on-political-ads/ (discussing disclosure advocates’ pleas to the FCC for assistance in
strengthening rules following Citizens United).
227. See MAP Petition, supra note 25, at 1.
228. Id. at 2.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Goodman, supra note 200, at 98 (citing Act of Aug. 29, 1912, ch. 389, 37 Stat. 539, 554
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1734 (2006))) (explaining that the legislation required
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owners and stockholders twice a year.232 Congress apparently exported this
requirement to broadcasting, including it in the Radio Act of 1927 and the
Communications Act of 1934.233 Because commercial advertisers sponsored
much of the early programming and clearly identified themselves, the
sponsorship-identification rules garnered little attention at the dawn of radio
regulation.234 Over time, as spot-advertising began to overcome advertiser
sponsorship of entire programs, the FCC became concerned that listeners
“know when the program ends and the advertisement begins,”235 and therefore
issued rules implementing the sponsorship-identification provision of section
317 of the 1934 Act.236 The quiz show and payola scandals of the 1950s
caused Congress to amend section 317 to extend the sponsorship-disclosure
requirement to station employees and criminalize non-disclosure.237 In recent
years, the FCC’s discussion of sponsorship-identification rules has related
principally to “sponsored news stories” and “video news releases.”238
A dearth of legislative history complicates attempts to ascertain Congress’s
intent in adopting the sponsorship-identification provisions in the 1927 and
1934 Acts.239 Nevertheless, the history of the sponsorship-identification
publishers to provide “reading notices” identifying paid ads). See generally Richard B.
Kielbowicz, Postal Subsidies for the Press and the Business of Mass Culture, 1880-1920, 64 BUS.
HIST. REV. 64 (1990) (providing a historical summary of postal advertising). Congress enacted
the Newspaper Publicity Act as a rider to the 1912 postal appropriations bill. Id. at 481.
232. Kielbowicz, supra 231, at 482.
233. Goodman, supra note 200, at 98.
234. See id.
235. Id. at 98–99 (quoting FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF
BROADCAST LICENSEES 47 (Arno Press, Inc. reprt. ed. 1974) (1946)). This was consistent with
the Hutchins Commission on the Freedom of the Press recommendation that “sales talk should be
plainly labeled as such.” Id. at 99 n.97 (quoting COMM’N ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE
AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 64 (1947)).
236. Id. (citing Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 199, at 341–42).
237. Id. at 99.
238. WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 279–80. A “sponsored news story” occurs when a
broadcaster agrees with a sponsor to air a news piece promoting the sponsor, but fails to disclose
to the public that the story resulted from such a sponsorship agreement. Id. A “video news
release” is a piece created by a sponsor to resemble a news story and aired by the broadcaster
without disclosure of how the piece was produced. Id. The FCC also calls for sponsorship
identification in “embedded advertising” and “product placement” contexts. Id. at 280; see also
Clay Calvert, What Is News?: The FCC and the Battle Over the Regulation of Video News
Releases, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 361, 366–67 (2008) (criticizing the FCC’s treatment of
video news releases).
239. As part of the congressional discussion before the passage of the Radio Act of 1927,
Congressman Emanuel Celler inserted the following statement into the Congressional Record:
Many broadcasting stations have developed paid-for propaganda and advertising. This
is being done in a most deceptive and disguised manner.
It is illegal for newspapers or magazines to publish advertising without letting their
readers know that the matter is paid for and is advertising. The reason for this was to
avoid the foisting of disguised advertising matter “as reading notices” or news. The
law was adopted to avoid this public imposition and deception.
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requirements suggests a concern about deception.240 Indeed, the principle that
viewers not be deceived or mislead unites all the circumstances in which the
FCC refers to sponsorship identification.
The FCC has repeatedly expressed the view that the public has a “right to
know whether the broadcast material has been paid for and by whom.”241 In
the early days of radio, many expressed distrust of advertising.242 Indeed, early
on, many argued against radio becoming a commercial, advertising-based
medium.243 In addition to concerns with avoiding vulgar commercialism and
promoting programming not limited to the requirements of the market, the
opponents of advertising feared that it would deceive and mislead listeners.244
According to the FCC, “[p]aramount to an informed opinion and wisdom of
choice . . . is the public’s need to know the identity of those persons or groups
Broadcasting of paid-for or indirect advertising without a statement that the matter
broadcast has been paid for is no less deceptive and an imposition.
67 CONG. REC. 2309 (1926).
240. The history of the Newspaper Publicity Act of 1912, from which the original
sponsorship-identification requirement for radio was apparently derived, shows that periodicals
had to identify their owners and stockholders to “address[] the concern that some publications
were secretly controlled by interests who used their columns to influence public opinion.”
Kielbowicz, supra 231, at 482. The statute’s “reader notice” requirement compelled periodicals
to label paid-for material that could be mistaken for stories as “advertisements” in order to stymie
“the widespread practice of disguising advertising as news stories or editorials.” Id. Both of
these provisions were clearly aimed to prevent readers from being misled.
Professor Ellen Goodman identifies “three basic critiques [of undisclosed sponsorship]: that
undisclosed sponsorship harms media competition, that it overcommercializes media content, and
that it deceives audiences.” Goodman, supra note 200, at 99–100. To this list, she adds the harm
of stealth marketing to “the public sphere and the integrity of public discourse.” Id. at 100. The
last two factors seem most relevant to the context of non-disclosure in the political arena.
241. Goodman, supra note 200, at 110 & n.158 (quoting U.S. Postal Serv., 41 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P&F) 877, 878 (1977)).
242. See, e.g., PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN
COMMUNICATIONS 338 (2004) (quoting one contemporary publication as declaring that “‘the
family circle is not a public space and advertising has no business intruding there unless it is
invited.’”).
243. See id. (“Radio advertising, it was universally agreed, was highly undesirable.”).
Nevertheless, the ability to reach a large audience at home with a repetitive message overcame
this initial reluctance. Id. at 354–55. Sponsors and stations, which, in the 1920s, had “delicately
refrained from explicit commercials or sales talks and allowed only ‘indirect’ advertisements,”
had “given [themselves] wholly over to commercialism” and direct advertisements by the 1930s.
Id.; see also ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND
DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928–1935, at 5 (1993)
(providing “a revisionist interpretation of American broadcasting history, one that regards the
emerging status quo [of corporate, commercial, advertiser-supported radio] as the product of an
intense and multifaceted political fight with obvious winners and losers, not as the ‘natural’
American system or as the product of consensus”).
244. See Goodman, supra note 200, at 110 n.158 (citing Broadcast Material Sponsorship
Identification, 25 Fed. Reg. 2406, 2406 (Mar. 16, 1960) (characterizing a station’s failure to
provide a notification that program material was aired in exchange for consideration as
“deception”)).
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who elicit the public’s support.”245 The agency’s recognition that audience
members are “‘entitl[ed] to know by whom they are being persuaded’”246 is
most persuasively explained as “directly related to a fear of deception.”247
Although the statutory language of § 317 does not directly address how
much sponsorship disclosure should be made in advertising, the goal of
avoiding deception can serve as a useful guidepost for the FCC’s standard.248
In 2002, the agency explained that because the sponsorship-identification
requirement is “based on the principle that the public has a right to know
whether the broadcast material has been paid for and by whom,” the provision
“mandates that “the audience be clearly informed that it is hearing and viewing
matter which has been paid for when such is the case, and that the person
paying for the broadcast of the matter be clearly identified.”249
Historically, the FCC has been particularly sensitive to the importance of
sponsorship identification in the context of political advertising.250 In 1991,
the FCC characterized the additional public-file requirements for political
assignments as “designed to make information about their sponsors more
available to the public.”251 This illustrates the FCC’s recognition that
disclosure of political-sponsor information had increasingly become a
necessity for the public. The Commission has insisted on “full and fair”
disclosure of sponsors’ identities since the 1940s.252 According to a 1963
public notice from the FCC, a station disclaimer stating that an advertisement
was a paid political announcement is per se insufficient to adhere to
Instead, the rules require that the
sponsorship-identification rules.253

245. Id. at 110 n.159 (quoting Sponsorship Identification Rules, 34 F.C.C. 829, 849 (1963)).
246. Id. (quoting Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 40 F.C.C. 141, 141
(1963), modified, 40 Fed. Reg. 41,936 (Sept. 9, 1975)).
247. Id. at 110. Professor Goodman situates this audience right “in the wreck of the payola
and quiz show scandals.” Id.
248. See id. (noting that the FCC’s “fear of deception” dictates much of its language
interpreting this law).
249. Advertising Council Request for Declaratory Ruling or Waiver Concerning Sponsorship
Identification Rules Advertising Council, 17 FCC Rcd. 22,616, 22,620–21 (2002) (order
responding to request for declaratory ruling).
250. See generally Identification of Sponsors, 9 Fed. Reg. 12,817 (Oct. 25, 1944).
251. Codification of the Commission’s Political Programming Policies, 7 FCC Rcd. 678, 686
(1991) (responding to many complaints regarding the radio stations’ failure to identify sponsors
in compliance with § 317).
252. During the 1944 campaign season, for example, the FCC noted the need for regulations
implementing § 317 in response to “numerous complaints . . . concerning the failure of radio
stations to identify the sponsors of political spot announcements.” Identification of Sponsors, 9
Fed. Reg. at 12,817. The current rule is only slightly modified from the rule adopted in 1944.
See BCRA, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, 88–90 (2002) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§
431–456 (2006)).
253. Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 40 F.C.C. 141, 150 (1963), modified,
40 Fed. Reg. 41,936 (Sept. 9, 1975).
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identification “fully and fairly disclose the true identity of the person or
persons by whom or in whose behalf payment was made.”254
In its petition for rulemaking, MAP contended that the FCC has a “long
history of directing stations to pierce the veil of the nominal sponsor.”255 For
example, as far back as 1946, the FCC required broadcasters to “take all
reasonable measures” to fully comply with identification rules, and explained
that “[i]f a speaker desires to purchase time at a cost apparently
disproportionate to his personal ability to pay, a licensee should make an
investigation of the source of funds to be used for payment.”256 The FCC has
long endorsed the principle that broadcasters have a duty to use “reasonable
diligence” in discovering the funding behind sponsorship to make that
information public.257 In 1992, the agency provided even more detailed
instructions for candidate commercials, and required that the sponsor “of
televised political advertisements . . . be identified with letters sized to at least
four percent of the vertical picture height and displayed for a minimum of a
few seconds.”258 In addition to on-air sponsorship identification, the FCC has
imposed an additional obligation upon stations since 1944 to include
sponsor-identifying information in the station’s public files with respect to
political advertising.259 In a 1963 public notice, the Commission explicitly
stated:
If payment is made by an agent, and the station has knowledge
thereof, the announcement shall identify the person in whose behalf
such agent is acting. If the sponsor is a corporation, committee,
association or other group, the required announcement shall contain
the name of such group; moreover, the station broadcasting any
matter on behalf of such group shall require that a list of the chief
officers, members of the executive committee or members of the
board of directors of the sponsoring organization be made available
upon demand for public inspection at the studios or general offices of
one of the stations in each community in which the program is
broadcast. In the event of a network originated broadcast, the
records required by the Commission’s Rules shall be made available

254. Id. (emphasis added).
255. MAP Petition, supra note 25, at 5. Other examples include the FCC’s reminder to
stations in 1950 that they had to make “adequate announcements when political broadcasts are
made.” Identification on Broadcast Station, 40 F.C.C. 2, 3 (1950).
256. MAP Petition, supra note 25, at 1 (quoting Albuquerque Broadcasting Company, 40
F.C.C. 1 (1946)).
257. See WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 280.
258. Codification of the Commission’s Political Programming Policies, 7 FCC Rcd. 1616,
1616 (1992).
259. Compare Announcement of Sponsored Programs, 9 Fed. Reg. 14,734 (Dec. 12, 1944),
with 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (2010).
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upon demand for public inspection at the studios or general offices of
the originating station.”260
The extensive regulatory history during which the FCC expressed an
unwavering commitment to a fully informed electorate suggests that the
agency could justify implementing an enhanced sponsorship-identification
requirement.261 The argument for donor disclosure in political ads today is the
same as the argument for commercial-advertising disclosure in the 1927 and

260. Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 40 F.C.C. 141, 150 (1963), modified,
40 Fed. Reg. 41,936 (Sept. 9, 1975).
261. See supra notes 239–63. Although the evidence is sparse, the FCC may have shifted
toward a narrower approach to § 317 in the 1970s. For example, VOTER, an unpublished opinion
issued by the FCC’s staff in 1979, stated that licensees could satisfy their obligations under the
§ 317 sponsorship-identification requirement so long as the sponsoring organization claimed that
it had editorial control of the program, regardless of who paid for it. VOTER, 46 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 350, 352 (1979); see also Paul Loveday, 87 F.C.C. 2d 492, 497 (1981) (reiterating VOTER’s
focus on the identity of the person with editorial control).
In Loveday, the FCC considered whether broadcast stations should have identified the tobacco
industry as sponsors of political advertisements attributed to “Californians Against Regulatory
Excess” (CARE), which advertised against a state proposition to create smoking and
non-smoking areas in indoor, public places. Paul Loveday, 87 F.C.C. 2d at 493. The FCC
concluded that the stations did not violate the sponsorship provisions of the Communications Act
or the rules and that they were not required to investigate more diligently Loveday’s claims that
the tobacco industry was the true sponsor. Id. at 497 (“To hold otherwise would require this
agency to investigate the nature of political committees organized to support or oppose an
election matter (e.g., whether or not corporate formalities were adhered to), to second-guess
broadcast station licensees’ judgments and to rule on the basis of hindsight, rather than reviewing
licensees’ decisions to determine if they acted reasonably and in good faith.”). The D.C. Circuit,
affirming the FCC’s decision, concluded that “the licensees were not required to inquire further
into the actual sponsorship of the political advertisements. Indeed, we have substantial doubt that
the Commission could require licensees to do more.” Loveday v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1443, 1445
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
This focus solely on editorial control, however, is not a fully considered FCC interpretation;
rather, it is a thinly supported staff reading that does not adequately reflect the statutory focus on
the payer’s identity. Neither the statute nor the agency’s regulations identify the sponsor as the
person or entity exercising editorial control over the advertisement. The statute targets
identification of who paid for “all matter broadcast . . . for which any money . . . is directly or
indirectly paid.” 47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) (2006). Historically, the FCC’s interpretation also
focused on identification of the payer. In 1958, for example, in discussing a particular station’s
§ 317 violation, the Commission characterized as “of particular significance . . . the requirement
of accurate and complete identification of the person or group paying for or furnishing material in
connection with a discussion of political matters.” Violation of Section 317 of the
Communications Act, KSTP, Inc., 40 F.C.C. 12, 14 (1958). Similarly, in a 1963 ruling, the
commission described the sponsorship-identification provision as requiring that the broadcaster
disclose “the true identity of the person or persons by whom or in whose behalf payment was
made.” Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 40 F.C.C. 141, 150 (1963), modified,
40 Fed. Reg. 41,936 (Sept. 9, 1975). In addition to lacking either a statutory referent or FCC
regulatory precedent, the focus on editorial control is far less objectively verifiable than
identifying who paid for the ad. There is no reason for the FCC to continue relying on this
misguided and apparently idiosyncratic interpretation.
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1934 Acts—namely, a concern with deceiving the public.262 Intentional
concealment to achieve a particular result undermines the ideal of voting
competence.263 The argument for donor disclosure is not based on a vague and
general preference for transparency in electoral structures; rather, it is based on
the goal of empowering voters to understand what might otherwise be
affirmatively misleading.264
Nevertheless, opponents to broader disclosure might argue that the
requirement to identify who paid for political advertising does not necessarily
entail full transparency of the identities of all, or even the major, donors to
independent organizations airing advocacy advertising.265 Such opponents of a
broad interpretation of § 317 might claim that the only disclosure authorized
by statute relates to the paying entity’s name.266 On this view, the statutory
sponsorship-identification obligation would be satisfied so long as the public is
advised of the formal identity of a political ad’s sponsor.267 If viewers seek to
find out more about the sponsoring entity, they can do so directly.
However, this formal reading is unsatisfactory and not statutorily required.
The statute does not define the word “paid.”268 To the extent that the FCC’s
implementing regulations since the 1940s have required broadcasters to “fully
and fairly disclose the true identity” of the sponsor, the agency has implicitly
supported the view that the public deserves to know the identity of the true
movers behind front organizations.269 One potential objection to this position
is that disclosing the sponsor’s true identity does not necessarily mean
disclosing the identities of its financial funders and supporters.270 Although
the FCC’s regulations require stations’ public files to contain a list of the
sponsoring entity’s leadership,271 objectors might claim that the leadership
group is not necessarily coextensive with the major funders of the nominal

262. Goodman, supra note 200, at 108 (discussing the problem of stealth marketing in
creating deception).
263. See Kang, supra note 132, at 1155.
264. Goodman, supra note 200, at 111–12. In addition to averting deception, a mandatory
requirement of donor disclosure under § 317 promotes the broader interest in public discourse.
Id. at 112–30. Professor Goodman argues that the anti-deception interest has limits “in a media
environment of pervasive skepticism” with “savvy” consumers whose skepticism limits their
credulousness. Id. at 111–12.
265. Cf. MAP Petition, supra note 25, at 6 (discussing the argument that disclosure of the
entity with editorial control over the ads is adequate).
266. Id. (emphasizing the statutory language requiring disclosure of the entity responsible for
payment).
267. Id. at 7.
268. 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2006).
269. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(e) (2010).
270. See, e.g., Barker & Wang, supra note 11 (explaining that super PACs may get the
majority of their funding from “affiliated nonprofits that are not required to reveal their donors”).
271. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(e); Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 40 F.C.C.
141, 150 (1963), modified, 40 Fed. Reg. 41,936 (Sept. 9, 1975).
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sponsor.272 On the other hand, it would be unreasonable to exclude major
donors to third-party advocacy groups from being considered “true”
sponsors.273 Even if they are not the only “true” sponsors, the fact that the
organizations would not be able to air the sponsored material without their
funding, suggests they should be included in the category. Because a donor to
an organization may not necessarily support every statement made by that
organization, it might be argued that a closer link should be demonstrated
between the donor and the advertisement itself in order to characterize the
donor as a true sponsor. However, such a limitation would eliminate the
important voting cue that the donor supports an organization that, in turn, is
responsible for the election ads at issue.
The interpretation suggested here is not precluded by any statutory
impediments. The FCC might be influenced to adopt such a reading by the
strong public consensus in support of donor disclosure.274 In any event, the
availability of this option might influence the political atmosphere, regardless
of what the FCC ultimately decides to do in response to MAP’s petition for
rulemaking.
2. Constitutionality and Desirability of Donor-Disclosure Requirements
The desirability of recourse to FCC regulation should also be considered as a
policy matter, and disclosure regimes like those advocated here should be
evaluated to determine whether they are consistent with the First Amendment
and likely to be workable and beneficial.

272. Cf. MAP Petition, supra note 25, at 7–8 (recommending enhanced disclosure rules
requiring disclosure of major contributors in addition to sponsorship). MAP called on the FCC to
revise its sponsorship-identification rules to require on-air disclosure of the “actual sponsor, i.e.,
the source of the funds for the commercials.” Id. With respect to “front groups” and institutional
sponsors funded by several sources, MAP called for on-air identification of any donor providing
at least twenty-five percent of the funding for television commercials and one-third of the funding
for radio ads. Id. at 7 & n.11. The petition also called on the FCC to amend its rules “to require
that stations keep on file, along with a listing of the nominal sponsor of a political ad and its
leadership, all who contribute 10% or more to the funding of the nominal sponsor.” Id. at 8. The
petition also requested the FCC to “strengthen section 73.1212(b)” because the current provision
“lacks any tool to assess compliance with the duty.” Id. Such strengthening would “require
broadcasters to obtain sworn statements from political advertisers [as] to their largest sources of
funding and place them . . . in the station’s public file.” Id. It is beyond the scope of this Article
to comment on the specific numerical requirements suggested by MAP, although the twenty-fivepercent figure does not appear unreasonable. Certainly, if the FCC agrees to undertake this
petition for rulemaking, many comments will be received with regard to the specific provisions.
273. See Barker & Wang, supra note 11.
274. John Eggerton, Survey Says: Put Contributors On Air, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Sept.
16, 2010, 4:08 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/457220-Survey_Says_
Put_Contributors_On_Air.php (reporting that sixty-eight percent of respondents to a poll by the
Center for Competitive Politics responded that “they favored making the heads and largest donors
appear in campaign ads to take responsibility for them”).
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a. Constitutionality
An FCC sponsorship-identification rule requiring entities sponsoring
election-related advertising to disclose direct and indirect sponsors would
likely pass constitutional muster. In the electoral context, the Supreme Court,
has consistently recognized voter-informational and corruption-deterrence
interests since the iconic Buckley v. Valeo.275 Indeed, as previously noted,
Citizens United itself strongly endorses disclosure as the flip side of unfettered
corporate electoral speech.276 In Citizens United, eight members of the Court
agreed that “disclosure permits citizens . . . to react to the speech of corporate
entities in a proper way. This transparency enables the electorate to make
informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and
messages.”277 According to all but Justice Clarence Thomas, transparency
concerning donors “help[s] citizens make informed choices in the political
Revealing political affiliations also allows voters to
marketplace.”278
determine whether elected officials are “‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed
interests.”279
Election-law scholars as well have consistently argued in favor of expanded
disclosure because publicity may reduce corruption and enhance
accountability.280 Donor disclosure is also likely to help increase voter
competence by serving as a useful cue to voters who would not otherwise
conduct additional research before voting.281 Disclosure can give voters useful

275. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26
(1976) (per curiam).
276. See supra Part I.A.
277. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916; see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
278. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003),
overruled in part by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913). In McConnell, the Court emphasized the
informational value of source disclosure:
BCRA’s disclosure provision requires . . . organizations to reveal their identities so that
the public is able to identify the source of the funding behind broadcast advertisements
influencing certain elections. . . . Curiously, Plaintiffs want to preserve the ability to run
these advertisements while hiding behind dubious and misleading names like: “The
Coalition-Americans Working for Real Change” (funded by business organizations
opposed to organized labor), “Citizens for Better Medicare” (funded by the
pharmaceutical industry), “Republicans for Clean Air” (funded by brothers Charles and
Sam Wyly).
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196–97.
279. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 259 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
280. See Johnson, Regan & Wayland, supra note 182, at 965–67.
281. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1012–13 (arguing in favor of election-related disclosure
requirements because they increase voter competence); see also Sheff, supra note 123, at 159
(discussing the incidence of low-information voters); supra notes 129–36.
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shortcuts by allowing them to rely on information identifying candidate
support groups and revealing the groups’ intensity of support.282
Nevertheless, although McConnell upheld the BCRA’s disclosure and
disclaimer provisions,283 the Court in Citizens United recognized that a group
could bring as-applied challenges upon a showing of a “reasonable
probability” that disclosure of its contributors’ names would “subject them to
threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private
parties.”284 Given that the Court did not find threats, harassment, or reprisal
despite worrisome examples cited by amici in Citizens United,285 the Court
may require a high reasonable-probability threshold.286 Nevertheless, this still
leaves a viable avenue for litigation by groups resisting disclosure.
Additionally, because effective corporate disclosure rules are likely to entail
“detailed requirements,”287 they might clash with the Court’s expressed
constitutional concerns in Citizens United about the complexity of
campaign-finance law.288 Thus, despite the Court’s affirmation of the value of
disclosure, “Citizens United may make it possible for opponents of disclosure
simply to rely on the administrative burden of keeping records, filing reports,
and abiding by certain organizational requirements.”289 To the extent that
282. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1026–27. To be sure, compelled disclosure has been
subject to heightened scrutiny, particularly in the context of political expression. In McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Commission, the Supreme Court, applying strict scrutiny, held that in the context
of anonymous pamphleteering, the First Amendment protects anonymous speech. 514 U.S. 334,
357 (1995) (striking down a state statute prohibiting distribution of anonymous campaign
literature on First Amendment grounds). Nevertheless, disclosure in the donor context has
received less stringent constitutional scrutiny than disclosure of speaker identity in the
pamphleteering context. See E. Rebecca Gantt, Note, Toward Recognition of a Monetary
Threshold in Campaign Finance Disclosure Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 385, 399–400 (2011)
(discussing levels of scrutiny and describing other scholars’ attempts to distinguish McIntyre
from disclosure cases). Notably, the Court in McConnell and Citizens United upheld BCRA
disclosure requirements without reference to McIntyre. See William McGeveran, Mrs.
McIntyre’s Persona: Bringing Privacy Theory to Election Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
859, 861–62 (2011). In any event, the Court in McIntyre found important that a private
individual, whose signature would not have added much information to the content of the
communication, wrote the anonymous handbill at issue. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348–49. The
Court also recognized that anonymity itself is an important cue, which can perhaps lead the
recipient of an anonymous communications to be skeptical. See id. at 348 n.11. In the context of
electioneering communications by benignly named interest groups, voters would not have the
informational cue triggering skepticism that anonymity would itself provide.
283. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196.
284. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 198).
285. Id. at 916.
286. See Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 66, at 1099; see also Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811
passim (2010); Gantt, supra note 282, at 412–13 (explaining that the evidentiary standard for
showing the prospect of reprisals “is so high that it essentially requires a showing of a pattern of
retaliation and harassment that has already occurred”).
287. Briffault, supra note 5, at 669.
288. Id. at 663.
289. Id. at 669–70.
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disclosure regulations are burdensome and subject to court’s searching
scrutiny, Citizens United ironically could become the basis for “constitutional
challenges to the administrative requirements entailed in disclosure.”290
b. Policy
Doctrinal issues aside, fundamental policy questions arise regarding the
application of § 317 and the Zapple doctrine to mitigate Citizens United.291
The fundamental policy question addresses the underlying value of disclosure
itself: is disclosure an effective mechanism? If not, additional disclosure
requirements might be an undesirable compromise of significant First
Amendment values in support of illusory regulatory goals.
As critics have reminded, disclosure is not an unmitigated good292—too
much can overwhelm and distract the hearer.293 According to skeptics, donor
disclosure fails to improve voter competence in many contexts294 and could
cause cascades of undesirable information cascades.295 Critics might question
the bona fides of disclosure proponents and suggest that calls for mandatory
290. Id. at 670; see also Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of
Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REV. 265, 268
(2000) (“Disclosure laws have the best chance of passing constitutional muster if they contain
clear standards for disclosure that are not overly burdensome.”).
291. For a discussion of § 317 and the Zapple doctrine, see supra Part II.
292. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 647, 651 (2011) (critiquing mandated disclosure in the commercial context).
293. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1025 (“Not only is it not the case, given voters’
capabilities, that more information is always a good thing, but too much information can
overwhelm the ability of average Americans to process and understand information and may
result in their tuning out data that could provide helpful cues.”); see also Ben-Shahar &
Schneider, supra note 292, at 686–87 (discussing the “overload” effect of overly complex
disclosures and the “accumulation” problem of too many disclosures); Richard Briffault,
Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 299–301 (2010) (“[M]assive disclosure
. . . threatens to inundate us in a sea of useless data, while potentially distracting attention from
the big donors whose funds play a more meaningful role in understanding a candidate . . . .”). See
generally Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255 (2010)
(reviewing some of the negative aspects of disclosure).
294. Arguably, even if disclosure is focused more on providing heuristic shortcuts, rather
than enabling voters to engage in well-researched analyses, there may be extensive variation in
the effectiveness of the cues provided, as well as limits to the enhancement of low-information
voters’ political knowledge through heuristic cues. See Sheff, supra note 123, at 152 (“The
growing consensus is that, although heuristic cues can assist low-information voters in bringing
their political decisionmaking closer to that of fully informed voters, persistent deviations
remain.”). A critic of full disclosure might assert that we should only expect voters to receive
effective cueing effects from donors with clearly branded messages and politically active
celebrities, which allows voters to discover their association with a candidate or an issue. See
David Lourie, Note, Rethinking Donor Disclosure After the Proposition 8 Campaign, 83 S. CAL.
L. REV. 133, 155–56 (2009).
295. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1046 (discussing this possibility but concluding that
“disclosure of group support for candidates seems unlikely to significantly increase the number of
undesirable cascades and may actually forestall some from occurring”).

146

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 61:97

donor disclosure are little but attempts to suppress political speech and
association.296 They might also posit that such disclosure would have the
unintended consequence of corrupting candidates.297 More broadly, it is
unclear whether effective disclosure rules would suffice to resolve the much
deeper problems associated with our excessively complex campaign-finance
system.298 Some could fear that even good donor-disclosure rules would
merely provide an illusion of improvement while hiding increasing electoral
inequality.299
Despite these questions, this Article concludes that, on balance, mandatory
disclosure of donor information for political advertising through FCC rules is
desirable. Despite the risk of too much information leading to voter
disengagement, the news media, parties, and advocacy groups can serve as
intermediaries to collect, cull, and explain information for voters.300 Certainly
some information cascades can be avoided by the increased availability of
further credible information.301 In any event, donor-identification information
is easily processed, especially if it associates the message with an identifiable
political, ideological, or economic brand.302 Although heuristic cues cannot

296. See Alexandre Couture Gagnon & Filip Palda, The Price of Transparency: Do
Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws Discourage Political Participation by Citizens’ Groups?,
146 PUB. CHOICE 353, 353–74 (2011). Critics might suspect that mandatory disclosure rules
could lead to extensive silencing, even if they would not engender the degree of harassment that
would trigger the standard articulated in Citizens United. Indeed, some critics have already
characterized calls for enhanced donor disclosure as strategic Democratic attempts to deter
conservative speech. See, e.g., Yoo & Marston, supra note 25, at 5; see also James Bopp, Jr. &
Jared Haynie, Citizens Divided on Citizens United:Campaign Finance Reform and the First
Amendment: The Tyranny of “Reform and Transparency”: A Plea to the Supreme Court to
Revisit and Overturn Citizens United’s “Disclaimer and Disclosure” Holding, 16 NEXUS 3, 19
(2010) (making a parallel between disclosure requirements for election advertising and Nazi laws
requiring Jews to wear identifying armbands).
297. See Scott M. Noveck, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Legislative Process, 47
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 75, 75 (2010) (discussing the “unintended effect” of enabling political
candidates to trace the origin of their financial support).
298. See Note, Restoring Electoral Equilibrium in the Wake of Constitutionalized Campaign
Finance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1128–31 (2011).
299. See id. at 1545–47.
300. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1025–26 (“[I]nformation is usually filtered through
intermediaries like the press before it reaches average citizens, so worries about overload can be
overstated.”); Briffault, supra note 293, at 299–300.
301. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1026 (arguing that “targeting disclosure requirements to
the information most likely to improve voter competence is sensible”).
302. See id. at 1026–27 (“For group support to serve as a heuristic, at least three conditions
must be met. First, voters must correctly associate the group with a particular ideology or policy
position that allows them to draw inferences about the candidate’s ideology and likely behavior in
office. Second, the information conveyed by the group’s support must be credible. In other
words, the voters must be able to trust that the group really does support the candidate and is not
acting strategically to send a false signal. Third, voters must be able to learn of the group’s
support; it must be publicized, preferably at a time when it will affect voters’ decisions.”).
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completely substitute for extensive political knowledge and full information,
they are “a pragmatic shortcut that both improves voter competence and
preserves voters’ evaluative autonomy.”303 Even if all donors do not
necessarily support each of the organization’s statements, disclosure of their
support conveys information about both the donor’s and the group’s general
ideological commitments;304 this is particularly true when the donor provides
significant financial support.
The extent of giving can serve as a
common-sense measure of the donor’s commitment to the group.305 Given that
some donors will be identified through voluntary or media disclosure,
mandatory disclosure requirements would even the playing field for voters so
that the availability of relevant information would not depend “on the vagaries
of political competition for disclosure.”306 Despite some social scientists’
suggestions that disclosure requirements inhibit groups’ political involvement
for fear of prosecution for alleged violations of reporting requirements,307 the
number of political groups seems to be increasing.308
Finally, disclosure, which contextualizes the heuristic cues that
low-information voters may glean from political advertising, surely serves the
goal of reducing the gaps between uninformed voters and fully informed
voters.309 In today’s political climate, donor-disclosure rules are defensive,
rather than offensive, requirements aimed at preventing organizations that
endorse or criticize candidates from hiding their ideological commitments in
order to give a neutral or benign impression.310 These “notorious” groups
“strongly resist publicity . . . [and] work diligently to hide their campaign
spending from disclosure.”311 Groups use “stealth PACs” and “veiled political
actors” to evade FEC disclosure requirements.312 Examples of attempts to
send voter “mis-cues” abound in connection with both initiatives and candidate

As for the claim that donor disclosure can reveal the identities of major donors to candidates
and thereby increase the possibility of quid pro quo corruption, today’s practices of partial
disclosure are arguably more likely to lead to corruption than a general disclosure mandate.
303. Kang, supra note 132, at 1160.
304. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1026–29.
305. Id. at 1037; see Kang, supra note 132, at 1181.
306. Garrett, supra note 173, at 1031–32.
307. See, e.g., Gagnon & Palda, supra note 296, at 369, 373.
308. See Brookes, supra note 89 (discussing the increase in new entities and comparing the
current trend to the midterm elections); supra note 85 and accompanying text.
309. See Kang, supra note 132, at 1164–65.
310. Garrett, supra note 173, at 1033–35.
311. Id. at 1035; cf. Jonathan C. Zellner, Note, Artificial Grassroots Advocacy and the
Constitutionality of Legislative Identification and Control Measures, 43 CONN. L. REV. 357, 361
(2010) (discussing “Astroturf” lobbying, which constitutes lobbying campaigns pretending to
result from grass-roots activity despite actually being strategic enterprises sponsored by
special-interest groups).
312. Garrett, supra note 173, at 1035.
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elections.313 A neutral or benign-sounding sponsor name lulls the voter into
suspending her skepticism and believing the advertised claims.314 In these
circumstances, mandated donor disclosure does nothing more than set the
record straight and provide an accurate way for voters to assess the credibility
of what the aired advertisements tell them.315 In effect, such requirements
function to make voter cues as accurate and credible as possible.316 Viewed in
this light, an FCC requirement that political advertisers disclose their major
sponsors is little more than a call to correct misleading cues in many election
contests.317
3. What Should the FCC’s Disclosure Regulations Look Like?
As Professor Richard Briffault noted in the more general context of
campaign-finance disclosure rules, “effective disclosure of corporate campaign
spending is likely to require complex and detailed rules.”318 Yet, to avoid
constitutional problems, the rules must be constructed in a manner that avoids
vagueness and overbreadth.319 This Article does not propose to draft such
rules. Ideally, in doing so, the FCC should engage in a full-fledged rulemaking
proceeding during which it would solicit the full range of opinions.320 Yet,
with the 2012 election looming, a more expedited process might be prudent.321
In exercising its discretion, some guideposts are available to the FCC. The
agency should keep in mind both what donor disclosure is designed to achieve,
and the well-documented history of gaming and circumvention associated with
existing campaign-finance disclosure requirements.322
313. Id. at 1035–36 (providing the example of advertisements sponsored by the
pharmaceutical industry under the guise of “a conduit organization with a name that sounded as
though it was an organization of senior citizens”).
314. See id. at 1053–37.
315. See id. at 1037 (discussing the important effects of mandatory disclosure).
316. Id.
317. Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) (“The First Amendment protects
political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to speech of corporate
entities in a proper way. This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and
give proper weight to different speakers and messages.”); see also Garrett, supra note 173, at
1037 (explaining that mandatory disclosure provides a “vital voting cue”).
318. Briffault, supra note 5, at 645 (“With many business corporations likely to channel their
funds through other organizations, disclosure will have to address not merely the spender of
record, but the corporations and other donors contributing to those organizations.”); accord
Richard Briffault, Two Challenges for Campaign Finance Disclosure After Citizens United and
Doe v. Reed, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 983, 987 (2011).
319. See Hasen, supra note 290, at 268–69.
320. See PATRICIA MOLONEY FIGLIOLA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32589, THE FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION: CURRENT STRUCTURE AND ITS ROLE IN THE CHANGING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LANDSCAPE 3 n.4 (2011) (describing the FCC’s rulemaking process).
321. See id. at 9 (recommending strict time limits on FCC processes, including rulemaking).
322. See Elizabeth Garrett, The William J. Brennan Lecture in Constitutional Law: The
Future of Campaign Finance Reform Laws in the Courts and Congress, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L.
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Professor Elizabeth Garrett suggests that mandatory disclosure rules should
be designed to provide information “in a way that increases the chances that
[voters] will encounter it during the course of their everyday activities . . .
[and] should be tailored to provide only the information most necessary for
voter competence.”323 Although voter access to such information is important,
it is only one part of the equation. As a practical matter, it is equally, if not
more, important to ensure the ready availability of information for politically
interested expert groups and organizations, which may serve as informational
intermediaries for the voting public.324 For example, even if citizens do not
have all of the detailed information about who is behind a group like Citizens
United, making that information available to the media, non-partisan electionwatching entities and even political opponents in an easily usable form would
help such groups further inform the public by revealing the political views
behind the group’s ads.325 Thus, as the first imperative for a disclosure rule,
the FCC should make the information available electronically.326 Lengthy
disclosures embedded in short radio and television spots can confuse
prospective voters with too much indigestible information.327 Instead, the FCC
should consider references and links to outside websites during § 317
announcements.328
In addition, an FCC attempt to draft rules to achieve the Citizen United goal
of an informed voting public must address at least three challenges.329 First,
critics could respond that even if the FCC adopted a rule requiring disclosure
of donors to non-candidate organizations buying airtime, donors could easily
seek to circumvent disclosure by incorporating and hiding behind the corporate
shield.330 If donors could simply circumvent the § 317 requirement by
structuring the ad-purchasing groups and their donors as matryoshka
REV. 665, 687–88 (2002) (describing ways organizations have circumvented various disclosure
rules).
323. Garrett, supra note 173, at 1042; see also Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled
Political Actors and Campaign Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 295
(2005) (“Voters have limited time and attention, so they should be provided with information
most crucial to improving their ability to vote consistently with their preferences.”). See
generally Noveck, supra note 297 (discussing the range of possible disclosure regimes focused on
achieving anti-corruption effects).
324. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 323, at 298.
325. See id. at 298–99 (discussing the effect intermediary groups could have if provided with
donor disclosures).
326. Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010) (suggesting that the Internet will
play an important role in providing prompt disclosure, which would be readily accessible for the
public); Bingham, supra note 174, at 1061–62 (explaining a proposed FEC rule requiring the
availability of funding information on online databases).
327. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1065 (noting that too much information can inhibit a
viewer’s ability to comprehend the information).
328. See Bingham, supra note 174, at 1061–62.
329. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916.
330. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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corporations or dissolving them shortly after running ads,331 structural
flexibility permitted under non-FCC law could arguably hamper, if not negate,
any FCC disclosure regime.
Second, skeptics could argue that although a rule requiring disclosure of all
donors would be unworkable and undesirable, a rule limiting disclosure to just
some donors is necessarily arbitrary.332 On what basis is the FCC to set the
donor disclosure level? Identities of small donors are unlikely to function as
relevant cues or increase voter competence because such insubstantial amounts
are not generally informative, but excluding this category does not provide
much of a limit.333 MAP’s rulemaking petition asks the FCC to amend its rules
to require on-air disclosure in television ads of those donors giving twenty-five
percent, for a maximum of four listed sponsors.334 In addition, MAP also
proposes that the FCC require stations to keep in their public files a list
identifying contributors of ten percent or more to the ad’s nominal sponsor.335
331. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 323, at 296; Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 138, at 87–89;
see also Michael Isikoff, Firm Gives $ 1 Million to Pro-Romney group, Then Dissolves, Records
Offer No Clues Who Was Behind Mystery Company that Donated to ‘Super PAC’, MSNBC.COM
(Aug. 4, 2011, 6:01 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44011308/ns/politics-decision_2012/t/
firm-gives-million-pro-romney-group-then-dissolves/#.Tj2YTGH5NrY (describing one firm, W
Spann LLC, that disappeared shortly after contributing $1 million to the Romney 2012
presidential campaign, which left little evidence of donor information). Subsequently, the donor
behind the corporation’s contribution, a former partner of Romney’s in a private equity firm,
came forward to identify himself. See Dan Eggen, Mystery Pro-Romney Donor Revealed as
Former Executive at Private Equity Firm, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2011, at A2. The donor, Edward
Conard, had been a former partner of Mitt Romney’s in Bain Capital. See Brad Hooker, Men
Linked to Corporate Donations to Pro-Romney Super PAC Have Long History of Donating to
Romney, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Sept. 13, 2011, 4:50 PM), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/0
9/money-men-pro-romney-super PAC.html; see also Ronald Campbell, SuperPACs May
Leave Official Campaigns in Dust, OC REGISTER.COM (Sept. 19, 2011, 5:02 AM), http://articl
es.ocregister.com/2011-09-19/news/30177265_1_romney-super-pac-priorities-usa-action-romney
-campaign (discussing the affiliations of some super PACs with high-profile candidates).
332. See infra notes 342–47 and accompanying text.
333. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1042 (“The source and amount of small contributions
and expenditures are not generally informative to voters, so a disclosure statute should exempt
individuals and groups that spend insubstantial amounts in this arena. This exception may be
required for the law to pass certain constitutional tests, and it also enhances the effectiveness of
the statute.” (footnote omitted)); see also Briffault, supra note 318, at 1004 (noting that U.S.
“disclosure thresholds are . . . low by world standards” and that “[r]aising the disclosure threshold
would protect the privacy of the most vulnerable political actors—small donors—with little or no
harm to the public education function of disclosure”).
334. MAP Petition, supra note 25, at 7. The MAP petition suggested slightly different
treatment of multiple sponsorships on radio broadcasts. Id. at 7 n.11 (“MAP proposes that [the
Commission] limit on-air disclosure to persons or entities providing one-third or more of the
funding of a commercial message. Where 10% or more of a commercial’s funding comes from
one source, radio political ads could include a mandatory statement during the ad that ‘a list of
sponsors is available in this station’s public file.’”).
335. Id. at 8. The current rules require stations to maintain a publically available file listing
of “the chief executive officers or members of the executive committee or of the board of
directors” of each entity paying for or furnishing political programming. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(e)
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These proposals attempt to balance three types of interests: interests in privacy,
practicability, and promotion of accurate voter cues.336 Of course, although
these proposals appear reasonable, they beg the question of why these
particular limits, rather than other plausible options. Any FCC rule must
directly address this point.
Third, donor disclosure might not exhaust the information necessary for
voting in an informed manner. Although it is often useful to identify financial
support, there are many circumstances in which voters would benefit more
from knowing the masterminds who operate advocacy organizations than from
knowing their financial backers alone.337 The two categories are neither
necessarily distinct nor necessarily coextensive. For example, Republican
strategist Karl Rove’s direction of Crossroads GPS and American Crossroads
may be as important a voting cue as the identity of the groups’ major donors.338
Responding to these challenges in reverse order, this Article proposes first
that the FCC adopt rules requiring the disclosure of both direct and indirect
major funders, as well as directors and principal officers of the nominal
sponsor purchasing the air time. This rule will enable voters to take
appropriate cues from the source of funds as well as the advocacy group.339
The FCC should require disclosure to prevent donors from hiding behind
501(c) groups that do not have to disclose their donors.340 Further, the
identities of those directing the operations of the nominal sponsor should be
disclosed because their background and political connection could influence a
voter’s interpretation of the ad.341 If the sponsor is not a corporation, then the
agency should require disclosure of the principal decision-making individuals
associated with the entity.342
Second, the percentage chosen in the MAP petition as a threshold for donor
disclosure is no more arbitrary than any other percentage that would lead to a

(2010); see also id. § 73.3526(b)(2) (requiring stations that have a website to make their files
available online).
336. See Press Release, Media Access Project, Media Access Project to FCC: Mandate
Disclosure of Political Broadcast Sponsors (Mar. 22, 2011), available at http://www.media
access.org/2011/03/media-access-project-to-fcc-mandate-disclosure-of-political-broadcastsponsors/.
337. See, e.g., Kenneth P. Vogel, Rove the Bogeyman Is Back, POLITICO (Sept. 30, 2010,
4:32 AM), http://dyn.politico.com/members/forums/thread.cfm?catid=1&subcatid=2&threadid=4
572980&adv=1 (discussing the effect on the public and political opponents caused by identifying
Karl Rove as the backer of independent groups supporting Republican candidates); see also
Garrett, supra note 173, at 1043 (“In most cases . . . support by individuals is not an effective
heuristic because most well-known people do not have clear reputations for policy positions.”).
338. See Vogel, supra note 337.
339. See supra notes 336–38.
340. See Barker & Wang, supra note 11 (explaining how some groups currently can organize
to prevent disclosure).
341. See supra notes 336–38.
342. See supra notes 336–38 and accompanying text.
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consensus that such an amount is significant enough qualify a donor as a
“major funder.”343 The FCC can make a reasonable choice of threshold
percentage based on a balance of the relevant parties’ interests.344 The most
pressing need for voters is effective disclosure, due to the constraints of limited
time and attention.345 Broadcasters’ principal concerns are cost, ease of
administration, and the desire to increase political advertising.346 The interests
of donors include privacy and the desire to avoid harassment.347 Independent
groups are likely concerned with maintaining their reputations so as to garner
supporters and influence policymakers.348
Finally, the claim that the proposed disclosure rules invite circumvention is
no stronger in the FCC context than in any other disclosure-based reform.349
Although the opportunities for circumvention may exist, there are also costs
associated with circumventing such rules and hiding information.350 Failure to
disclose may also raise credibility concerns because viewers will wonder what
the group is hiding.351 Additionally, ideological organizations and their
participants often face the conflicting desires of hiding their memberships from
those who would disagree, while simultaneously publicizing their activities
and donors to those in their ideological camp.352 Satisfying both goals
becomes increasingly difficult, as organizational structures tilt toward secrecy.
At the same time, organizations trying to increase their political profiles might
feel that more transparency could strengthen influence.353 Furthermore,
343. Cf. Editorial, The FCC Muzzle, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2011, at A16 (“The petition also
seems to have pulled the 25% and 10% disclosure thresholds out of the air, because it makes no
attempt to justify them.”).
344. See supra note 336 and accompanying text.
345. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1012–13 (discussing the importance of making
information that is necessary for decision making easily available to voters who are too busy to
spend extended time learning about candidates).
346. See, e.g., Michael Corcoran & Stephen Maher, Media Don’t Bite the Ruling that Feeds
Them, FAIR (Jan. 2011), http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=4223.
347. See Garrett, supra note 173, at 1043.
348. See id. at 1027–28 (discussing the desire of independent groups to have the public know
who they support in order to encourage public supporters to become “due-paying members” and
to use their reputations to influence policymakers).
349. See Garrett, supra note 322, at 686–88 (describing ways in which organizations
circumvent various FCC and BCRA disclosure rules).
350. See, e.g., id. at 690 (“A candidate who discloses nothing does send an interesting signal
about her credibility.”); Garrett, supra note 173, at 1027 (explaining advocacy groups’ incentive
to publicize their views to attract supporters).
351. See Garrett, supra note 322, at 690.
352. See Garrett & Smith, supra note 323, at 297–99 (describing which organizations want to
publish their membership and when they might work to hide their membership); see also Garrett,
supra note 173, at 1027.
353. Admittedly, donors could choose to tell a partisan leadership group of their involvement
while still remaining undisclosed to the public. See, e.g., Barker & Wang, supra note 11 (“‘Say I
gave a million dollars to Crossroads GPS,’ said [Professor] Rick Hasen . . . ‘You can tell the
whole Republican leadership that. ProPublica can’t find it, but the people you are trying to
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independent ideological groups that seek to engage in political advertising vary
in their available resources and capacities.354 Strategies to evade disclosure
that might be financially and otherwise viable for large, sophisticated groups
might not be equally available to more modest organizations.355 Moreover,
FCC sponsorship-identification rules configured to require corporate donors to
reveal their directors, principal officers, and perhaps even major shareholders
would likely reveal the organization’s principal movers.356
4. Voluntarily Adopted Disclosure Guidelines
Nothing in the Communications Act or the FCC’s rules prohibits broadcast
stations and cable operators themselves from implementing their own private
rules requiring more explicit disclosure about the people and entities funding
and operating independent, third-party organizations.357
The main obstacle to stations voluntarily implementing their own disclosure
rules is the concern that independent political-support groups might shun those
stations requiring disclosure in favor of their less punctilious competitors. Fear
of competitive disadvantage and the loss of political-advertising revenue might
cause stations to be less willing to adopt contractual requirements
voluntarily.358 If, however, loss of competitive advantage is the only obstacle
impeding voluntary disclosure rules, corporations might be induced to adopt
them in exchange for rewards or benefits. For example, the FCC and other
organizations could give stations that have adopted voluntary disclosure rules
an approval rating similar to a Good Housekeeping seal of approval, which
could have positive reputational and economic value to the station and enhance
the station’s or network’s brand.359 In light of the public’s expressed distaste

influence can find it.’”). Nevertheless, people know that as soon as information is revealed to one
party, it will quickly spread to others.
354. See, e.g., Luo & Palmer, supra note 101 (describing considerable differences in
spending among various independent groups).
355. See Barker & Wang, supra note 11 (describing the levels of organization necessary to
evade disclosure); see also Garrett & Smith, supra note 323, at 296 (describing the complexity
required to obscure the other source of funding).
356. Sponsorship-identification rules grant broad authority to the FCC. See Sponsorship
Identification Rules, 34 F.C.C. 829, 849 (1963); Applicability of Sponsorship Identification
Rules, 40 F.C.C. 141, 141 (1963), modified, 40 Fed. Reg. 41,936 (Sept. 9, 1975). As a practical
matter, and to the extent that control follows investment, identification of the major actors in the
corporation would probably reveal important donors even if shareholder disclosure was not
directly required. Often, there will be an overlap between the directors and principal officers and
the shareholders of these companies.
357. See 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2006); see also supra Part II.A.1.
358. In fact, stations heavily rely on political advertisements for their revenue. See, e.g.,
Corcoran & Maher, supra note 346 (“Political ads are expected to account for 11 percent of the
total revenue for local broadcasters this year . . . .”); Malone, supra note 82.
359. See The History of the Good Housekeeping Seal, GOODHOUSEKEEPER, http://www.
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for negative advertising,360 some stations might opt for voluntary disclosure
policies particularly if they were not alone in doing so.
C. Revival of a Zapple-Type Antidiscrimination Doctrine for Independent Ads
In addition to forcing third-party disclosures, the FCC could apply a rule
based on its dormant Zapple doctrine to post-Citizens United advertising
expenditures.361 The FCC has the authority to adopt this quasi-equal
opportunities rule, which could have a beneficial impact on disclosure, at least
on the margins.362
Because the FCC never repudiated the Zapple doctrine, it still exists
unofficially, although it has rarely been asserted with success.363 Critics would
argue that the possibility of an equal opportunities requirement for
independent-group ads is doomed because the Zapple doctrine has its roots in
the now-abandoned fairness doctrine.364 However, a revival of the fairness
goodhousekeeping.com/product-reviews/history/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2011). The possibility that
advertisers could move their business to other types of media does not necessarily mean that this
kind of voluntary, industry-based “branding” approach would fail.
360. See Tom Denari, Why Attack Ads and Disney Movies Are So Darned Effective, ADAGE
(Oct. 19, 2010), http://adage.com/article/small-agency-diary/attack-ads-disney-movies-darnedeffective/146579/; Do Negative Campaign Ads Work?, THISNATION.COM (Oct. 25, 2011),
http://thisnation.com/question/031.html (“[V]oters overwhelmingly dislike negative advertising
and are troubled by its widespread use.”); Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Skeptical About What
They See in Political Ads, GALLUP (Oct. 20, 2006), http://www.gallup.com/poll/25093/americans
-skeptical-about-what-they-see-political-ads.aspx (discussing the public’s distaste for negative
advertising in political campaigns).
361. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the Zapple doctrine).
362. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2006) (granting the FCC the authority to require broadcasters to
provide equal opportunity to opposing candidates).
363. See Vandell, supra note 208, at 455–56 (“The Zapple doctrine has survived, though
successful complainants are rarely brought against networks for following it.”).
364. See id. at 456 (“Congress has never codified the Zapple rule, and so its future is in a
much more precarious position after the fairness doctrine’s repeal . . . .”). After much critique,
the FCC abandoned the fairness doctrine in 1987. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043,
5057 (1987) (memorandum opinion and order), aff’d sub nom. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC,
867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In August 2011, the FCC officially removed the fairness doctrine
from its books. John Eggerton, FCC Strikes Fairness Doctrine from Fed Rulebook,
BROADCASTING & CABLE (Aug. 22, 2011, 2:00 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article
/472722-FCC_Strikes_Fairness_Doctrine_From_Fed_Rulebook.php.
Many years after the FCC abandoned the general fairness doctrine, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit ordered the FCC to repeal the personal-attack and political-editorializing
rules, which were particular applications of the fairness doctrine. See Radio-Television News
Dirs. Ass’n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Repeal or Modification of the Personal
Attack and Political Editorial Rules, 65 Fed. Reg. 66,643, 66,644 (Nov. 7, 2000) (revising
sections 73 and 76 of Title 47 of the Code of Federal Regulations).
Calling for the revival of a regulatory doctrine associated with the fairness doctrine may be
particularly dangerous as a political matter. Perhaps because of the view that right-wing talk
radio was able to develop only because of the demise of the fairness doctrine, conservatives are
strongly opposed to a return of the doctrine. See Stephen Clark, FCC Agrees to Take ‘Fairness
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doctrine is not a necessary prerequisite for the application of the Zapple-type
antidiscrimination doctrine to independent expenditures.365 Commissioner
Nicholas Johnson, in his concurring opinion in Zapple, chided the FCC’s
decision as effectively “bring[ing] in ‘supporters’ of or ‘spokesmen’ for
candidates through the back door of the fairness doctrine.”366 He saw “no legal
reason why the Commission could not rule that sec. 315 (a) encompasses
spokesmen for or supporters of political candidates as a logical extension of
congressional intent.”367 This Article does not contend that § 315, in an
expanded reading, should cover airtime purchases by independent groups;
rather, it proposes that the FCC can and should apply antidiscrimination
principles to airtime sales for non-candidate electoral speech under the
ancillary authority granted to the FCC to effectuate the goals of § 315.

Doctrine’ Off the Books, FOXNEWS.COM (June 8, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/
06/08/fcc-agrees-to-take-fairness-doctrine-off-books/.
365. The Zapple doctrine was associated with the now-defunct fairness doctrine only because
the request for an interpretive ruling from which the Zapple doctrine was derived was specifically
couched in terms of the fairness doctrine. See Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C. 2d 707, 707 (1970).
Rather than an application of the fairness doctrine, the Zapple doctrine is, in fact, much closer to a
determination of the outer parameters of the equal opportunities principle under the FCC’s
ancillary jurisdiction. See infra notes 373–80.
This is not inconsistent with the FCC’s recent rejection, under judicial duress, of its
personal-attack and political-editorializing rules. See Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n, 229
F.3d at 272; Repeal or Modification of the Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 643. The FCC’s now-eliminated political-editorializing rule had required broadcasters
endorsing a candidate to notify the candidate’s opponents and offer them equal opportunities to
respond to the endorsement. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1930 (1998). The personal-attack rule required
broadcasters to notify the victim of an on-air attack on her character or integrity and offer equal
opportunities to the subject of the attack to respond. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920. Broadcasters
challenged the personal-attack and political-editorializing rules after the fairness doctrine was
struck down, but the challenges were stalled on the FCC docket for years prior to the Court of
Appeals’s intervention. See Radio-Television News Dirs. Ass’n, 184 F.2d at 877–78 (recanting the
history of challenges to the personal-attack and political-editorializing rules).
Repeal of the political-editorializing and personal-attack rules should not necessarily imply the
same outcome for the Zapple doctrine. These rules were far more intrusive on editorial discretion
than the quasi-equal opportunities doctrine. The political-editorializing rule directly penalized
broadcasters’ decisions to make political endorsements, and doubtless had a chilling effect on
direct political speech by the broadcast licensee itself. Similarly, the personal-attack rule imposed
a potentially onerous and vague obligation to identify attacks and provide free response time. In
addition to these distinctions, it should be noted that the personal-attack and
political-editorializing rules arose not out of § 315, but directly out of the fairness doctrine from
the outset. In fact, the famous case in which the Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment
challenge to the fairness doctrine—Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC—dealt with those rules
rather than the general fairness-doctrine obligation. See generally 395 U.S. 367 (1960).
366. Zapple, 23 F.C.C. 2d at 710 n.4.
367. Id. (charging that the majority failed to explain why “the Commission is apparently
unwilling to enlarge sec.315(a), but willing to narrow the Cullman interpretation of the fairness
doctrine. There may well be policy reasons for this approach; if so, I would have preferred that
they appear in the majority’s letter”).
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The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, recognized by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., provided that the FCC should have
the authority to regulate in a manner “reasonably ancillary to the effective
performance of [its] various responsibilities for the regulation of television
broadcasting.”368 Given the FCC’s express statutory authority to regulate
political advertisements under § 315, the FCC can reasonably read the
ancillary-jurisdiction doctrine to permit the adoption of regulations that adapt
the statutory antidiscrimination regime to the realities of modern political
advertising.369 Although the dangers of an expansive ancillary jurisdiction
doctrine are evident, adoption of an antidiscrimination rule akin to Zapple’s
368. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968) (interpreting the 1968
incarnation of 47 U.S.C. § 152(a)). Under this grant of authority, the FCC commenced its
regulation of cable television two decades before Congress enacted the Cable Communications
Act of 1984. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & A. Richard Metzger, Jr., FCC Regulatory Authority
over Commercial Television Networks: The Role of Ancillary Jurisdiction, 77 NW. U. L. REV.
403, 436–39 (1982); see also Cable Communications Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98–549, 98 Stat. 2779.
Title I of the Act also gives the FCC authority to “perform any and all acts, make such rules and
regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may be necessary in the
execution of its functions.” 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2006). This provision is often referred to as the
“necessary and proper” clause of the Act. John Blevins, Jurisdiction as Competition Promotion:
A Unified Theory of the FCC’s Ancillary Jurisdiction, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 585, 596 & n.53
(2009). The extent of the agency’s ancillary authority is also part of the current discussion on
FCC’s authority to regulate the Internet. See, e.g., id. at 587; James B. Speta, The Shaky
Foundations of the Regulated Internet, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 107 (2010)
[hereinafter Speta, Shaky Foundations]. More specifically, with regard to radio and television,
the preamble to section 303 of the Communications Act of 1934 provides that the standard for
FCC action is “public convenience, interest, or necessity.” Communications Act of 1934, §303,
47 U.S.C. § 303 (2006). Section 303(r) of the current statute authorizes the FCC to “[m]ake such
rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as
may be necessary.” Id. § 303(r). Section 315(d) provides that “[t]he Commission shall prescribe
appropriate rules and regulations to carry out” its statutory authority. Id. § 315(d).
For further discussions of the Commission’s ancillary authority, see Susan P. Crawford, The
Ambulance, the Squad Car, & the Internet, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 873, 925–31 (2006); Joseph
R. Fogarty & Marcia Spielholz, FCC Cable Jurisdiction: From Zero to Plenary in Twenty-Five
Years, 37 FED. COMM. L.J. 113 passim (1985); Mark D. Hoffer, The Power of the FCC to
Regulate Cable Pay-TV: Jurisdictional and Constitutional Limitations, 53 DENV. U. L. REV. 477
passim (1976); Krattenmaker & Metzger, supra, passim; James B. Speta, FCC Authority to
Regulate the Internet: Creating It and Limiting It, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 15, 22–30 (2003)
[hereinafter Speta, FCC Authority]; Speta, Shaky Foundations, supra, at 107; Philip J. Weiser,
Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 41, 50–51 (2003).
369. 47 U.S.C. § 315(d). Perhaps the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine was not mentioned in
Zapple because its recognition by the Supreme Court in the 1968 Southwestern Cable decision
was so recent at that time. See supra note 368 and accompanying text. In addition, the Zapple
ruling was issued in response to a request specifically phrased in fairness-doctrine terms. See
Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d at 707. Because the fairness doctrine was still in force and could easily
resolve the questions posed, and because (as pointed out by Commissioner Nicholas Johnson in
his concurrence) the FCC had previously taken the position that § 315(a) did not apply to airtime
purchases by candidate supporters, the FCC may not have thought it necessary to revisit § 315(a)
or invoke the new doctrine of ancillary authority. See supra notes 363, 366–67 and
accompanying text.
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quasi-equal opportunities is a far less aggressive exercise of regulatory power
than others the FCC has previously justified under the mantle of ancillary
authority.370
370. To be sure, the ancillary-jurisdiction doctrine is controversial and its boundaries unclear.
See, e.g., Blevins, supra note 368, at 587 (“Analyzing the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction has been
an exercise in confusion.”). Some have criticized the doctrine as “vague and incoherent,”
whereas others have warned of its “virtually limitless” scope. Id. Professor (and former FCC
Commissioner) Glen Robinson views the FCC’s use of the doctrine to regulate cable as a seminal
example of the agency “creat[ing] its mandate out of thin air.” Glen O. Robinson, Regulating
Communications: Stories from the First Hundred Years, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 303, 308–09 (2010).
Regardless of one’s view of the extent of the FCC’s residual authority to regulate technologies
not clearly subject to the Act in the absence of explicit statutory jurisdiction, application of
ancillary authority to the narrow context of political ads should be far less troublesome. In the
context of political advertising, the FCC would be regulating areas in which it has much more
express statutory authority, and with regard to technologies, it is expressly authorized to regulate
in the public interest, convenience, and necessity. See Krattenmaker & Metzger, supra note 368,
at 454–55 (proposing that “the Commission’s jurisdiction extends to entities that (1) own,
operate, or use interstate wire or radio communications facilities; and (2) thereby engage in
activities that have a substantial impact on the Commission’s ability to carry out its statutory
obligations”). In other words, a Zapple-like equal opportunities regime for third-party political
advertising is arguably “sufficiently close to the underlying jurisdictional hook” to fit a traditional
account of when courts uphold FCC exercises of ancillary jurisdiction. See Blevins, supra note
368, at 607 (describing and criticizing the traditional account). For an early judicial recognition
of the FCC’s “expansive powers” to regulate under the Communications Act of 1934, see Nat’l
Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943) (approving the FCC’s broad “chain
broadcasting” rules, which were designed to curb monopolistic network power, even though the
agency did not have direct statutory authority over broadcast networks).
Of course, reasonable minds could disagree as to the closeness of the relationship between
direct statutory authority and any given exercise of FCC ancillary authority. See Blevins, supra
note 368, at 607–08 (“What exactly makes a given regulatory scheme ‘close’ to the underlying
statutory authority? Are there any objectively verifiable ways to assess it?”). Critics of the
approach suggested here could also claim that the FCC should not be able to adopt regulations
under its ancillary authority that could be said to undermine the legislative intent behind the direct
statutory hook. In addition, those who seek to limit the exercise of ancillary authority to
situations in which regulation will promote market competition might be concerned that a Zappletype rule would extend ancillary jurisdiction improperly to promote controversial non-economic
goals. Id. at 617–18, 627–28.
These objections should not, however, preclude a quasi-equal opportunities rule grounded on
ancillary jurisdiction. Political broadcasting is one area in which there should be little
disagreement that the goals of the explicit statutory provisions would be closely promoted by a
well-crafted and reasonable Zapple-type rule. Congress saw “radio’s potential importance as a
medium of communication of political ideas [and] . . . sought to foster its broadest possible
utilization.” Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 529 (1959).
Moreover, if independent third-party ads are likely to flood radio and television during elections,
the FCC needs the power to prevent partisan distortions in such ads so that they do not undermine
the goals of § 315. If cable regulation was properly justified under the FCC’s ancillary
jurisdiction because of cable’s impact on broadcasting, then surely the FCC should have the
authority to regulate non-candidate ads possibly affecting the role of candidate equal
opportunities in the electoral scheme. See infra note 385 (noting that neither the legislative
history nor the text of § 315 establish whether a Zapple rule would be inconsistent with § 315).
Courts have affirmed exercises of FCC ancillary authority in circumstances of clearer tension.
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Indeed, there is a direct relationship between ensuring rough equivalence in
independent political ads and effectuating the congressional intent behind
§ 315(a), which provides political opponents with equal opportunities to
address the voters.371 Without a similar antidiscrimination principle applied to
independent-group advertising, opposing independent advocates could well
drown out the candidates whose speech is protected under § 315(a).372 The
FCC surely has the authority to ensure that § 315(a) does not become an
insignificant and irrelevant element in a political discourse.
The Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934 envisioned a
politics in which broadcasters would not stack the deck against candidates’
opportunities to speak to the voters.373 Today’s political reality—in contrast to
that of 1927 and 1934—is that much election advertising is controlled not by
parties or candidates, but by third-party, independent groups.374 The § 315
antidiscrimination principle originated from legislators’ concerns about
discriminatory sales of political-advertising time.375 Today, when independent
advertising expenditures may well exceed candidate- and party-funded ads, it
would be prudent to ensure that broadcast licensees do not unduly favor a
particular side and thereby effectively eviscerate § 315(a).376

See Blevins, supra note 368, at 595–600. Perhaps that is because too limiting a reading of the
direct statutory authority would effectively eliminate ancillary authority. Finally, whatever the
merits in general of distinguishing between economic and noneconomic regulatory goals to
justify the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, a reasonable attempt to prevent strategic political
partisanship in the transmission of independent political ads would not likely be a controversial
goal as such. Disagreement would likely be limited to the particulars of the rules as adopted.
371. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a).
372. See supra Part II.A.2.
373. See Vandell, supra note 208, at 446 (discussing the history of § 315(c)).
374. See Barker & Wang, supra note 11 (discussing the rapidly increasing rule of
independent groups in recent years); see also Gold & Mason, supra note 20 (discussing the
relationship between candidates and independent support groups). On the other hand, it is true
that such independent groups can informally coordinate with parties and candidates. See Barker
& Wang, supra note 11 (discussing the interplay between independent groups and parties and
candidates); Hooker, supra note 331.
375. Herbert Hoover, then-Secretary of Commerce, testified before Congress in the 1920s
that “[w]e can not allow any single person or group to place themselves in position where they
can censor the material which shall be broadcasted to the public, nor do I believe that the
Government should ever be placed in the position of censoring this material.” To Regulate Radio
Communication: Hearing on H.R. 7357 Before H. Comm. on the Merchant Marine & Fisheries,
68th Cong. 8 (1924) (statement of Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce). Many congressmen
sought common-carrier status for broadcasters with respect to use of stations for political
candidates and “discussion of any question affecting the public.” Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc. v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 104 (1973) (quoting 67 CONG. REC. 12,503 (1928)).
Ultimately, the 1927 Act did not include common-carrier language, but it did include an amended
equal opportunities provision, which has since been enacted in § 315. Id.
376. Cf. Reed-Huff, supra note 31, at 204 (discussing increasing levels of independent
advertising expenditures).
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It is important for the FCC to provide a bulwark against partisan decisions
by broadcasters with respect to advocacy ads. Some critics of this assertion
might argue that this kind of antidiscrimination rule is unnecessary, because
private, profit-maximizing broadcast licensees, which are increasingly reliant
on political advertising for their bottom lines, will not sacrifice profit at the
altar of ideology.377 However, this is not entirely reassuring, as the history of
broadcasting contains examples of political favoritism.378 Today, as well,
entities like Fox Broadcasting give reason to fear electoral partisanship by at
least some broadcasters.379 Moreover, industry accounts suggest that groups
spurred by Citizens United may inundate broadcasters with requests for
third-party political ads.380 If stations are faced with a scarcity of airtime
available for political advertising during peak electoral periods, they will have
to select from a number of competing advertisements and advertisers. This
might lead to at least some partisan effects, even if political partisanship is not
the official policy of the station.381 If that is so, then a quasi-equal
opportunities rule could help level the playing field among non-candidate
electoral advertisers.382

377. See supra note 358 (noting stations’ heavy reliance on political-advertising revenue).
378. See Vandell, supra note 208, at 44 (highlighting that concern over “politically interested
media owners” and paternalistic concern for the public were factors that led to the adoption of
§ 315(a)).
379. See, e.g., Stephen Clark, FCC Agrees to Take ‘Fairness Doctrine’ Off the Books,
FOXNEWS.COM (June 8, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/06/08/fcc-agrees-to-takefairness-doctrine-off-books/.
380. Reed-Huff, supra note 31, at 204 (citing Downey, supra note 195).
381. Cf. Jeremy P. Jacobs, Media Buying After Citizens United, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS,
June 2010, at 10 (discussing the increased competition among advertisers after Citizens United).
382. See supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text. Alternatively, the application of the
Zapple doctrine arguably could have the negative effect of “tak[ing] [further] inventory away
from the candidates.” Cf. Jacobs, supra note 381, at 10 (arguing that because third-party groups
are not guaranteed the stations’ lowest unit rates applicable to candidate advertising, broadcasters
might prefer to sell airtime to them, thereby putting candidates “at a disadvantage because
wealthy third party groups could lock in their ad buys early, before a candidate has raised the
money to cover his or her media plan”). On this view, imposing Zapple obligations on third-party
advertising might create a scarcity of broadcast ad time for candidates, who might shift to nonbroadcast advertising venues, leaving broadcast television as the noisy battleground of third-party
groups. However, this is not likely to happen very soon. First, broadcasters have statutory
obligations to offer equal opportunities when § 315 applies and to provide reasonable access to
federal candidates under § 312(a)(7). See 47 U.S.C. §§ 312(a)(7), 315 (2006). They logically
must be conservative in their third-party airtime sales to make sure that they can meet candidate
airtime requests. Second, broadcast television and cable are still the most significant advertising
venues. Katharine Q. Seelye, About $2.6 Billion Spent on Political Ads in 2008, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 2, 2008, 4:15 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/02/about-26-billion-spenton-political-ads-in-2008/. The Internet, although increasingly important, cannot yet compete with
the traditional electronic media, so it is unrealistic to expect massive candidate flight from
television.
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This Article does not follow Commissioner Johnson’s lead in Zapple383 by
arguing that requiring equal opportunities for a candidate’s supporters and
opponents is a logical interpretation of § 315(a). One simple reason is that
reading independent third-party political advertising into § 315(a) would
stretch the statutory language384 and legislative history.385 Another is that strict
383. Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C.2d 707, 709–11 (1970) (Johnson, Comm’r, concurring).
384. See 47 U.S.C. § 315. The statutory language limiting its application to “legally
qualified candidates” constrains how expansively § 315(a) can reasonably be interpreted. See id.
It would not unduly stretch the statute to conclude that equal opportunities should apply not only
to candidates, but also to the candidate’s authorized speakers. In such circumstances, the
authorized speaker would effectively be acting as a proxy for the candidate, and the statutory
language could reasonably be considered to cover such speakers. As for unauthorized supporters,
the statute could be interpreted to include such independent speakers if the statutory terms
“legally qualified candidates” could be read to refer not to candidates, but to candidacies. Such a
reading, however, conflicts with the § 315 language securing equal opportunities to “any person
who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station.” Id.
(emphasis added).
385. One argument for why the FCC should not seek to situate a Zapple-type doctrine in the
equal opportunities provision itself is that in 1927 and 1934 Congress chose not to enact proposed
bills that would have extended equal opportunities to candidate supporters and parties. Although
the legislative history provides no clear explanation of why Congress so limited equal
opportunities, it could be argued that Congress, by its actions, effectively rejected Zapple-like
protections. See Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., 186 F.2d 1, 3 (3d Cir. 1950)
(“[T]here are strong reasons for advocating . . . a broad construction [of § 315 to include
broadcasts by candidate supporters]. When we turn to the legislative history of Section 315,
however, we find this very question of including supporters of candidates within the purview of
that section has been specifically considered and rejected by the Congress, which has made it
perfectly clear that the section is intended to apply only to the personal use of broadcasting
facilities by the candidates themselves.”).
Before the passage of the Radio Act of 1927, a significant number of congressmen objected to
what they called private censorship by broadcasters and called for licensees to be regulated as
common carriers, required to provide “equal service and equal treatment to all.” Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 105 (1972) (quoting 67 CONG. REC.
5482 (1926) (statement of Rep. Edwin Davis)). A bill reported to the Senate by the Committee
on Interstate Commerce specified that broadcasters could “make no discrimination as to the use
of such broadcasting station” if they permitted their stations to be used “for the discussion of any
question affecting the public.” Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 69-404, at 18 (1926)). However, many
others objected to broadcasters becoming common carriers “compelled to accept anything and
everything that was offered.” Id. (quoting 67 CONG. REC. 12,502 (statement of Sen. Clarence
Dill)). Senator Clarence Dill, explaining the need for an amendment to the proposed legislation,
stated the view that “[w]hen we recall that broadcasting today is purely voluntary, and the
listener-in pays nothing for it, that the broadcaster gives it for the purpose of building up his
reputation, it seemed unwise to put the broadcaster under the hampering control of being a
common carrier.” Id. Ultimately as passed, section 18 provided that:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any
public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all
other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station, and the
licensing authority shall make rules and regulations to carry this provision into effect:
Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material
broadcast under the provisions of this paragraph. No obligation is hereby imposed upon
any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate.

2011]

Plan B for Campaign Finance Reform

161

Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, §18, 44 Stat. 1162, 1170; see also 5 AMERICAN
LANDMARK LEGISLATION: PRIMARY MATERIALS 419–52 (Irving J. Sloan, ed. 1977) (discussing
the legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934).
Before the passage of the 1934 Act as well, Congress sought to require licensees to give equal
opportunities to candidate supporters and opponents “‘to permit equal opportunity for the
presentation of both sides of public questions.’”
Mark R. Arbuckle, The Evolving
“Communications Marketplace”: Rethinking Broadcast Fairness Two Decades After Syracuse
Peace Council, 18 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 69, 72 (2008) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 72-2106, at 4
(1933)). In the 72nd Congress, the House and Senate both passed H.R. 7716, a bill to amend the
Radio Act of 1927, which contained an amendment broadening section 18, “generally referred to
as the ‘political section[,]’ [which was] designed to insure equality of treatment to candidates for
public office, those speaking in support of or in opposition to any candidate for public office, or
in the presentation of views on public questions.” 76 CONG. REC. 5038 (1933); see 5 AMERICAN
LANDMARK LEGISLATION, supra, at 448. Without explanation, President Herbert Hoover pocketvetoed this amendment in addition to numerous other pieces of legislation in 1933. Arbuckle,
supra, at 72; see also Turner Catledge, Congress Ends in Solemn Dignity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5,
1933, at D5. In the next Congress, a bill including a proposed § 315 modeled on the expanded
section 18 that had been pocket vetoed was again introduced in the Senate. S. 3285, 73rd Cong.
(1934). Although the Senate passed the bill “extend[ing] the requirement of equality of treatment
of political candidates to supporters and opponents of candidates, and public questions before the
people for a vote,” differences between the Senate and House bills led to the appointment of a
conference committee, whose report struck out this expanded equal opportunities provision.
Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, Inc., 186 F.2d 3, 5 (1950); 5 AMERICAN LANDMARK
LEGISLATION, supra, at 450–52. Instead, it was decided that the new § 315 should mirror section
18 of the Radio Act of 1927. See 78 CONG. REC. 10,988 (1934) (reflecting the conferees’ report,
without explanation, that “[t]he Senate provisions, which would have modified and extended the
present law, is not included in the substitute”). Ultimately, Congress passed § 315 of the
Communications Act of 1934 without any reference to uses of broadcast stations by noncandidates. The Third Circuit read this legislative history as “clearly disclos[ing] the intention of
the Congress with respect to a provision which otherwise might be regarded as ambiguous.”
Felix, 186 F.2d at 5.
Nevertheless, an argument can be made that a Zapple-like quasi-equal opportunities FCC
regulation would not, in fact, be inconsistent with congressional intent if we focus on the entire
period at the dawn of radio regulation and the overall legislative debates. First, there was strong
legislative sentiment throughout the period for an expansion of the non-discrimination provision
beyond candidates. See Arbuckle, supra, at 72. But for the President’s unexplained pocket veto
of H.R. 7716 in 1933, an equal opportunities requirement extending to supporters and opponents
of candidates would have amended section 18 of the Radio Act and become law. Id. Although
President Hoover did not explain the veto, it is unlikely to have resulted from the
equal opportunities provision. See id. Thereafter, S. 3285, which passed in the Senate, expanded
§ 315 by “extend[ing] the requirement of equality of treatment of political candidates to
supporters and opponents of candidates, and public questions before the people for a vote.” S.
REP. NO. 72-564, at 10 (1932). Available records do not explain the trimming of the provision by
the conference committee, which resulted in the limited version appearing in the Communications
Act of 1934. At worst, then, the legislative history shows a controversial provision that missed
becoming law by a hair’s breadth.
Second, congressional discussion throughout this period also demonstrates a concern that
legislating equal opportunities for the discussion of public issues would lead broadcasters to avoid
airing discussions of public issues. 67 CONG. REC. 12,504 (1926). In a statement delivered
during a Senate hearing on S. 2910 in 1934, an officer of the National Association of
Broadcasters characterized “the inevitable effect” of the proposed § 315 as “tak[ing] away the
usefulness of radio by driving political discussions off the air.” A Bill to Provide for the
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Regulation of Interstate and Foreign Communications by Wire or Radio, and for Other Purposes:
Hearing on S. 2910 Before the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 73rd Cong. 67 (1934)
(statement of Henry Bellows, Officer of the Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters) [hereinafter Hearing on
S. 2910]. This may have been, in part, because of concerns about imposing expanded defamation
liability on broadcasters. Under one of the proposed bills, for example, broadcasters would not
have any power of censorship over the political speech they aired, but they would not be granted
the immunity against defamation liability later recognized in WDAY. See 68 CONG. REC. 4152
(1926) (statement of Sen. Robert Howell). The larger the number of people who would have to
be granted equal opportunities, the larger the threat of defamation liability for the stations. It is
because of this that the National Assocation of Broadcasters representative argued against S.
2190: “It says, in effect, that since the present situation [liability without the right to censor under
section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927] is intolerable, this bill [will] make it very much worse.”
Hearing on S. 2910, supra, at 67; see also 68 CONG. REC. 4152 (1926) (Statement of Sen. Robert
Howell). If this is so, then the objecting congressmen were worried not about equal opportunities
for political speech by candidate supporters as such, but by the expanded defamation liability
such speakers would pose under a regime in which no immunity was statutorily provided.
Hearing on S. 2910, supra, at 67; 68 CONG. REC. 4152 (1926) (statement of Sen. Robert Howell).
In addition to concerns about defamation liability, broadcasters also expressed concern about the
potentially expansive obligations to provide equal opportunities: “If I permit 1 person to speak
over a station for 15 minutes in behalf of a candidate, then I must permit 50 other people to have
the same amount of time each. That is what you say but I take it that is not what you meant.” To
Amend the Radio Act of 1927: Hearing on H.R. 7716 Before the S. Comm. on the Interstate
Commerce, 72nd Cong. 11 (1932) (statement of Henry Bellows, Officer of the Nat’l Ass’n of
Broadcasters).
Third, none of the unsuccessful bills limited the expansion of equal opportunities just to
supporters and opponents of candidates. In rejecting those provisions, Congress was thus
rejecting much more expansive regulation than simply broadcasts by candidate supporters or
opponents. The proposed bills effectively turned broadcasters into common carriers in the area of
speech on matters of public concern. See 67 CONG. REC. 12,502 (1926) (Statement of Sen.
Clarence Dill). Many legislators, including Senator Dill, objected to the transformation of radio
stations into common carriers. Id. Thus, it is not clear whether the application of equal
opportunities only to supporters and opponents of candidates would necessarily have been seen as
posing as great a threat.
Fourth, one commentator claims that “key legislators believed the 1927 Radio Act already
required stations to provide fair access to non-candidates. In their view, it was not necessary to
add a fairness amendment since the Radio Act was left intact when it was transplanted into the
1934 Act.” Arbuckle, supra, at 73. As documented in the legislative history, some commented
that discrimination in political advertising had not been a significant problem prior to 1927,
indicating a desire to limit the relevance of the issue. See 68 CONG. REC. 3032, 3258 (1927)
(statement of Sen. Clarence Dill). There is also evidence that “many licensees have operated on
the assumption that supporters are also included. They have made equal time available to
opposing supporters, parties and candidates.” Jack H. Friedenthal & Richard J. Medalie, The
Impact of Federal Regulation on Political Broadcasting: Section 315 of the Communications Act,
72 HARV. L. REV. 445, 484–65 (1959); Note, Campaign Speeches on Radio and TV: Impartiality
Via the Communications Act, 61 YALE L.J. 87, 89 (1952) (footnote omitted). They may have
done so on the assumption that their public interest obligations and the FCC’s fairness doctrine
required it. Now that the fairness doctrine is no longer part of the FCC’s regulatory arsenal, it
could be argued that it is necessary to assimilate speech by candidates’ supporters and opponents
back into § 315.
Finally, the original drafters of radio law were open to statutory revision in light of experience.
Given the “new and undeveloped” character of the radio industry, Senator Dill argued in 1926
that Congress should not “put too many legislative shackles around the industry at this stage of its
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application of the § 315 regime would be unworkable. Even though
broadcasters have been known to complain about “equal time” burdens in
crowded electoral fields, it is easy enough to determine who should be
considered a “legally qualified candidate” under § 315.386 However, the
universe of groups and individuals potentially entitled to equal opportunities
under an expanded definition of § 315(a) is both far greater and more
uncertain. Given the potentially innumerable equal opportunity requests that
could be received in response to a single ad supporting or opposing a
candidate, a broadened application of the equal opportunities provision could
paralyze broadcasters and cable operators. Indeed, in an election with many
candidates and support groups, imagining circumstances in which a station
would not be vulnerable to a claim that it had not provided strictly equal
opportunities to all views would be very difficult. Further, the legislative
histories of the Communications Act and the Radio Act demonstrate a concern
that requiring equal opportunities for the discussion of public issues would
overburden broadcasters with demands for equal airtime because “public
issue” can be interpreted very broadly.387
Of course, neither the Communications Act nor the FCC’s rules prohibit
broadcast licensees from either rejecting non-candidate political advertising or
negotiating its revision.388 In Columbia Broadcasting Systems v. Democratic
National Committee, the Supreme Court explicitly upheld broadcaster
discretion to reject advocacy advertising.389 Thus, broadcasters could choose
to reject an offensive or misleading political advertisement.390 Indeed, the

development.” 68 CONG. REC. 3028 (1927). As broadcast interference called for legislation, but
the two Houses could not agree, Senator Dill argued for passage of a compromise statute open to
future revision. Id. In sum, Congress’s passage of equal opportunities provisions limited to
candidates in 1927 and 1934 need not be read as an explicit rejection of a general
antidiscrimination principle with regard to political advertising by candidates’ supporters and
opponents.
Despite these arguments about the legislative history of the early radio statutes, this Article
takes the position that there are policy advantages to grounding a Zapple-like doctrine on the
FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction rather than in the logic of § 315, regardless of Commissioner
Johnson’s position in Zapple.
386. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1940 (a)(1) (2010). The regulation includes additional requirements for
legal qualification as well. Id. § 73.1940.
387. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 99, 106–07 (1973)
(quoting 67 CONG. REC. 12,509 (1926)). Congress wanted to avoid setting up broadcasters as
common carriers required to air everything that came their way “so long as the price was paid.”
Id. at 106 (quoting 67 CONG. REC. 12,502 (1926)).
388. See id. at 122–23 (finding that the Act does not prohibit the FCC from allowing
broadcasters to refuse to sell ad space to groups that desire to spend on an issue).
389. Id. at 94, 97, 132.
390. LaVonda N. Reed-Huff, Offensive Political Speech from the 1970s to 2008: A
Broadcaster’s Moral Choice, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 241, 282–83
(2008).
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broadcast industry had a long history—particularly at the networks—of
rejecting all advocacy advertising prior to the 1980s.391
Television and radio have shifted radically. Too much money is at stake in
political advertising for stations to even consider rejecting many outside-group
political ads.392 Economically beleaguered stations and networks are no longer
squeamish about avoiding advocacy advertising.393 Although stations might
still reject some kinds of political advertising as a moral matter,394 the large
majority of commercial broadcasters and cable companies are likely to resist
foregoing significant financial benefits in response to arguably moral
objections. As commercial enterprises with profit-maximizing officers and
fiduciary duties to their shareholders, these entities will face commercial
imperative weighing heavily against moral scruples over395 harsh and arguably
misleading political-advocacy advertising.396
Short of a blanket rejection of all ads that might trigger expanded § 315
obligations, how could a broadcaster avoid rejecting some ads to which
equal opportunities obligations would attach in principle? As a practical
matter, a workable antidiscrimination rule in the context of non-candidate
political advertising must give stations significant discretion to achieve a rough
balance serving the public interest, rather than formal equality.397 A formal
incorporation of outside ads into § 315 would not permit the exercise of
broadcaster discretion once the station chose to air a third-party ad supporting
or opposing a candidate and thereby automatically triggered the statutory equal
opportunities requirement.398
391. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., 412 U.S. at 98–99 (describing CBS’s policy against
accepting controversial advocacy advertising).
392. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text (describing the recent increase in
independent groups’ political-ad spending levels).
393. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.
394. Reed-Huff, supra note 390, at 282–83.
395. See supra note 377 and accompanying text.
Admittedly, a Zapple-like
396. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text.
antidiscrimination rule could lead stations to avoid highly partisan ads by outside groups, and
thereby lead to an arguably unconstitutional chilling effect under the First Amendment. Indeed, it
might lead to a constitutional challenge to § 315 itself. Although Supreme Court cases such as
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1960), implicitly confirm the constitutionality
of the current version of § 315, query whether an interpretation that includes a quasi-equal
opportunities component might not increase the burden on stations with limited airtime and lead
to an overly conservative approach to the sale of airtime to outside groups. The limited right of
access under § 312(a)(7) could not offset such a chilling effect because of its limitation to federal
candidates. See supra note 221. In addition, if the lowest-unit-rate provisions of § 315(b) were
deemed applicable to the revived Zapple, then stations would doubtless complain about the
financial burdens imposed by an expanded equal-time rule. See supra note 221. This is another
reason not to call for formal incorporation.
397. Cf. Reed-Huff, supra note 390, at 282–83 (describing how broadcasters are “fiduciaries
of the public trust” that make decisions on advertising to serve the public interest).
398. This is, of course, assuming that opponents of a candidate or the candidate’s support
group or supporters of another candidate would seek equal opportunities for their messages.
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Reading Zapple as incorporated formally through § 315 would also likely
hamstring the FCC in any attempt to promote voluntary implementation of
private, self-regulatory measures to control offensive and misleading political
ads.399 Self-regulatory measures could include rejecting such ads, requiring
additional documentation of truth regarding claims made, or negotiating
changes in the ads.400 Stations may have some economic incentives to exercise
editorial control over outside-group ads or reject the most inaccurate and
misleading. They may have concerns about reputational harm from association
with excessively negative and false advertising, as commercial broadcasters
develop business reputations that could be tarnished by excessive association
with such fare.401 Although the principal object of voter discontent with
offensive and false attack ads is likely to be the speaker, it stands to reason that
station association with this kind of advertising would diminish the station’s
credibility as well. This is particularly true if the group responsible for the
attack ad does not itself have a clearly established reputation. In such
circumstances, viewers might be more likely to question the station’s decision
to air the ad rather than simply reacting to the speaker alone. Stations may also
have incentives to reduce potential litigation risk. In the past, the FCC has
taken the position that political advertising by supporters or opponents of
candidates does not receive the immunity from defamation claims that is
granted to candidates under § 315.402 If that is the rule, rational broadcasters

399. There is also an argument that assimilation of the Zapple rule into § 315 might entail the
application of the lowest-unit-rate discounted-time provision under § 315(b) where relevant. See
supra note 221 (discussing the lowest-unit-rate discount). However, the Zapple doctrine does not
require an extension of the lowest-unit-rate obligation. There are good reasons for requiring
airtime discounts for candidates themselves, so that they have the opportunity to address the
voting public directly. This rationale does not logically apply in the same way to outside groups
supporting or opposing the candidate. In any event, given the complexities in the way that
stations sell airtime and the extent to which they profit from political advertising, even the
extension of the lowest-unit-rate requirement to independent ads would not likely be deemed a
significant burden by broadcasters.
400. Cf. Reed-Huff, supra note 390, at 283–85 (discussing the roles and responsibilities of
broadcasters and the necessity of allowing broadcasters to blame the pros and cons of airing an
ad).
401. See Christina H. Burrow, Thomas M. Clyde & Michael D. Rothberg, Negative Issue
Advertisements: A Practical Matter, COMM. LAWYER, Summer 2004, at 7. Although the speaker
is likely to be the principal object of voter discontent with offensive, false attack ads, it is
reasonable to expect that association with such advertising would diminish the station’s
credibility, particularly if the group airing the ad does not have a clearly established reputation.
402. See, e.g., FCC Political Primer, 100 F.C.C.2d 1476, 1513 (1984) (citing Farmers Educ.
& Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959); Felix v. Westinghouse Radio
Station, 186 F.2d 1 (1950)); Use of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 24
F.C.C.2d 832, 874 (1970) (“Section 315 . . . is not a defense to an action for libel or slander
arising out of broadcasts by non-candidates speaking in behalf of another’s candidacy. Since
section 315 does not prohibit the licensee from censoring such a broadcast, the licensee is not
entitled to the protection of section 315.” (citing George F. Mahoney, 40 F.C.C. 336 (1962)));
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concerned about litigation risk would have clear incentives to involve their
legal departments in advertising review, to request more documentation of the
truth of claims made, and to negotiate revisions toning down falsehoods in
third-party advocacy ads. A strict application of equal opportunities under
§ 315 to such ads would significantly limit broadcaster choice and editorial
control.403
Even if the FCC can revive a Zapple-like non-discrimination obligation
under its ancillary authority, does Zapple provide enough insulation from the
potentially distorting effects of Citizens United? If one of the most worrisome
aspects of the decision is that it opened “the floodgates”404 to disproportionate
amounts of corporate money overwhelming the political process, then it is
unclear whether application of the quasi-equal opportunities doctrine could
realistically reduce the threat of the spectacular expense of political
campaigns.405 Because Zapple does not require broadcasters to subsidize the
speech of less well-funded supporters to help equalize the messages heard by
the audience, the practical effect of the doctrine in today’s environment of
dominating independent-ad coffers is uncertain.406
FCC, Use of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 31 Fed. Reg. 6660, 6671 (Fed.
Commc’ns Comm’n Apr. 27, 1966).
403. To be sure, § 315 contains a prohibition on censoring candidate messages, and the
Supreme Court affirmed broadcasters’ immunity against defamation actions concerning those
messages. WDAY, 360 U.S. at 529 (affirming broadcasters’ immunity against defamation actions
when they broadcast ads by candidates without censoring candidates’ messages). It is not
self-evident that the immunity against defamation is inapplicable in Zapple cases. Despite the
FCC’s previously stated view, the Supreme Court’s argument in Farmers Education &
Cooperative Union of American v. WDAY, Inc. could be read to apply to ads by supporters as well
as candidates. See id. at 529–30. If the FCC were to adopt an antidiscrimination provision
directly under the authority of § 315, courts might interpret the WDAY immunity as applicable
regardless of prior FCC precedent. Stations would be less concerned with defamation claims
against them for airing libelous independent political ads. Even so, of course, rational
broadcasters should be concerned about reputational harm. In any event, the Court’s articulated
concerns about the chilling effect of broadcaster censorship of candidate speech in WDAY are not
necessarily relevant to non-candidates’ speech, so courts considering the issue would not
necessarily adopt this expansive reading of WDAY.
404. See Reed-Huff, supra note 390, at 214 (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876,
968 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); see also John Eggerton, Obama Takes on Campaign-Ad
Ruling in State of the Union, BROADCASTING & CABLE (Jan. 27, 2010, 10:32 PM),
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/446345-Obama_Takes_on_Campaign_Ad_Ruling_in
_State_of_the_Union.php (quoting President Obama’s statement that “[l]ast week, the Supreme
Court reversed a century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special
interests—including foreign companies—to spend without limit in our elections” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Guthrie, supra note 137 (quoting Representative Chris Van Hollen,
stating that the decision “will open the floodgate, if left unchecked and unchallenged, to more and
more special interest money” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
405. See Jacobs, supra note 381, at 10 (quoting the comment that if there is high demand for
third-party ads, “it can be pretty expensive for independent expenditures and issue advocacy to go
in and do television advertising” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
406. Cf. Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C. 707, 708 (1970) (declining to require free rebuttal time).
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Regardless of the merits of proposals designed to reduce the effect of wealth
disparities in elections, currently no political will exists to require broadcasters
to subsidize ads by less well-funded groups.407 Moreover, evidence from the
2010 midterm election suggests that although an astronomical amount of
money was spent on television advertising in support of the candidates,
supporters of candidates from both parties were well funded.408 Additionally,
corporations are not alone in contributing to political advertising, with labor
unions taking an increased role.409 It is true, of course, that even if money
might not have been a significantly differentiating factor between the titanic
major players, minor party candidates and their supporters can be significantly
hobbled by having less of it.410 Applying the Zapple doctrine admittedly does
not address that problem.411 Nevertheless, there is sufficient benefit to
deterring partisanship to justify reviving the doctrine, even if some real,
unresolved problems remain in the political system.412
III. INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AND INSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
A. Why the FCC?
A focus on the FCC as a means to regulate campaign finance naturally raises
questions of institutional choice. Television, as the premier venue for political
advertising, is central to American political discourse,413 and the FCC is in a

407. Cf. id.
408. See The Money Behind Elections, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/big
picture/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2011).
409. Suzy Khimm, The Citizens United Effect, MOTHER JONES (June 7, 2010, 3:00 AM
PDT), http://motherjones.com/politics/2010/06/citizens-united-effect (“Just as predicted,
campaign ads that would previously have been illegal are now airing in key midterm election
races. But the players funding those ads aren’t the ones you might expect. It turns out that some
of the first groups to exploit Citizens United aren’t corporations, but labor unions.”). But see
Corcoran & Maher, supra note 346 (taking exception with “the implication that labor unions
benefited as much from the Citizens decision as corporations”).
410. Cf. Jacobs, supra note 381, at 10 (discussing the increased cost of political-advertising
airspace after Citizens United and its effect on the ability of less well-funded actors to buy spots).
411. See id. (reporting on the predicted spike in television ad costs due to third-party
involvements and how expensive ad space could harm candidates).
412. See supra Part II.C.
413. By television, I mean to refer to both broadcast and cable television. Broadcast
television is still the primary venue for political advertising. See Andrea Morabito, The Cable
Show 2011: Local TV Still ‘Nuclear Weapon’ of Election Ads, BROADCASTING & CABLE (June
15, 2011, 12:59 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/469757-The_Cable_Show_2011
_Local_TV_Still_Nuclear_Weapon_of_Election_Ads.php (observing the dominance of broadcast
television in election ad spending); see also Fowler & Ridout, supra note 78, at 2 (“[T]he best
evidence suggests that local cable does not represent a large population of the ads aired during
congressional campaigns.”). However, local cable has become more significant as a venue for
political ads recently. See WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 108–09.

168

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 61:97

natural position to consider how to regulate television.414 Although online
political advertising has become an important element in the campaign
landscape,415 it is overshadowed by broadcast and cable television, which are
far more central to political advertising as a whole.416
The obvious benefit of calling for an FCC-based administrative solution is
that it does not require congressional approval. Congress has already given the
FCC a broad mandate for executing and enforcing electronic-media
regulation.417 The statutory and regulatory tools for FCC intervention in this

414. See supra Part II.A. But see Yoo & Marston, supra note 25, at 4 (criticizing the political
expansion of FCC jurisdiction into regulation of political speech through MAP’s rulemaking
petition).
415. See Travis N. Ridout, Erika Franklin Fowler & John Branstetter, Political Advertising in
the 21st Century: The Rise of the YouTube Ad 13–17 (Aug. 23, 2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1642853; Kate Kaye, The State
of Online Political Advertising, YALE L. SCH., http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/ISP/Kate
_Kaye.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2011).
416. See Ridout, Fowler & Branstetter, supra note 415, at 14. Critics of FCC involvement
have also called the possibility of agency action a “grab for new jurisdiction [by] tired old New
Deal agency . . . approaching its eightieth birthday and . . . seeking new regulatory turf.” Yoo &
Marston, supra note 25, at 4. To the extent that comments like this are attempts to paint the FCC
as a self-interested regulatory agency arbitrarily involving itself into a debate to which it is
irrelevant, they forget the FCC’s role in regulating the medium that is still most central to political
advertising in the modern campaign. See supra Part II.A.
417. See 47 U.S.C. § 154 (2006). Of course, adding another administrative entity into the
mix may lead to institutional conflict, complexity, and confusion. The 1974 amendments to
FECA created the FEC and tasked it with overseeing the conduct of election campaigns and the
voting system. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,
§201(a), 88 Stat. 1263, 1272 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2006)). The FCC currently
cooperates with the FEC. E.g., Political Programming, FED. COMM. COMMISSION,
http://transition.fcc.gov/mb/policy/political/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (noting the FCC
compliance with “the requirement that the FCC compile, maintain, and provide to the public on
its website any information the Federal Election Commission may require to carry out Section
304(f) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended”); see also Compliance with
ELECTION
COMMISSION,
Laws
Outside
the
FEC’s
Jurisdiction,
FED.
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/compliance_nonfec.shtml#communications (last updated
2008) (providing direction to FCC and FTC regulations that cover certain political broadcast ads
and telephone communications). Will involvement of the FCC inappropriately undermine this
structure? With inconsistent approaches to funding disclosure, will the two agencies further
contribute to campaign-finance complexity and incoherence?
The fact that different
administrative agencies with different enabling statutes may simultaneously exercise jurisdiction
over the same phenomena does not necessarily require one to concede to the other. To the extent
that involvement of the FCC fills in limitations and gaps in the FEC’s rules—and to the degree
that FCC action can get around FEC dysfunction—the campaign system is likely to benefit.
Overlapping administrative regulation is fairly common. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 57a (2006)
(granting the FCC rulemaking authority to combat deceptive practices in communication), with
15 U.S.C. § 54 (authorizing the FTC to prevent deceptive practices that affect commerce). The
FCC and the FTC have overlapping jurisdiction in the area of deceptive practices and that overlap
does not appear to have resulted in significant policy incoherence. Id. There is no reason to
believe the situation would be different with the FEC.
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area are already in place.418 However, some critics challenge the legitimacy of
FCC action by arguing that it is improper for the agency to read its existing
precedents in a manner contrary to Congress’s rejection of the DISCLOSE
Act.419 This argument is not persuasive because the DISCLOSE Act included
provisions for more controversial campaign-disclosure reform.420
Furthermore, both Republicans and Democrats have traditionally agreed on the
desirability of disclosure in the election context.421 Moreover, interested
parties can participate in an FCC proceeding and voice their views, which
would generate much clearer signals to the FCC regarding desirable
regulations than can be gained from a complex congressional failure to act.422
Other opponents criticize possible FCC action as a Democratic tactic
designed to suppress effective Republican advertising.423 Indeed, Professors
John Yoo and David W. Marston describe all the disclosure-seeking responses
to Citizens United as having “a single goal: to stifle the First Amendment
speech rights of political opponents.”424 The fundamental problem with this
characterization is that the proposed disclosure rules would apply equally to all
political advertisers regardless of political-party affiliation.425
Of course, an expansive reading of § 317 and a revival of the Zapple
doctrine may not be consistent with the FCC’s current regulatory priorities.
The agency may choose not to wade into the post-Citizens United political
advertising controversy. Even advocates of disclosure within the FCC might
hesitate to act without some congressional support for fear of congressional
418. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
419. See John Eggerton, Rep. Walden Will Go ‘Nuclear’ If FCC Adopts MAP Petition,
BROADCASTING & CABLE (Apr. 1, 2011, 6:24 PM), http://www.broadcasting
cable.com/article/466160-Rep_Walden_Will_Go_Nuclear_If_FCC_Adopts_MAP_Petition.php
(noting that House Communications Subcommittee Chair Greg Walden saw the MAP petition “as
an end-around after Congress did not pass tougher on-air disclosure laws backed primarily by
Democrats”); see supra Part II.A (discussing the relevant regulatory provisions of the
Communications Act of 1934).
420. See supra note 183. The bill went much further than merely adding a donor-disclosure
provision and was controversial for reasons far beyond donor disclosure. GARRETT, WHITAKER
& LUNDER, supra note 181, at 6–8. That the bill did not reach consideration in the Senate says
little both about overall congressional will regarding donor disclosure and about how the FCC
should interpret its own policies adopted under different statutory schemes.
421. Noveck, supra note 297, at 75, 96 (“[I]ncreased reporting and disclosure of political
contributions has seen widespread support from across the political spectrum.”).
422. Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin & Evan Mendelson, Transparency and Public
Participation in the Federal Rulemaking Process: Recommendations for the New Administration,
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 9224, 926–27 (2009); see also Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where and
How of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 525
(1982) (discussing public participation leading to better development of policy).
423. See Yoo & Marston, supra note 25, at 2, 4 (“The FCC, of course, is an independent
regulatory agency, but Genachowski bundled more than $500,000 for Obama’s 2008 presidential
campaign and has visited the White House more than 80 times.”).
424. Id. at 2.
425. See id. at 4.
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retaliation.426 There is a clear risk that the agency may paralyze the MAP
initiative through inattention and delay.427 Forging ahead with such a
controversial change could certainly cost the FCC political capital, and there is
already pressure on the agency to stay out of the highly controversial area of
campaign finance.428 Representative Greg Walden, chairman of the House
Communications Subcommittee, explicitly warned the FCC that he would “go
‘nuclear’” if the FCC used its sponsorship-identification rules to require
disclosure of political-message sponsors in response to the MAP petition.429
Nonetheless, there is support at the FCC for requiring increased disclosure.
Commissioner Michael Copps has already publicly expressed his support,
stating that “[i]f some group called ‘Citizens for Spacious Skies and Amber
Waves of Grain’ is actually under-written by a chemical company that doesn’t
want to clean up a toxic dump, viewers, listeners and voters should know
this.”430 Commissioner Mignon Clyburn also expressed her support for
increases in political-ad disclosure requirements.431 Additionally, a recent
FCC staff report advocated a shift in the agency toward greater disclosure.432
Continuing attention to the issue might prompt new actors to support FCC
regulations increasing disclosure requirements. Regardless of the ultimate
outcome, it is clear that the FCC is an appropriate conduit for the realization of
Justice Kennedy’s vision of an effective marketplace of political information in
Citizens United.433
B. Beyond Disclosure: Whether the FCC Should Adopt Affirmative
Political-Programming Requirements
Critics of Citizens United who worry that wealthy advertisers will evade
disclosure, dominate political discourse, and skew electoral results are unlikely
to be satisfied with the procedural proposals thus far; however, they might look
to the FCC for more affirmative solutions. For example, Commissioner Copps
has called on the agency to adopt a public-value test, including “meaningful

426. See Barry R. Weingast, Regulation, Reregulation and Reregulation: The Political
Foundations of Agency Clientele Relationships, 44 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 152 (1981).
427. See Wyatt, supra note 226.
428. See, e.g., Yoo & Marston, supra note 25, at 4; Eggerton, supra note 419.
429. Eggerton, supra note 419.
430. Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps
on the Importance of Disclosure for Political Advertisements (Mar. 22, 2011), available at
http://www.fcc.gov
/document/copps-importance-disclosure-political-ads.
431. Wyatt, supra note 226.
432. WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 347–48. The Third Circuit’s recent rejection of a prior
FCC attempt to deregulate some of its ownership rules may also reduce administrative timidity.
Bill Carter, Court Overturns FCC Cross-Ownership Rule, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011, at B4.
Admittedly, the Third Circuit’s opinion rests on narrow grounds.
433. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010).
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commitments to news and public affairs programming,” to update the
licensing-renewal system for radio and television licensees.434
In keeping with that approach, the FCC might be tempted to adopt an
affirmative requirement for political programming on broadcast television akin
to the FCC’s current children’s educational television rules.435 If voters are
“civic slackers” who could benefit from additional political education,436 and if
the political education they are likely to receive from partisan, negative, and
veiled ads is likely to skew the voting system,437 then broadcasters arguably
should tap the extensive educational potential of the medium to improve
political discourse. Assuming that a flood of conflicting independent ads
unduly confounds the public, does—or can—station-sponsored political
programming enhance voters’ political information and serve as a
contextualizing counterweight to partisan advertising? Can the FCC intervene,
within the bounds of the First Amendment? Even if it is authorized to do so,
should it?
Many complain about the current picture of political programming on
television. They point to a marked decline in political programming on the
broadcast airwaves438 and disparage cable political programming as polarizing
434. Michael J. Copps, Comm’r, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Remarks at the Columbia
University School of Journalism: Getting Media Right: A Call to Action 4 (Dec. 2, 2010),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/getting-media-right-call-action-fcc-commissionermichael-j-copps-columbia-university-school; see also WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 292–93
(explaining Commissioner Copps’s proposal); Brian Stelter, A New Test Is Proposed in Licensing
Radio Ad TV, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2010, at B31.
435. See Copps, supra note 434, at 4. See generally Lili Levi, A “Pay or Play” Experiment
to Improve Children’s Educational Television, 62 FED. COM. L.J. 275 (2010) (discussing the
FCC’s children’s E/I (educational/informational) programming requirements).
436. See Sheff, supra note 123, at 150–51 (“One robust and persistent finding validates the
‘civic slacker’ view of the electorate. It is generally recognized in social science circles that
American voters tend not to be especially well informed . . . .”). But cf. James A. Gardner,
Anti-regulatory Absolutism in the Campaign Arena: Citizens United and the Implied Slippery
Slope, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 673, 702–04 (2011) (discussing how voters develop
coping strategies to address “overabundance” of information, including selectively ignoring
available information).
437. See supra Part I.B.
438. See, e.g., Broadcast Localism, 23 FCC Rcd. 1324, 1348–49 (2008). In its inquiry into
broadcast localism, the FCC reported that there was variation in the amount of political
programming aired on broadcast stations and “sharp disagreement among commentators as to the
broadcasters’ record in airing programming addressing political issues and the commission’s legal
authority in the area.” Id. at 1349. Recounting its previous observations that although “some
broadcasters have aired many hours of political programming and . . . several television networks
have provided free airtime to candidates for president in recent elections,” the FCC Localism
inquiry also referred to research indicating a decline in political programming. Id. at 1348.
Indeed, the FCC noted congressional testimony to the effect that “larger station group owners air
less local campaign news than smaller and midsized station group owners.” Id.; see also Seth
Grossman, Note, Creating Competitive and Informative Campaigns: A Comprehensive Approach
to “Free Air Time” for Political Candidates, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 351, 358 (2004)
(asserting both reduction in and limited, “horse-race” focus of television campaign coverage).
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infotainment.439 They argue that commercial broadcasters have not “cover[ed]
the political news to the fullest degree” as intended when Congress adopted
exemptions to the equal opportunities requirements of § 315 fifty years ago.440
Despite these limitations, as well as critics’ commendable concerns about voter
ignorance and disaffection, FCC adoption of “meaningful”441 programming
requirements for political coverage would be troubling and unwise.
An FCC-implemented affirmative political-programming requirement risks
government intervention into broadcaster speech without any clear evidence of
likely need or likely success.442 The rich media environment available today,
including the web and social media, provides voters with the degree of political
information they desire, in whatever customized form they choose.443 It is far
439. See, e.g., Kevin Koe et al., Hostile News: Partisan Use and Perceptions of Cable News
Programming, 58 J. COMM. 201–19 (2008); Lili Levi, A New Model for Media Criticism: Lessons
from the Schiavo Coverage, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 665, 686–96 (2007) and sources cited therein;
Ricchiuto, supra note 214, at 268; cf. Lauren Guggenheim, Nojin Kwak & Scott W. Campbell,
Nontraditional News Negativity: The Relationship of Entertaining Political News Use to Political
Cynicism and Mistrust, 23 INT’L J. PUB. OPINION RES. 287 (2011).
440. See Ricchiuto, supra note 214, at 268 (quoting 105 CONG. REC. 14,451 (1959)
(statement of Sen. Spessard Holland)). The decline in broadcast political programming has
occurred despite the FCC’s very liberal interpretations of the four exceptions to § 315 since the
1980s. Vandell, supra note 208, at 458–62. Starting with the FCC’s decision to classify the Phil
Donohue program as an exempt offering under § 315(a), the FCC has consistently expanded the
range of programming exempt from equal opportunities obligations. Id. at 459–62 & n.96;
accord Michael Damien Holcomb, Congressional Intent Rebuffed: The Federal Communications
Commission’s New Perspective on 47 U.S.C. § 315(A)(2), 34 SW. U. L. REV. 87, 88–89 (2004);
see also Telepictures Prod., Inc., 23 FCC Rcd. 7168, 7169 (2008) (declaring more recently that
the television program entitled TMZ, consisting of “entertainment news events,” should be
considered an exempt bona fide newscast); Angelides for Governor Campaign, 21 FCC Rcd.
11,919, 11,923 (2006) (finding the “news interview” segment of the Tonight Show with Jay Leno
to qualify as an exempt bona fide news interview). As the FCC explained, the news-interview
segments of the Tonight Show with Jay Leno, Oprah, Howard Stern, the Sally Jessy Raphael
Show, Jerry Springer, Politically Incorrect, and the 700 Club are now all considered exempt
programs. See id. at 19,922–27; Clay Calvert, What Is News?: The FCC and the New Battle Over
the Regulation of Video News Releases, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 361, 362 (2008). Some
have argued that this has opened the door to partisan licensee programming decisions with no
FCC oversight and has particularly hurt minority or unsuccessful candidates. See Akilah N.
Folami, Freeing the Press From Editorial Discretion and Hegemony in Bona Fide News: Why the
Revolution Must Be Televised, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 367, 368 (2011) (arguing that early
interpretations of § 315 exemptions led to narrow political discourse).
441. See Copps, supra note 434, at 4.
442. See Gardner, supra note 436, at 705–04; Daniel R. Ortiz, The Engaged and the Inert:
Theorizing Political Personality Under the First Amendment, 81 VA. L. REV. 1, 27–29 (1995)
(coining the term “civic slob”).
443. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Democratic Paradox of Campaign Finance Reform, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 893, 905 (1998); see also Gardner, supra note 436, at 702–09.
As for political junkies, arguably better and more immediately accessible information may be
available to them elsewhere—in newspapers, magazines, web sites, and social media on the
Internet. See WALDMAN, supra note 80, at 226. Although Americans are consuming more media
and have not abandoned traditional media, studies show fluctuation in the consumption of news.
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from clear that broadcast programming aired to satisfy FCC requirements
would provide any significant “value added” to what is already available in the
overall media marketplace, at least without an unacceptable degree of quality
oversight by the FCC. Whatever the constitutionality, practicability, and
wisdom of more indirect, incentive-oriented regulations designed to promote
more and better political programming on television, a traditional, mandated
programming requirement is a very bad idea.
IV. CONCLUSION
Campaign-finance-reform advocates decry the Roberts Court’s use of the
First Amendment to undercut attempts to level the electoral playing field.
Although the possibility of involving the FCC in a response to these
developments has received little notice, there is reason to believe that this
alternative may generate a moderate and realistic approach to mitigating some
of the troubling effects of the Court’s deregulatory campaign spending
jurisprudence.
Reaching out to the FCC is neither illegitimate nor
institutionally problematic.
The FCC should: 1) interpret the sponsorship-identification provision of the
Communications Act of 1934 to require disclosure of direct and indirect
donors to, and directors and principal officers of, groups purchasing political
airtime; and 2) adapt its moribund quasi-equal opportunities doctrine under
Zapple to the current political-advertising landscape in order to prohibit
broadcaster discrimination and partisanship in the sale of airtime to supporters
of political candidates. The FCC has the authority for both regulatory
initiatives: disclosure under its sponsorship-identification authority and an
anti-partisanship rule under its ancillary authority. Additionally, broadcasters
and cable systems could be induced to adopt ameliorative policies voluntarily.
Brand-enhancing rewards systems could be used to influence the private
adoption of enhanced disclosure rules. Similarly, if the FCC reaffirms its prior
view that the statutory immunity against defamation suits for candidate speech
does not apply to ads by supporters or opponents of candidates, then television
stations will have potentially significant economic incentives to reject or
negotiate edits in at least the most obviously false and misleading third-party
ads. There is nothing to prevent the FCC from reading its enabling statute and
precedents consistently with these proposals, and such a reading would likely
be deemed constitutional under the Roberts Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence.
Naturally, skeptics who fear § 317’s vulnerability to gaming and evasion,
who question the need for (and usefulness of) the Zapple doctrine, and who
doubt the ability of voluntary responses to curb the Citizens United effect, and
who despair of the television coverage of electoral politics today, might
Id. However, “news junkies have more ways of finding news . . . [,] everyone else has more ways
of avoiding it.” Id. at 227.
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recommend instead that the FCC adopt affirmative political-programming
rules to promote democracy. However, it would be misguided for the agency
to require political-programming minima from regulated television entities.
Instead of affirmative content control, FCC disclosure requirements and a
policy of overall non-discrimination in airtime sales for independent political
advertising are more likely to advance the goals of campaign-finance reform.

